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THE DREYFUS CASE



CAPTAIN ALFRED DREYFUS

THE DREYFUS CASE

by

ARMAND CHARPENTIER

Translated by

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GEOFFREY BLES

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CHAPTER I

THE SECRET SERVICE DEPARTMENT IN 1894.—ITS PRINCIPAL AGENTS: LAJOUX, CORNINGE, THE WOMAN BASTIAN, BRUCKER, GUÉNÉE, VAL CARLOS.—THE BORDEREAU.—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL D'ABOVILLE ATTRIBUTES IT TO CAPTAIN DREYFUS.—THE HANDWRITING EXPERTS: GOBERT, BERTILLON, PELLETIER, CHARAVAY, TEYSSONNIÈRES.—DREYFUS ARRESTED AND SENT TO THE CHERCHE-MIDI.—REVELATIONS OF *LA LIBRE PAROLE*.—PANIZZARDI'S TELEGRAM.—DREYFUS ORDERED TO APPEAR BEFORE A COURT-MARTIAL.

DURING the war of 1870 the French High Command discovered that the Prussians had at their disposal an elaborate system of espionage which was rendering them valuable service. Taking this lesson to heart, the French General Staff, as soon as the war was over, proceeded to reorganize the old Imperial Secret Service on an entirely new footing.

The department which thus came into being, known officially as the *Section de Statistique*, was affiliated to the 2nd Bureau of the General Staff. Its purpose was twofold: to discover spies, and to organize a system of counter-espionage to mislead them. In 1893 the head of this department was Colonel Sandherr. Working under him were Lieutenant-Colonel Cordier, Commandant Henry, Captain Lauth, and Gribelin, the registrar.

These officers were aware that the German Military attaché in Paris, Colonel Schwartzkoppen, had set up a secret service department in his office at the German Embassy; that the Italian attaché, Colonel Panizzardi, was co-operating with him, and that each acquainted the other with the contents of whatever documents they might come across. The Germans had two other secret service centres, one at Brussels, the other at Strassburg.

To counteract these activities, Colonel Sandherr had posted one of his agents, Lajoux by name, in Brussels.

Lajoux, having become acquainted with a German spy called Richard Cuers, pretended to be bribed over by the latter, and handed to him sundry false documents which his department from time to time supplied. Another agent, Corninge, played off a similar trick on Panizzardi, the Italian military attaché. In order to keep Lajoux and Corninge well supplied, the officers attached to the 2nd Bureau fabricated a number of "faked" documents—schedules, time-tables, and mobilization schemes—keeping a careful record of them, so that they should be consistent with each other.

Sandherr also contrived to enlist the services of a charwoman employed at the German Embassy, who occasionally did duty for the concierge in the porter's lodge. This woman, whose name was Bastian, was in the good graces of the Ambassador, Count von Munster. She had free access to all the rooms, and used to pick up the fragments of any letters, documents, or memoranda she might come across in the waste-paper baskets and fireplaces of the establishment. When she had collected a goodish number, she put her booty into a paper bag and handed it to a secret service agent named Brucker, and Brucker took it to Major Henry. The 2nd Bureau also had a man called Guénée on its staff. Guénée had formerly been in the police, and the fashionable drinking-bars were now the principal scene of his activities.

All these agents, seeing the kind of work on which they were engaged, were of doubtful moral character. Thus, a female associate of Brucker's called Forêt, who went by the name of Millescamps, once told General Loizillon, Mercier's predecessor at the War Office, that her lover had confessed to her that, if the Germans would pay him 50,000 francs, he would work for them. Brucker, in revenge, accused his mistress of stealing some of the papers he had got together, and of handing them to Schwartzkoppen. The woman was arrested and sentenced to five years' imprisonment on January 4, 1894.

After that, Henry told the woman Bastian to bring her papers direct to him. In order not to implicate her, in case she was shadowed, Henry went at nightfall to some lonely spot or other, to the Square Sainte-Clotilde, or sometimes into the church itself, and there Bastian would come and hand him her papers. Brucker, lowered in his self-esteem, did not like this arrangement at all, and complained about it to Lieutenant-Colonel Cordier, at the same time attempting, by a great display of zeal, to get back into favour through some big *coup*.

In addition to these people, the *Section de Statistique* employed a number of occasional spies drawn from every grade of society. Among these latter was an ex-Spanish military attaché, the Marquis del Val Carlos. Once a considerable figure in society, he still continued to live in style, no one knew how. In the diplomatic world, and still more in gambling circles, he was a familiar figure, and whatever rumours came to his ears he duly reported, either to Guénée or to Henry. His services, at first *gratis*, were subsequently rewarded with a monthly subsidy.

After a time the attachés, civil and military, of the German Embassy took a suite of rooms in a house opposite their official quarters, where they used to repair for rest and diversion. The French Secret Service took the concierge of this establishment into their pay, rented the flat above, and subsequently had microphones installed in the fireplaces, so that their agents should overhear what the attachés were talking about in the rooms below.

Such, in broad outline, was the French system of espionage and counter-espionage. In the years prior to 1894 the Secret Service Department had succeeded in detecting a certain number of treasonable activities. Thomas, the pyrotechnician at Bourges; Boutonnet, the librarian at the church of Saint Thomas Aquinas; Greiner, a clerk at the Admiralty, had all been arrested and sentenced.

In 1892 the General Staff, presided over by General de

Miribel, became aware that leakages were taking place in the case of important plans and maps of fortifications. In December 1893 a letter was intercepted. It came from Schwartzkoppen, who was on leave in Berlin, and he wrote to his *locum tenens* saying he would no doubt receive a visit from an individual he called "the man of the Meuse fortifications," and telling him to pay the fellow the sum of 300 francs if he brought the remaining Meuse plans, the plans of Toul, and various other drawings.

Colonel Sandherr passed on this letter to General Mercier, who had just been appointed Minister for War (December 3, 1893), in order to show him that the Germans were still carrying on a system of espionage, despite the Ambassador's undertakings to the contrary. After the Boutonnet affair, Count von Munster had in fact promised the French Government that the military attachés in his Embassy should from that time forth abandon all trafficking with French officers or civil servants. The letter about "the man of the Meuse fortifications" proved that this was anything but the case. Either Count von Munster had failed to keep his word or else he was ignorant of the activities of his attachés, who were in direct communication with the headquarters staff in Berlin.

Be that as it may, General Mercier showed the letter to M. Casimir-Perier, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, requesting him again to approach Count von Munster, with a view to putting an end, once for all, to these acts of espionage.

But besides this letter various earlier documents had been intercepted, among them one bearing the pseudonymous signature *Alexandrine*. It ran as follows:

"I was very sorry not to see you before I left. Anyhow, I shall be back again in a week. With this, I am sending you a dozen plans of the Nice fortifications which that swine D—— (*ce canaille de D——*) has sent me for you. I told him that you didn't intend to have anything

more to do with him. He said there must be some misunderstanding, and that he was anxious to do everything in his power to give you satisfaction. He said he was pig-headed, but that you didn't bear him any grudge. I told him he was mad, and that I did not think you'd have anything more to do with him."

The two military attachés, Schwartzkoppen and Panizzardi, had for some time been in the habit of corresponding under the same pseudonym, which, however, they varied from time to time. The 2nd Bureau therefore applied to the Foreign Office to find out in whose handwriting this document was. Seeing that it had to do with Nice, and that consequently it affected Italy, the logical conclusion seemed to be that it had been sent to Panizzardi by his colleague Schwartzkoppen. However, the Quai d'Orsay said it came from the Italian attaché.

As this document plays some considerable part in what follows, it may be mentioned here that it bore no date. When it came into the possession of the War Office, the Statistical Department had not yet made it a rule to pencil the date of receipt on documents of this nature. When, therefore, this letter, signed *Alexandrine*, was photographed in October 1894, no note of the date appeared upon it.

Later on Lieutenant-Colonel Cordier swore he had seen it as far back as 1892. It purported to be an answer from Schwartzkoppen to a request from Panizzardi for plans of the Nice fortifications. Captain Lauth affirmed that he had pieced the document together sometime during the closing weeks of 1893; at all events before 1894.

When this letter was seized, it seemed apparent that the spy in question, "*ce canaille de D—*", could not be an officer, and that for two reasons. In the first place, Schwartzkoppen and Panizzardi were paying only ten or twenty francs for these documents. One could hardly

imagine an officer playing the traitor for so paltry a sum as that. Secondly, if it had been an officer, the military attachés would not have rejected his services in so cavalier a manner.

For these reasons the 2nd Bureau confined its investigations to the humbler civil servants. A man named Dubois, who was mentioned in one of Panizzardi's letters, and who had let the Italian Embassy have some papers of no importance, was kept under observation. They also kept an eye on Duchet, a junior clerk. But neither of these two lines of inquiry led to any result. Nor was it likely that they would, because the military attachés had long been in the habit of disguising the names of the spies in their employ. In all likelihood the name of the spy who had handed over the twelve plans of the Nice defences began with any letter of the alphabet except D.

But whoever "that swine D——" who wrote the letter may have been, one thing was certain, and that was that important plans had been given away. Somewhere about the same date, December 25, 1893, Schwartzkoppen had received this laconic telegram from Berlin: "*Chose aucun signe d'État Major*" ("What's-his-name no sign from Headquarters"). The following month, January 1894, the woman Bastian came to the 1st Bureau with some torn pieces of a letter written in pencil and reading as follows:

"Doubt . . . proof. . . . Rank of officer . . . dangerous position for me, with a French officer . . . not to carry on negotiations personally . . . to bring what there is . . . absolute . . . Information Bureau . . . no report . . . bodies of troops . . . important only . . . coming from the Government office . . . already somewhere else."

What could be the meaning of this scrap of paper, which looked like the draft of a reply to the telegram of December 25th? One thing certainly, and that was that the spy here involved was somebody more important than the "man

of the Meuse fortifications," or "that swine D——." This time it was an officer, or someone palming himself off as such, someone from whom Schwartzkoppen had received offers. But here again inquiry bore no fruit.

In this same month of January the Intelligence Department came into possession of a letter from Panizzardi to Schwartzkoppen, in which the following passage occurred :

"I have written again to Davignon, and therefore I beg that if you have to go into this matter again with your friend, you will do so privately, so that Davignon shall know nothing about it. In any case he wouldn't answer, for it would never do for one attaché to concern himself with the affairs of another."

When this letter reached the Bureau, no one attached any importance to it. Lieutenant-Colonel Davignon was the second-in-command at the 2nd Bureau, the head of which was Colonel de Sancy. Their duties consisted in receiving foreign officers and in complying with their requests as far as possible. Both alike performed their duties with much affability. It was then considered that Panizzardi's letter, which will reappear in the trial as "the Davignon letter," had reference to a request for information on some matter of trifling importance.

In March 1894 the Marquis del Val Carlos would appear to have informed the agent Guénée that Schwartzkoppen and Panizzardi had gone into partnership, and to have advised him to warn Commandant Henry "that there was need to keep a sharper look-out than ever at the War Office." He is reported to have added :

"It transpires from the last talk I had with them that they have someone in the offices of the General Staff who keeps them admirably informed. See what Guénée knows; if I knew the name I would tell it you."

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A month later Val Carlos seems to have been more precise: "You have one or more wolves in your fold. Keep a sharp look-out."

Such was the chief documentary evidence bearing on treason that came into the hands of the *Section de Statistique* from 1892 to 1894. It was now that the "Affaire Dreyfus" dawned on the horizon.

On September 24, 1894, Commandant Henry arrived at his office at an early hour. He called Gribelin, the registrar, and said: "Just look what I've had handed to me! This is a fine state of things! I hope now we shall catch the fellow." A few minutes later he was displaying his treasure to two other officers, Captains Lauth and Matton.

What Henry had in his hand was a piece of tracing paper of a yellowish tint, ruled with little squares about a tenth of an inch across. It had been torn into three or four pieces, but had been stuck together again, and, according to the witnesses who saw it at the time, it was "absolutely dry."

Henry declared that this document had been contained in a parcel of papers which had been brought him by the woman Bastian. The letter, written on both sides of the paper, read as follows:

"Though I have not heard that you want to see me, I send you, nevertheless, some interesting information:

1. A note on the hydraulic brake 120, and the manner in which this has answered its test.
2. A note on covering troops (some changes will be introduced by the new scheme).
3. A note on a modification in artillery formations.
4. A note relating to Madagascar.
5. The proposed manual for field-artillery (March 14, 1894).

"This last-mentioned document is extremely difficult to obtain, and I can only have the use of it for a very few days. The War Office have distributed a limited

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number among the various corps, and these corps are responsible for them. Every officer to whom a copy has been allotted will be required to surrender it after the manœuvres.

"If, therefore, you will take what you want from it and then hold it at my disposal, I will call and take it, unless you would rather I had it transcribed *in extenso* and sent you a copy.

"I am just off to manœuvres."

When this letter, which was henceforth known as the *bordereau* (or list), was put into his hands, General Mercier was very deeply incensed. Although he did not know the precise value of the documents enumerated, since they had not been recovered, he had no doubt that the author of this document belonged to the War Office and was an officer. That opinion was shared by the officers of the 2nd Bureau.

Inquiries were immediately set on foot and, since it was generally held that the traitor must belong to some Government Office, the investigations were limited to the offices of the administrative departments. The thing was to identify the handwriting. As early as September 26th General Renouard, who, in the absence of General de Boisdeffre, was Acting Chief of Staff, submitted the *bordereau* to the heads of the four offices of the General Staff. They all declared that the writing suggested nothing to them. Colonel Sandherr then had the document photographed by one of his agents, a man named Toms. Proofs were sent round to the heads of the various departments. Everyone tried his hardest to solve the mystery, the more so as no one wanted to be suspected of negligence. General Deloye, Director of Artillery, had numerous specimens of handwriting compared, but no result was forthcoming.

The *bordereau* was on the point of being filed away when, on Friday, October 5th, Lieutenant-Colonel d'Aboville, who had just succeeded Colonel Roget as deputy-head of the Fourth Bureau of the General Staff, returned from leave.

He knew nothing of what had been happening. His superior, Colonel Fabre, made him acquainted with the facts. After reading through the *bordereau*, d'Aboville declared that its author must certainly be a cadet on the General Staff belonging to the Artillery. "If," he added, "I had the job of finding him, I think I could easily do so." Then he explained his line of investigation.

The *bordereau* referred to "a memorandum on the hydraulic brake of the 120." Therefore the author of it must be an artilleryman and very well informed, for at Bourges such details were kept a strict secret.

The traitor was certainly in touch with the following: the Third Bureau, since he was in possession of the new manual on artillery fire; the First Bureau, since he spoke of the new field formations; the Second and Third, because of the memorandum on Madagascar; and with the Third, again, because of his reference to "covering troops," etc.

Now, the only people who pass through all these bureaux are the Staff College probationers. It followed, therefore, that the traitor was a probationer belonging to the Artillery. This being established, Fabre and d'Aboville took the list of probation officers on the General Staff. Their eyes lighted on the name of Captain Dreyfus. At the same time this difficulty confronted them. The *bordereau* concludes with the words: "I am just off to manœuvres." Now Dreyfus did *not* attend the manœuvres. He could not, for a circular, dated May 17th, had ordered that the probationers on the General Staff, instead of going to the manœuvres, were to put in three months with an infantry regiment.

That completely upset d'Aboville's argument. But Fabre turned the thing over in his mind and got round the difficulty. Might not the reference be to a tour of the General Staff in the Eastern District, which had taken place in the preceding June, and in which Dreyfus had taken part? D'Aboville jumped at this explanation.

Thus reassured, the two officers turned their attention to comparing handwritings, and noted a striking similarity

between Captain Dreyfus's writing and the writing on the *bordereau*; and there is no doubt that there are points of resemblance between them. That was the terrible fatality that overshadowed the affair from the very beginning. From that moment the two officers ceased to have any doubts about the matter, and they forthwith acquainted their superiors, Generals Gonse and de Boisdeffre, with the result of their investigations.

Gonse immediately sent for Colonels Sandherr, Lefort, and Boucher, the respective heads of the three General Staff departments. These officers, having compared specimens of Dreyfus's handwriting with the *bordereau*, expressed their agreement with Fabre and d'Aboville. De Boisdeffre, who had been unable to be present at the consultation, was advised of the result. He immediately informed General Mercier.

Although these officers agreed as to the similarity between the two handwritings, they thought it better to have an authoritative opinion. Gonse called in Commandant du Paty de Clam, who belonged to the 3rd Bureau of the General Staff, and was reported to be something of a handwriting expert. Gonse put all the papers before him and asked him whether, in his view, they all emanated from the same person. After a rapid examination, du Paty replied in the affirmative. When, however, he was told what was at stake, namely that it made out Dreyfus to be a traitor, he asked them to let him examine the papers more attentively.

Next day, October 7th, he sent a note to Gonse which concluded with these words, "On the whole, in spite of certain dissimilarities, there is sufficient resemblance between the two writings to justify the calling in of a professional expert."

On October 9th General Mercier attended a Meeting of the Cabinet and asked the Minister of Justice, M. Guérin, to give him the name of a professional handwriting expert. His colleague mentioned M. Gobert, who was employed in

that capacity by the Banque de France. The following day, Mercier advised the President of the Republic, M. Casimir Perier,* that a letter emanating from an officer on the General Staff—he mentioned no name—had been seized at the German Embassy, that there seemed to be no doubt about its being an act of treason, but that, all the same, the documents handed over were apparently of no great importance.

From the Élysée, Mercier went on to see the Premier, Charles Dupuy, who decided that before making the matter known to the Council as a whole it should be put before a small committee of four, consisting of the four Ministers more particularly concerned: the Premier, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, and the Minister for War. They met at the Home Office on Thursday, October 11th. Mercier outlined the circumstances, making no mention of Dreyfus. He then showed them the *bordereau*, and asked them to advise him as to how he should act.

Hanotaux, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, said that if there was no evidence beyond the *bordereau* and amateur handwriting experts, it seemed to him impossible to institute proceedings. Dupuy and Guérin would not commit themselves. In the end, Hanotaux got Mercier to promise that, unless he discovered more convincing evidence against the incriminated officer, no proceedings should follow. It was further decided that facilities should be given to the Minister of War to carry out a search at the quarters of the officer under suspicion.

As soon as he got back to his office, Mercier, instead of arranging for the domiciliary visit as agreed, gave orders that steps should be taken to place Dreyfus under arrest. Then, as he was obliged to accompany de Boisdeffre to the manœuvres at Limoges and Amiens, and would thus be away for some days, he directed that Gobert, the handwriting expert, should be called in, and Gonse showed him

* Elected President of the Republic June 27, 1894, after Carnot's assassination.

the *bordereau* and a few specimens of Dreyfus's writing, unsigned. Gobert asked if they could not have a photograph of the *bordereau* taken at the War Office. Gonse said that was impossible, because all Paris would know about the *bordereau* the next day. That was an odd remark, seeing that the *bordereau* had been photographed the week before and copies sent out to the heads of the various bureaux of the General Staff.

Gobert then explained that a photograph was absolutely necessary, and inquired whether it could not be taken at the Prefecture of Police by Alphonse Bertillon, head of the criminal identification department. To this Gonse agreed.

The same day Mercier requested M. Cochefort, *Commissaire aux Délégations*, to come and see him at his office. When he had given him an account of the matter, mentioning Dreyfus by name, he inquired what procedure would have to be followed in the event—the probable event—of an arrest. He then put him in touch with Sandherr, Henry, and du Paty de Clam. These latter told Cochefort that lengthy investigations had been carried out, that there were plenty of proofs, and that, over and above the *bordereau*, there was another paper on which the name of Dreyfus had been written by a foreign spy.

On Saturday, October 13th, Gobert presented his report to General Gonse. He maintained that the writing on the *bordereau* and that of the incriminated person were of "the same graphological type." He added, however, that "a detailed analysis showed, notwithstanding some significant points of resemblance, differences both numerous and important which could not be ignored." He said that the writing on the *bordereau* was "natural, normal, and very rapid," which ruled out the hypothesis that the writer might have tried to disguise his hand. He concluded thus: "The anonymous letter might be from someone other than the person suspected."

Gonse did not argue the point; he merely informed Gobert that the arrest of the suspect had been decided upon.

The same day, the various specimens of handwriting were placed in the hands of Bertillon, who—although not a handwriting expert—agreed to undertake the task assigned to him. That very evening he submitted his report. He said that he had been greatly struck by numerous coincidences, particularly by the absolutely abnormal, and consequently very conspicuous, formation of many of the letters. One difference between the *bordereau* and the documents which he had compared with it particularly impressed him, and that was that the double “s” was written in the same manner, but in inverted order, in the *bordereau* and in the authentic examples of Dreyfus’s handwriting; and so he wondered how it came about that “the writer, who was clearly a person of intelligence, could have written so incriminating a letter with scarcely any attempt to disguise his handwriting.” “If,” he said in conclusion, “we dismiss the hypothesis of a deliberate forgery, it seems evident that one and the same person wrote the incriminating document and the various specimens submitted to us for comparison with it.”

Before ever Bertillon had handed in his report, General Gonse put his signature to a letter requesting Dreyfus to present himself at the War Office at 9 a.m. on Monday, October 15th. Mercier, who got back to Paris on the night of the 13th, was informed of the measures that had been decided upon in his absence. He approved them, and also signed an order whereby du Paty was authorized, as an officer of the judicial police, to make the necessary preparations for proceeding against Dreyfus on a charge of High Treason.

On Monday, October 15, 1894, Captain Dreyfus made his way to the War Office. He was wearing civilian clothes in accordance with instructions. Major Picquart, to whom he presented himself, conducted him into the office of General de Boisdeffre, where he also found Major du Paty de Clam, and, at the other end of the room, three other men: Gribelin, the registrar, Cochefort, and his secretary.

Du Paty asked Dreyfus to fill up a statement of personal details regarding himself. Then, pretending that he had just cut his thumb, he requested him to write a letter which he had to present to General de Boisdeffre for signature. Dreyfus complied. Du Paty then seated himself beside him, and in a low voice dictated as follows:

"As it is of great importance to me to regain immediate possession of the documents which I handed to you before my departure for manœuvres, I beg you to send them to me with all dispatch by the bearer of this letter, who is a person of trust.

"I would remind you that the documents in question are, (1) A memorandum on the hydraulic control of the 120 gun, and the way in which——"

At this point du Paty stopped short. "What is the matter with you, Captain?" he hissed. "You are trembling! . . ."

"Not at all," replied Dreyfus, "but my fingers are cold,"* and he waited for the other to continue.

"Attend to what you are doing," said du Paty, "it is a serious matter." Then he went on to dictate:

" . . . it worked at the manœuvres."

(2) A memorandum on covering troops.

(3) A memorandum on Madagascar."

Although the writing was firm and regular, du Paty rose and, placing his hand on Dreyfus's shoulder, shouted in a voice of thunder:

"Captain Dreyfus, I arrest you in the name of the Law. You are charged with the crime of High Treason."

Dreyfus rose, vehemently protested against this charge, loudly declared his innocence, and flew into a rage. When the torrent of words had subsided, the Commandant read over to him article 76 of the Code, which concerns acts of treason. And as he read he uncovered a revolver which lay on the table concealed under a pile of papers. Dreyfus

* From the records of the Meteorological Department it appears that the thermometer registered 41° that morning in Paris.

saw this, and exclaimed, "I am innocent. Kill me if you like."

"It is not for us to do this act of justice," answered du Paty, "but for you."

"I shall not," answered Dreyfus, "I am innocent. I will live in order to prove my innocence."

At that moment Cochefort and his secretary rushed forward and seized Dreyfus in order to search him. The Captain offered no resistance. "Here are my keys," he said. "Take them. Examine everything in my house; I am innocent." He then protested that he had never had anything to do with any foreign agent, he was well off, he had a wife and children, he was fond of his profession as an officer, he was the victim of an abominable mistake, and demanded to be told what he was accused of.

Du Paty told him that he was charged with High Treason; but he did not show him the *bordereau*; he did not even read it over to him. On the contrary, he tried to mystify him by alleging that his arrest was brought about by the seizure of a variety of documents. Cochefort urged him to confess, and asked him whether he had not entrusted some military documents to a woman. Dreyfus swore he had never been guilty of any such indiscretion. "If," he went on, "the conduct ascribed to me were true, I should be a contemptible scoundrel. . . . I mean to live, to establish my innocence."

Du Paty sent for Commandant Henry, and said, "It merely remains for you to conduct Captain Dreyfus to the Cherche-Midi."

The cell allotted to the accused had been chosen that same morning by Lieutenant-Colonel d'Aboville, who handed to Commandant Forzinetti, the prison governor, the committal order signed by General Mercier. This document set forth that Dreyfus was to be kept in the strictest confinement, and that he was to have neither pen nor ink, paper nor books. The warrant further stated that General Saussier, Military Governor of Paris, was not to know of

Dreyfus's incarceration. D'Aboville also warned Forzinetti to beware of a move by influential Jews.

About midday Dreyfus arrived in a cab, accompanied by Henry and a police officer. Henry handed Forzinetti the committal order, dated the previous day and signed by Mercier.

At the same hour du Paty de Clam went to Dreyfus's home, accompanied by Cochefort and Gribelin. Madame Dreyfus received them, and du Paty de Clam at once began: "Madame, I have a very sad duty to perform."

"My husband is dead?"

"No; worse than that."

Not understanding, Madame Dreyfus went on, still dwelling on her first idea,

"He hasn't been thrown from his horse?"

"No, Madame, he is in prison."

The unhappy woman besieged him with questions, but he refused to give her the slightest information. Madame Dreyfus, who had one of her two children ill, insisted on informing her husband's brothers, as was her duty. Du Paty objected. "One word, one single word from you would ruin him for ever. The only way to save him is to keep silence."

Madame Dreyfus acquiesced and gave her word, protesting all the time that her husband had done no wrong and could only be the victim of some mistake. Du Paty then proceeded to search the flat. He unlocked cabinets, ransacked drawers, and took possession of all the papers, which he handed to Cochefort. He then demanded to see a statement of the Captain's financial position. The expenditure was normal. Dreyfus's private income,* derived from

* Alfred Dreyfus was born at Mulhouse on October 1, 1859. After the Franco-Prussian War his father chose French nationality and came to Paris. In 1878 Dreyfus entered the École Polytechnique, which he left in 1880 to go to the École de Fontainebleau. On October 1, 1882, he was appointed Lieutenant in the 31st regiment of artillery at Le Mans, whence he was transferred, in 1883, to the 1st cavalry division

a capital of 400,000 francs, was invested in a factory at Mulhouse (Mulhausen), which was under the management of one of his brothers.

When the search was completed, du Paty and his companions departed, carrying off the books and papers they had seized to the War Office. The books were technical works, maps, plans, etc., the papers chiefly manuscript notes connected with his military duties. Du Paty had hoped to find some thin writing-paper, water-marked and ruled in squares, similar to that on which the *bordereau* was written. He was disappointed. A search carried out subsequently, first by Cochefort and next by Bertillon, at Dreyfus's relatives' as well as at the principal stationers', was also barren of result. A few wholesalers only had paper at all resembling it, but it was not water-marked like the *bordereau*. As a matter of fact, these searches had not elicited a single thing which could be regarded as furnishing any evidence of guilt.

Once alone in his cell, Dreyfus, who had hitherto maintained a brave front before his accusers, gave way to grief and wept like a child. This monstrous accusation, crashing so cruelly upon his life, which till now had been happy and successful; the atmosphere of uncertainty and bewilderment in which he was compelled to remain; the abrupt separation from his wife and children; all these dramatic stage effects of mystery, in which the business was conducted, put him in a state of mind bordering on frenzy. When an hour later

stationed in Paris. On September 12th he was appointed Captain in the 21st regiment of artillery and detailed as adjutant at the School of Military Pyrotechnics, Bourges.

On April 20, 1890, he entered the École Supérieure de la Guerre, and left in 1892 with the mark "very good" to his credit. This won him an appointment as probationer on the Army Headquarters' Staff on January 1, 1893. On April 21, 1890, Dreyfus had married Mlle Lucie Hadamard, to whom he had been engaged for several months, and by whom he had two children. His share of his father's estate, his wife's dowry, and his own pay brought him in an annual income of some 30,000 francs.

Forzinetti came to see him, the prisoner begged to be furnished with the wherewithal to write a letter to the Minister. Moved as he was by the man's distress, and instinctively divining his innocence, Forzinetti was obliged to answer that he had been specifically forbidden to let him have paper, ink, pens, or books.

For three days Dreyfus was left alone, seeing no other faces than those of his keepers, his hours, whether waking or sleeping, one long and hideous nightmare. On the third day he was in a raging fever, and haunted by hallucinations. It was then that du Paty came again, as night was falling, to continue his interrogations. His plan was to burst into the cell with an electric torch, and suddenly to flash a light on the prisoner's countenance. Commandant Forzinetti told him that he had no such torch, and that, anyhow, he would not be a party to that kind of experiment.

Du Paty, who was accompanied by Gribelin, the registrar, ordered Dreyfus to write. He dictated some ten passages or so, each bringing in the principal words of the *bordereau*, and he made the prisoner adopt all manner of different positions, now seated, now standing up, now with a glove on, now with it off, etc. Then he told Dreyfus that the people at the War Office knew for certain that documents, which could only emanate from an officer on the Staff, had reached the hands of an agent of a foreign Power. He asked him several more questions, and then, by the light of a candle, showed him a piece of paper with the photographic reproduction of a sentence in the *bordereau*. "Je vais partir en manœuvres"—"I am just off to manœuvres." He made him write each word separately, then two, three, and four words, one after the other, and finished up with the whole sentence. After which he held up before him the piece of the photograph, and said, "Do you recognize your writing?" "That is not my writing," answered Dreyfus, adding, "Take me to Headquarters. I may find out there." Du Paty and Gribelin laughed ironically. Dreyfus had another look at the paper. "It seems to me," he said, hesitatingly, "that this

writing has a faint resemblance to Captain Brault's, but," he added, "I could not swear to it."

Du Paty insisted, and affirmed that the "experts" had established the identity of his writing with that of the document, a line of which he had just been shown. Dreyfus again protested, repeating that that line had not been written by him and that, for the rest, either the experts had made a mistake or else they had based their judgment on documents fabricated with words detached from his writings.

Similar examinations took place on October 20th, 22nd, and 24th. The tests varied. Once du Paty had cut up a photograph of the *bordereau* into ten pieces, from each of which he had cut out words or portions of words, e.g. "quelques modifica . . ." "Madagascar," etc., and thrust them under Dreyfus's eyes. On another occasion he had photographs taken of some of the Captain's letters and cut them up into small pieces. These he put into his *képi*, together with pieces of the *bordereau*. He would then pick one out at random and ask Dreyfus if it was his writing. Dreyfus never once made the slightest mistake.

After eleven days of complete solitude, without a book, without a visit, save from Forzinetti who, feeling that he was innocent, did his best to console him, Dreyfus, at breaking-point, implored du Paty to show him the proofs which the General Staff had in its possession, and which he (du Paty) had said were overwhelming. Silence was the sole reply.

When du Paty did not go to examine Dreyfus, he went and cross-questioned his wife. Madame Dreyfus begged him to allow her to write to her husband, even if it had to be in the presence of witnesses. Du Paty refused, affirming his profound conviction of Dreyfus's guilt, and adding that he had absolute proof of it in his pocket. All the time, he commanded her to keep silence, going to the length of saying, "A single word, and it means war."

The report of the expert Gobert was all in favour of Dreyfus. Bertillon's was very vague. Du Paty therefore

asked the latter for another report, but this time he told him Dreyfus's name, and said that his guilt was certain.

Being thus convinced in advance of the prisoner's guilt, Bertillon's task, as he conceived it, was merely to demonstrate that guilt. Having proclaimed the resemblance between the handwritings, he went on to express his astonishment that the traitor had not attempted any disguise, such as writing backwards, or writing with his left hand, or with a glove on. And why this peculiar thin paper, so out of the common that you could not find it in any shop? Adopting the *reductio ad absurdum* argument, he concluded that Dreyfus used his own ordinary handwriting in the hope of conveying the impression that no traitor in his senses would ever be likely to do such a thing. As for the thin paper, that was used in order to suggest that the letters were traced. And if some of the letters on the *bordereau* differed in character from the writing in the letters, that, too, was merely Dreyfus's cunning. The *bordereau* was an example of "auto-forgery."

In view of the definitely conclusive nature of this report, Mercier requested Guérin, the Minister of Justice, to give him the names of three qualified experts. Lépine, Prefect of Police, to whom this request was communicated, mentioned MM. Charavay, Pelletier, and Teyssonnières, who all undertook to act. The first was an authority on ancient manuscripts; the second was employed in an editorial capacity at the Académie des Beaux-Arts; the third, an ex-employee in the Public Works department, had been had up on a charge of insubordination before the Tribunal of the Seine, which, a few days later, ordered his dismissal from the service.

The experts worked on photographs of the *bordereau* and specimens of Dreyfus's writing.

Pelletier was the first to present his report. It was absolutely negative. He refused to attribute the *bordereau* to either one or the other of the persons suspected.

Teyssonnières took the same line as Bertillon, with whom he had been in conference.

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Charavay, who was not quite so sure, concluded nevertheless, "that the incriminating document was in the same hand as the others." At the same time, he made the reservation that Dreyfus might have "a handwriting double."

In view of the somewhat contradictory nature of these reports, and of the utter lack of evidence resulting from the official inquiry, du Paty de Clam, Mercier, and de Boisdeffre were on the point of declaring that there was no case. Some decision had to be reached, and quickly, for Dreyfus was in an alarming condition. He had fainting fits and hallucinations, and wept and laughed by turns.

Not wishing to have the responsibility on his own shoulders, Forzinetti reported to the Minister, who ordered that his captive should be seen by the prison doctor. Next day, October 28th, Dr. Defos de Rau went to see Dreyfus, and prescribed a sedative.

In the evening of that same day, M. Papillard, who was on the editorial staff of the *Libre Parole*, received the following letter:

MON CHER AMI,

It is as I told you. It was Captain Dreyfus, of No. 6 Avenue du Trocadéro, who was arrested on the 15th for espionage and is now in prison in the Cherche-Midi.

It is given out that he is away travelling, but that is a lie, in order to hush the thing up. All Israel is up in arms. Get my little inquiry put through as soon as possible.

Yours,
HENRY.

Next day, Monday, October 29th, the *Libre Parole* published the following note:

"Is there any truth in the recent report that an important arrest has been made by the military authorities? It would appear that the person arrested is accused

of espionage. If the report is true, why have the authorities kept it so profound a secret? Some explanation is certainly called for."

Greatly annoyed by this indiscretion, du Paty de Clam hurriedly wound up his report. While recording the conviction that Dreyfus was guilty, he left it to the Minister to "judge what further steps should be taken in the matter." He then authorized Madame Dreyfus to break the news to her brothers-in-law. Mathieu Dreyfus, who was at Mulhouse, arrived in Paris on November 1st. As he was leaving the station, he heard the paper-boys shouting out the news of his brother's arrest.

That morning the *Libre Parole* came out with a gigantic headline in heavy black type reading "HIGH TREASON, ARREST OF A. DREYFUS, THE JEWISH OFFICER." Underneath an article, written by Commandant Biot, who signed Ct. Z—, recalled the information published three days previously, and reproduced a report of the *Agence Havas*, and some paragraphs that had appeared the day before in the *Éclair* and the *Patrie*.

The newspaper went on to say that it had received confirmation of this unspeakable crime in a note reading as follows:

"The officer, arrested for treason, belongs to the General Staff. The affair, however, will be hushed up because the officer is a Jew. Look for him among the Dreyfuses, the Mayers, the Levys. The traitor was arrested a fortnight ago, and has made a full confession. Absolute proofs are forthcoming that he has sold our secrets to Germany. He is in the Cherche-Midi, but not under his own name; an attempt is being made to smuggle him away to Mulhouse, where his family resides."

Owing to these divulgations, a meeting of the Cabinet was hastily convened. Mercier showed his colleagues the *bordereau*.

declared that the documents concerned could have been handed over by no one but Dreyfus, and drew attention to the report of the experts. After hearing these explanations, the Council unanimously decided to proceed against Dreyfus. Next day the Minister for War handed over the papers in the case to General Saussier, the Military Governor of Paris, who entrusted the conduct of the preliminary proceedings to Commandant Bexon d'Ormescheville, secretary to the 1st Court-Martial.

As soon as this decision was made public, Dreyfus and the charges against him became the great sensation of the day. In 1894 the anti-Jewish campaign, which had been launched a few years before with the publication of Edouard Drumont's *La France juive*, had distorted the minds of a great number of Frenchmen. It was enough that Dreyfus was a Jew for popular opinion to be up in arms against him, even before he had been tried.

There was a fierce competition among the newspapers as to which should give the fullest details of the crime that had been committed, for that a crime *had* been committed was regarded, from the very first, as a thing beyond dispute. From now onwards the most incredible particulars were spread abroad: "Dreyfus had sold himself to Italy and Germany.—His arrest had not taken place till he had been interrogated at great length by General de Boisdeffre.—Cochefort had made minute inquiries at Nancy and at Nice.—Dreyfus had sold the mobilization plans of the 15th Army Corps, as well as the plans of the fortress of Briançon.—He had sold the mobilization secrets to the Germans, as well as the time-table of the concentration trains.—He had divulged the names of the officers sent on special service abroad.—He spent all his money in gambling.—An Italian female spy of noble birth and remarkable beauty had known him at Nice, and it was for her that he had played the traitor.—Moreover, he had made a clean breast of the whole thing." Such, with endless variations, were the tales of which the newspapers were full. So excited was public

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opinion that one reader of the *Petit Journal* suggested that Dreyfus should be put in an iron cage like a wild beast, and so exhibited to the various regiments before being taken out and shot.*

While the populace was venting its fury against Dreyfus, events were taking place which were afterwards to have an important bearing on the case.

When, on November 1st, the *Libre Parole* denounced Captain Dreyfus, Schwartzkoppen and Panizzardi, who knew no one of that name among those with whom they had dealings, were not a little taken aback. Never doubting, however, that the statements were well-founded, they concluded that Dreyfus must have been in direct communication with the German and Italian headquarters. On November 2nd, Panizzardi sent the following telegram in code to his superiors:

"If Captain Dreyfus has had no dealings with you, it would be well to instruct the Ambassador to publish an official denial, in order to avoid comments by the Press."

General Marselli, Commandant of the General Staff, answered the same day as follows:

"Neither the Italian General Staff nor any of the services connected with it have ever had relations, direct or indirect, with Captain Dreyfus,"

and the German military attachés in Paris, Rome, Berne, and Brussels telegraphed to Berlin that the name of the arrested officer was quite unknown to them. Schwartzkoppen and Panizzardi assured their ambassadors that they knew nothing of Dreyfus.

The telegram which Panizzardi had dispatched on November 2nd had been intercepted by the Postal Authorities and communicated to the Foreign Office, where an endeavour was made to de-code it.

* November 10, 1894.

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After several attempts, the following translation was given to Colonel Sandherr :

“If Captain Dreyfus has had no dealings with you, it would be well to instruct the Ambassador to publish an official denial. Our emissary has been warned.”

However, the de-coding clerk indicated that he was doubtful about the last five words. Two days later, the correct translation of them was given to Sandherr.

At the same time, the German Embassy, having gained information from inquiries instituted in the principal spy centres, had the following paragraph inserted in the *Figaro* :

“Never on any occasion has Schwartzkoppen received any letters from Dreyfus ; nor has Schwartzkoppen ever had any dealings, direct or indirect, with him. If the officer in question has committed the crime imputed to him, the German Embassy has nothing to do with the matter.”

On the 12th a similar declaration was published in Rome by *l'Italia*, and the *Gaulois*, in its issue of the 14th, printed a categorical denial from Austria.

Lastly, acting under instructions from Prince Hohenlohe, the Imperial Chancellor, Count von Munster called on M. Hanotaux to give him oral and official confirmation of the paragraph in the *Figaro*.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs gave him a courteous hearing and replied with a few civil words, adding that the matter did not concern his department. The fact was that Hanotaux was in rather a delicate situation. Knowing as he did, through Mercier, that the *bordereau* had been discovered at the German Embassy, he could not attach entire confidence to the declarations of the Ambassador. As, on the other hand, he regarded Count von Munster as a perfectly honest man, he was forced to conclude that his military attachés had kept him in the dark regarding their espionage activities.

All these official declarations, as well as the semi-official statements that appeared in the Press, had no effect upon the crowd. Vainly a few journalists here and there endeavoured to give expression to a little common sense. One such, Emile Bergerat, in *Le Journal* of November 6th, published an article denouncing the storm of madness that was sweeping over France, the land of free and generous-hearted men, and claimed that Dreyfus had "at least a right to be innocent." Another, Paul de Cassagnac, in *l'Autorité* of November 14th, after pointing out that the case rested on declarations by experts who were by no means unanimous, went on to say that he was not one of those who would consent to shoot a French officer on the findings of a few charlatans who set up as experts in handwriting.

But these appeals for fair play had no effect on the general public. For them, Dreyfus was already a convicted traitor.

While the crowd, without any knowledge of the evidence, were already condemning a man who was still awaiting trial, the prosecution was taking its course.

The examination of the accused occupied twelve sittings, from November 14th to the 29th inclusive. Bexon d'Ormescheville began by repeating the questions which had already been put by du Paty, and he got the same replies. Having shown the prisoner the original of the *bordereau*, he asked him why he denied its authorship; and Dreyfus replied, "I know in my soul and conscience that I did not write that letter; therefore it cannot be my handwriting."

In the course of the investigations undertaken by him, du Paty de Clam had instructed one of the detectives of the Secret Service Department, Guénée by name, to make inquiries among the clubs. Some days later, Guénée handed him a report in which he stated that Dreyfus was an habitué of several gambling dens of very ill-repute, two of which had recently been shut up by the police; that he had had some heavy losses at the Betting Club, and that his wife's family had had to pay big sums on his account. On the other hand, the Prefect of Police, M. Lépine, who had also

been making inquiries in the same quarters, handed Henry, a few days later, a memorandum stating that Captain Alfred Dreyfus was not known in the clubs, and that the persons indicated by the newspapers had nothing to do with the officer in question, but were different people of the same name. Henry kept this memorandum to himself and only handed d'Ormescheville the report he had had from Guénée.

Acting on this report, the examining magistrate asked Dreyfus whether he knew the managers and habitués of the clubs in which he was stated to have gambled. Dreyfus declared that he knew nothing about any of them, and that he was not a gambler. D'Ormescheville then showed him his household account-book in which appeared the following entry: "50 francs, losses at cards." To this Dreyfus replied that he had occasionally had a game of cards with his wife's people. D'Ormescheville could not believe that, and wrote down in his notes: "It is clear, in spite of his denials, that Dreyfus is a gambler."

After gambling came women. Dreyfus had had a few quite unexciting "affairs," which, with one exception, had all been prior to his marriage. But none of these *liaisons* had seriously affected his career. The principal one, which had been with a young woman named Dida, who had subsequently been killed by a Russian, had taken place ten years previously.

D'Ormescheville also heard the evidence of a number of officers who had been more or less colleagues of Dreyfus. Captain Maître recounted that Dreyfus had proposed to have questions put to some of the people who worked in the factory of which his brother was manager with a view to getting some useful information about the German mobilization plans. Captain Tocanne, who had been a fellow-student of his at the École Supérieure de Guerre, deposed that he was talkative and obsequious. Captain Dervieux had been struck with his memory, his intelligence. Captain Roy had heard it said that he was very intelligent, but he himself thought he was about the average. Lastly,

at du Paty's request, d'Ormescheville heard the evidence of Corporal Bernollin who, stationed in the ante-room of Colonel de Sancy's office, fulfilled the double rôle of usher and scribe. Sometime during February 1894, the corporal had copied a memorandum from Commandant Mollard containing "statistical, topographical, and geographical information relating to Madagascar." Bernollin affirmed that the memorandum was marked "secret and confidential." This memorandum, which consisted of about twenty pages, he left lying on his desk, where anybody could read it, and put it away at night in a cardboard folder. Bernollin, however, omitted to say that the military attachés, Schwartzkoppen and Panizzardi, often came to see Colonel de Sancy and hung about in his ante-room waiting their turn to go in.

When the examination was over, d'Ormescheville drew up his report. It began with a general review of the case. "The charge," he wrote, "is founded on an urgent letter, written on thin transparent paper, but undated and unsigned." It was addressed to a foreign Power and, according to General Gonse, it reached its destination, but he was precluded from saying by what means it was recovered.

As three of the memoranda enumerated on the said letter or *bordereau* had to do with artillery, it was assumed that its author belonged to that branch of the service. Documents in Dreyfus's handwriting were looked for and found in the department. They were submitted for examination by M. Gobert, handwriting expert to the Banque de France. This examination was, as we have seen, favourable to Dreyfus. D'Ormescheville, however, passed that over, hinting that Gobert behaved in rather a strange fashion, going out of his way to inquire the name of the person involved in the charge. Similarly, he ignored the report of the expert Pelletier, which was definitely favourable to Dreyfus. On the other hand he made a great deal of the report of Alphonse Bertillon, whose conclusions, which were dead against Dreyfus, he considered irrefutable.

As the system invented by Bertillon to prove that Dreyfus

wrote the *bordereau* is destined to play an important part in the subsequent proceedings, it will be as well to indicate here and now the circumstances which led its author to devise it.

While d'Ormescheville was pursuing his work for the prosecution, du Paty, who had got it into his head that the Dreyfus family were communicating with the prisoner by cipher, handed over their letters to d'Ormescheville, who, in turn, passed them on to Bertillon. In one of them, which was from Madame Dreyfus, the expert again came across "The A negative" which had so much struck him in the accused's handwriting. In another letter, emanating from one of the prisoner's sisters-in-law, he discovered "the long S," which was one of the characteristics of the *bordereau*. Lastly, when the Captain's rooms were searched, on October 15th, du Paty found in his blotting-case a letter from his brother Mathieu. He gave it to Bertillon, who recognized "the exact model of all the divergencies pointed out by the experts between Drcyfus's writing and the writing on the *bordereau*."

Taking these data as his starting-point, Bertillon proceeded to build up his theory of "auto-forgery." This theory, of an extraordinarily elaborate character, he illustrated with a diagram so complicated and fantastic—an arsenal and a fortress, with all manner of labyrinthine corridors—that when, at Mercier's request, Casimir-Perier examined it, he could make nothing of it and declared it was the work of a madman.

Over and above this expert examination of the handwriting, which formed the basis of his accusation, d'Ormescheville was at pains to show that the memoranda or documents enumerated in the *bordereau* had a real value, and that Dreyfus alone was in a position to get to know their contents. In point of fact, no one knew exactly what the documents were, since they had found their way into Schwartzkoppen's hands and had not been recovered.

As we have seen, the *bordereau* sets forth four memoranda

and one document: the *projet de tir* for field-artillery (March 14, 1894). If it had been established that Dreyfus had had this manual in his hands and had not returned it, this would constitute a piece of presumptive evidence against him. But Captain Jeannel affirmed that he had lent his manual to Dreyfus in July, and that the latter had almost immediately returned it. The General Staff put the date of the *bordereau* as some time in April. The charge therefore broke down, since the loan of the manual had not taken place until two months later. Moreover, three thousand copies of it had been sent out wholesale to all the artillery regiments, a fact which deprived it of any character of secrecy.

As to the four memoranda, the prosecution knew no more about them than the titles. What sort of value, if any, they had, no one had the smallest idea. It appears that any officer could have written a memorandum on Madagascar, on the covering troops, or on the abolition of the pontoneers, which had been the subject of debate in the Chamber and the Senate in May 1894. The memorandum on the 120 gun was the only one that seemed, on the face of it, to offer any interest. Now, one of the detectives attached to the Secret Service Department had sent in a questionnaire dated September 20th and addressed by the German General Staff to one of its agents. The writer of the said questionnaire asked for "an exact description of the 120 gun, tubes, carriage, mechanism, etc." That showed that the memorandum referred to in the *bordereau* could not have been of any great value. But Sandherr and Henry said nothing to the prosecution about this questionnaire.

D'Ormescheville submitted his report to General Saussier, the Military Governor of Paris, on December 3rd, and the next day the latter gave orders that Dreyfus should be committed for trial. From that day onwards Dreyfus was allowed to write to his wife, and to receive visits from his counsel. This is what he said in his first letter to his wife, dated December 4th:

"I have been overwhelmed, and utterly depressed, in my

gloomy prison here, with nothing but my own thoughts to keep me company. I have had moments of frenzied madness; I have even wandered in my mind, but my conscience never slept. It kept saying to me: 'Keep your head up! . . . Go straight ahead!'

"I am longing for a letter from you; you are my hope, my one consolation. Without you, life would be a burden indeed. The bare thought that I could be accused of such a crime makes me tremble all over; my whole being revolts at it."

Then, as the day of the trial drew near, he told her how confident he was:

"The truth will come out about everything, and in spite of everything. We are no longer in an age when things can be hushed up. The men I have to deal with are straightforward, honest soldiers like myself; they will see that a mistake has been made. I have absolute confidence. They will hear me and understand."

Mathieu Dreyfus wrote first of all to Waldeck-Rousseau, asking him to undertake his brother's defence. But for a number of years Waldeck-Rousseau had confined himself to civil cases. He advised him to employ a criminal barrister, and suggested Maître Demange.

Mathieu Dreyfus took his advice, and went to see Maître Demange. The latter told him that he would only undertake his brother's defence if, after seeing all the papers in the case, he saw no proof that he was guilty. "If," he added, "my conscience forbids me to defend him, my refusal will get about, and be commented on. I shall be your brother's first judge."

Mathieu Dreyfus accepted the conditions. Demange went to the Cherche-Midi and imposed the same conditions on the prisoner, who also agreed to them. Some days later, having studied the documents, he was amazed to find how insignificant they were. Whereupon he returned to the prison and told Captain Dreyfus that he believed in his innocence, and would undertake his defence.

CHAPTER II

THE COURT-MARTIAL.—DEMANGE PROTESTS AGAINST THE CASE BEING HEARD *IN CAMERA*.—THE WITNESSES.—HENRY'S DRAMATIC EVIDENCE.—THE SECRET DOSSIER.—DREYFUS FOUND GUILTY.—DU PATY DE CLAM VISITS THE PRISON.—THE DEGRADATION CEREMONY.—THE ELECTION OF FÉLIX FAURE AS PRESIDENT.—THE DEPARTURE FOR DEVIL'S ISLAND.

THE trial opened on December 19th in the Court-Martial Hall at the Cherche-Midi. The tribunal consisted of seven officers, not one of whom belonged to the artillery. They were Colonel Maurel, Lieutenant-Colonel Echemann, Commandants Florentin and Gallet, Captains Roche and Freystaetter. With the exception of Gallet, who belonged to the cavalry, the remaining judges were all infantrymen. Commandant Brisset was public prosecutor.

The charge having been read out, the names of the witnesses were called over. The prosecution had cited Gonse, Henry, du Paty de Clam, seventeen other officers, whose evidence had been heard by d'Ormescheville, Cochefort, and the handwriting experts. For the defence, the witnesses were the Chief Rabbi of Paris, a few personal friends, and six officers, with whom, or under whom, the accused had served.

Commandant Brisset began by asking that the case should be heard *in camera*. Maître Demange immediately demanded leave to state his case. But the words, "seeing that the only document . . ." were scarcely out of his mouth, when Maurel, the presiding Judge, interrupted and told him not to make mention of any document regarding the affair. Demange protested, declared that he would divulge nothing, "but that he thought it incumbent upon him to point out . . ." Here he was again interrupted. "There is no necessity to mention a single document . . ." Demange persisted: "Seeing that the solitary document . . ." Here Maurel flew into a rage and declared that he would

not allow him to go on. Commandant Brisset approved, and even contested the right of the defence to state their case.

"How," asked Demange, "do you expect me to show that there is no danger in a public trial if I am not allowed to discuss material facts?"

"You have no right to do so."

"But in the interests of the defence . . ."

"There are other interests at stake besides those of the prosecution and the defence, in this case."

"Are my arguments accepted; yes or no?"

"Lay them on the table, without reading them," answered Brisset.

Realizing that further discussion would be useless, Maître Demange handed in his written arguments. The Court withdrew to deliberate on the matter, and unanimously declared in favour of a secret trial. The Court was then cleared. Only Lépine, the Prefect of Police, and Commandant Picquart, who had been instructed by Mercier and de Boisdeffre to watch the proceedings, remained in their seats behind the judges. Vallecalle, the usher, recited d'Ormescheville's report, and Colonel Maurel proceeded to examine the defendant. The questions were the same as those which had been put to him during the preliminary interrogation, and Dreyfus returned the same replies. The President agreed that the defendant had never seen the firing of a 120 gun and that the documents regarding covering troops were of little importance. On the other hand, he maintained that the memorandum on Madagascar was Corporal Bernollin's, and the firing-manual Captain Jeannel's. Dreyfus demanded to be confronted with Bernollin and Jeannel. This Maurel refused. And Commandant Brisset observed, "Whoever gave him the manual, Jeannel or anyone else, the fact remains, Dreyfus must have had it."

The proceedings were brief. The examination of the witnesses began at once, and went on during the 20th and the 21st. De Boisdeffre had not been called. Gonse recounted

the origin of the affair, in accordance with what he had been told by Sandherr, Fabre, and d'Aboville. Then he did his best to discredit the expert Gobert. Finally, he contended that one officer, and one only, could have furnished the memorandum on covering troops. Dreyfus replied that secretaries of the General Staff, non-commissioned officers, and privates had copied out documents on the subject. This Gonse denied. But Maître Demange questioned Captain Toccanne, one of the witnesses, on the point, and he agreed that Dreyfus was right.

Fabre and d'Aboville explained that, if they had had the idea of examining Dreyfus's handwriting, the reason was that, as the *bordereau* made mention of three memoranda concerning artillery, it could only emanate from an artilleryman.

Next came Henry and du Paty de Clam. The first, who had been chosen by Mercier to give evidence on behalf of the Secret Service Department, recalled the arrival of the *bordereau* and swore that Dreyfus was guilty. Du Paty told them all about the dictation test, affirming that the defendant began to tremble when he came to the sentence about the hydraulic brake. Dreyfus protested, and Maître Demange, picking up the sheet, asked du Paty to point out where he saw the smallest sign of shakiness. Du Paty floundered, and finally declared that an innocent man would have trembled, and that if Dreyfus had not done so it was because he was a fraud.

He next went on to speak of the examination at the Cherche-Midi, and said that he had taken advantage of a moment when Dreyfus happened to be sitting with his legs crossed to ask him point-blank an embarrassing question. Well, at that very moment he had clearly seen him fidget with his foot. When Dreyfus had shown that he could not have known in April or May about artillery regulations that did not come into force until July, du Paty retorted that the *bordereau*, instead of being dated April, as had been supposed, might have been written in August. On this supposition,

the words "off to manœuvres" would refer to the autumn manœuvres, which Dreyfus thought he would be able to attend. Dreyfus answered that that was impossible, by reason of the note of May 17th informing all Staff College recruits that they would not go to the manœuvres. Therefore, if August was the date, he knew he would not go to manœuvres, and could not have written the words, "I am off to the manœuvres," etc., which state a definite fact. He requested Colonel Maurel to ask for the note of the General Staff, but the latter took no steps in the matter.

The registrar, Gribelin, who followed Commandant du Paty de Clam, merely confirmed the statements of his superior. He added that Dreyfus seemed to him like a play-actor who had prepared all his speeches and all his gestures beforehand. Cochefort, Superintendent of Police, gave his version of the dictation scene, as well as of the fruitless search that had been carried out in Dreyfus's rooms.

On the evening of this first day's hearing, Commandant Picquart went to call on de Boisdeffre and Mercier, and said that, in view of the flimsiness of the charges, it seemed to him that an acquittal was likely.

Next day, December 20th, Demange read out de Boisdeffre's note about probationers not attending manœuvres. Du Paty then agreed that it was not the grand autumn manœuvres that were meant, and fell back on interpreting the word "manœuvres" as "journey of the General Staff": thus making the date of the *bordereau* once more April.

Then, one after another, the witnesses called by the prosecution gave their evidence: Captain Boullenger, Commandants Gendron and Bertin-Mouroi, not having anything definite to say, limited themselves to recording their general impressions, which were unfavourable to Dreyfus. Other officers—Commandant Mercier-Milon, Colonel Colard, Captains Brault, Sibille, and Roy—declared that they looked on Dreyfus as a loyal soldier, and certainly did not remember his ever asking them indiscreet questions. Tocanne, who had been with him at the École de Guerre,

stated that he considered him incapable of a criminal action.

In point of fact, all the allegations against Dreyfus, being reduced to their just proportions, entirely lost the suspicious character with which d'Ormescheville had endeavoured to invest them. The case for the prosecution was breaking down. Then it was that, during an adjournment of the sitting, Commandant Henry got through a request to one of the judges, Commandant Gallet, asking him to put to him (Henry) a question regarding the presence of a traitor in the 2nd Bureau during the spring. Gallet agreed to do so.

Henry, invited to reply, advanced to the bar of the Court and declared that, in March, a highly respectable person had advised the Secret Service that an officer at the War Office was playing the traitor. In June, this person volunteered the further information that the traitor was an officer in the Intelligence Department. Then, turning to Dreyfus, and pointing at him with his finger, he cried in a loud voice, "And that traitor stands there!"

Dreyfus and Demange at once demanded that the "highly respectable person" should be brought into Court. Meanwhile they asked for his name.

Henry refused to give it, and tapping his *képi* with his hand, he said, "There are some secrets in an officer's head which even his *képi* must not know."

Demange and Dreyfus continuing their protests, Colonel Echemann and President Maurel said to Henry that they did not ask the name of the person, but only whether he could declare on his honour that the person referred to, whoever he was, told him that there was a traitor in the Intelligence Department, and that his name was Dreyfus. Henry stretched out his arm towards the crucifix, and said, in a loud voice, "I swear it!"

These words, and the passionate tones in which they were uttered, had a powerful effect on the judges, as well as on Lépine. Picquart alone remained unimpressed, for he knew that the "highly respectable person" was none other than

Val Carlos, who, being in the pay of the Department, reported to Henry and Guénée anything he could glean from the conversation of the military attachés. Naturally, the significance of these fragments was often distorted, and they lost nothing in passing from mouth to mouth. Such was the case in this instance.

In March, Val Carlos said to Guénée, "If I knew the name I would tell it you." In June, repeating the story to Henry, he said, "If I knew the name, I wouldn't tell it you."

After Henry's sensational statement, the experts were called upon to give evidence. Gobert and Pelletier, while recognizing that there were certain resemblances between the writing on the *bordereau* and Dreyfus's own hand, stated that the differences were more numerous still. Dreyfus did not deny the resemblances, and it is indisputable that at a first glance there is a certain resemblance, a kind of family likeness, between the documents as a whole. If there had not been, the Dreyfus Case, which was to stir the whole world to its depths, would never have been heard of. Over its very beginning there hung a fatality more terrible than anything conceived by the writers of Greek tragedy.

The third expert, Charavay, ascribed the *bordereau* to Dreyfus, but with the reservation that he (Dreyfus) might have a handwriting "double." As for Teyssonnières, he declared that Dreyfus had disguised his handwriting, but that he was the author of the *bordereau*.

The following day it was Bertillon's turn. He began by saying that he was not an expert. Then, having recourse to photographic negatives, enlargements, weird and intricate drawings, he set forth his discovery and explained that Dreyfus had made use of three different handwritings: his own, his wife's, and his brother Mathieu's. He spoke of the key-word, *intérêt*, which occurred in Mathieu's letter, of the word *adresse* which was twice repeated in the *bordereau* and became a sign of recognition. He told them all about the citadel, the fortress with its three divisions, the corridor of

the clipped A's, and the trenches of the elongated terminals which constituted the plan of defence devised by the traitor.

Demange, Lépine, Picquart, and the Government Commissioner, Brisset, afterwards declared that they had not understood a word of Bertillon's demonstration, and it may reasonably be supposed that the judges were equally mystified. They, however, allowed themselves to be impressed by the scientific phraseology of the system.

The testimony of the witnesses for the defence was brief. It consisted wholly of evidence as to moral character. The Alsatians, Koecklin and Jeanmaire, who had known the Dreyfus family for many years, bore witness to their patriotism, good reputation, and absolute integrity. They could not conceive the possibility of such an apparently motiveless crime. Du Paty interposed with the remark that a factory belonging to the Dreyfus family had recently been burned down, and that a very large amount had been paid as indemnity, insinuating thereby that the excessive sum paid as indemnity represented the price of treason. Demange immediately telegraphed to the insurance companies, and their accounts, which came next day, effectively disposed of du Paty's insinuation.

The Chief Rabbi of Paris, Lévy-Bruhl the philosopher, Dr. Vaucaire, Arthur Amson, a big manufacturer, all testified that Dreyfus was a man of correct and sober life, entirely absorbed in his profession. Six officers—Colonel Clément, Commandants de Barbarin, Ruffey, and Leblond, and Captains Mayer and Devaux—came forward to speak of their esteem for Dreyfus.

After these various witnesses had been heard, the Court adjourned, and it was then, and not till then, that du Paty came and handed to Maurel, the President, a sealed packet which he had received from Sandherr, and asked him, on behalf of General Mercier, to submit it to the judges when they were alone in the Council Room.

When the Court reassembled, the Government Commissioner rose to address the Court. He declared his belief

that Dreyfus was guilty on the strength of the facts contained in d'Ormescheville's report. He adduced no fresh arguments and called no further witnesses.

Next day, December 22nd, on leaving his cell, Dreyfus, who was confident of acquittal, said to Forzinetti, "To-day I shall be in the bosom of my family again."

As soon as the Court had assembled, Maître Demange rose to make his speech for the defence. He spoke for three hours. His whole line of argument went to prove that Dreyfus could not have been the author of the *bordereau*. As he did not go to the manœuvres, how could he have said, "I am just off to manœuvres"?

Similarly, what could he know about the behaviour of the 120 gun, since he had never seen it at work. Again, he could not have spoken of artillery changes of which he knew nothing, still less could he have parted with a gunnery manual of which he had never had a copy in his hands. Moreover, the wording of the *bordereau* was peppered with technical solecisms and inexactitudes. Would a former student of the École Polytechnique, of whose knowledge all the teaching staff had spoken in such glowing terms, have made such mistakes as those?

That there *was* a certain similarity between Dreyfus's handwriting and the writing on the *bordereau*, everyone agreed, including the defendant himself. But there were differences, differences of such a nature that, of the four experts, two were for and two against, so that in order to obtain a casting vote the prosecution had had to avail themselves of Bertillon's demonstrations, of which no one could make head or tail. In conclusion, a crime of this magnitude implied a motive. Now, in spite of all their best endeavours, the prosecution had completely failed to produce a single one. Maître Demange then referred to Dreyfus's life. He, too, like his brother, might have gone in for money-making by devoting himself to commerce. But his soldierly ideas, his intellectual culture, his desire for distinction had led him to prefer the career of arms.

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The public prosecutor briefly replied. He agreed that moral proofs were lacking, but he said there was one material proof, an all-sufficient one, and that was the *bordereau* which Dreyfus, and no one else, could have written. Dreyfus made a final protest. Then the judges withdrew to consider their verdict.

They were away about an hour. President Maurel opened the sealed packet which du Paty de Clam had given him from Mercier. In view of the controversy to which the revision of the case subsequently gave rise, we may be permitted to state, here and now, that the said package contained the four following documents:

- (1) A biographical memorandum drawn up by du Paty making out that Dreyfus had perpetrated a whole series of treasonable acts, from his entry into the École de Guerre, when he had divulged to Germany the details of a confidential lecture on mobilization, till he passed to the Military school at Bourges, when he had sold the secret of a melinite shell.
- (2) The document known as "Schwartzkoppen's Memorandum" (*le memento Schwartzkoppen*), that is, the rough pencil draft, pieces of which had been found at the German Embassy and brought by the woman Bastian to the Secret Service Department in January 1894. This document, containing the words, "*Doubt*," "*Proof*," etc., has already been quoted.
- (3) Panizzardi's letter to Schwartzkoppen, quoted above ("*I have written to Colonel Davignon*," etc.).
- (4) The document containing the words "*ce canaille de D—*" signed with the pseudonym *Alexandrine*. This was the paper containing the words, "Herewith a dozen plans of the Nice fortifications which that 'canaille de D—' has sent me to give to you."

These four documents were enclosed with a covering letter which concluded thus:

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- (1) The officer (or person) who handed over the Nice plans in April 1894 may have belonged to the *Section des places fortes du 1^{er} Bureau*, since the plans were there.
- (2) The traitor's name begins with a "D."
- (3) The person at the time had fallen out with Schwartzkoppen, but was trying to resume relations.

General inference: The facts above-stated are applicable to Captain Dreyfus. In that case Schwartzkoppen's friend in Davignon's office, the D—— who betrayed the Nice plans, the writer of the incriminating letter, and Captain Dreyfus can only be one and the same person.

Before reading the documents composing the *petit dossier*, and giving them to the judges, Colonel Maurel explained that the people with whom Dreyfus had been corresponding were the German and Italian military attachés. These latter used to exchange information, and signed their letters with pseudonyms, their favourite ones being *Alexandrine* and *Bourreur*.

Maurel subsequently averred that he only read one of these documents, and that, after doing so, he had circulated the others among his colleagues. On the other hand, Freystaetter swore that Maurel read them all and commented upon them. The recollections of the other judges were less precise, but all agreed in saying that the document "*ce canaille de D——*" had played a vital part in confirming their opinion. None of them realized that he was doing anything illegal in judging a defendant in the light of documents which neither he nor his counsel had ever seen.

The seven judges unanimously declared the prisoner guilty. Maurel pronounced sentence. Its terms—capital punishment having been abolished for political crimes—were "imprisonment for life in a fortress, deprivation of rank and degradation."

The sentence was read out in public session. The defendant .

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was not in Court. On hearing the verdict, Demange burst into tears. Then he went to the infirmary where Dreyfus was expecting him, and, being unable to speak, clasped him in his arms. A few minutes later, Dreyfus was led out into the vestibule of the Court where the guard was drawn up under arms. It was now dark. The usher, by the light of a candelabra, read the sentence. Dreyfus was taken back to the infirmary, where he broke down and sobbed. Then he was led back to his cell, where Demange, who had come to offer him consolation, again embraced him, saying, "*Mon capitaine*, your condemnation is the greatest crime of the century."

As soon as judgment had been pronounced, and while Picquart was on his way to convey the news to Mercier, Colonel Maurel handed back the secret *dossier* to du Paty de Clam. He in turn gave it to Sandherr, who took it next day to the Minister for War. In Sandherr's presence, Mercier tore up the "biographical memorandum," observing that no trace of it should be allowed to remain. Then he ordered that the *dossier* should be dispersed, and the several documents distributed among the various files to which they had originally belonged. This order, however, was not carried out. Sandherr kept the envelope, and Henry wrote on it the words "secret dossier," putting his initials on the back, and placed it in an iron safe in which confidential documents were kept.

Entering his cell, Dreyfus saw Forzinetti, and exclaimed, "My sole crime is that I am a Jew," and asked him for a revolver. But Forzinetti, who had been a witness of the agony he had been through, and who thoroughly believed in his innocence, impressed upon him that, for his wife's sake, and for the honour of everyone connected with him, it was his duty to live. Dreyfus gave him his word that he would do so. He gave a similar promise by letter to his wife.

The Military Appeal Court, of which General Gossart was president, being unaware that the secret *dossier* had been

communicated to the judges without the knowledge of the accused and his counsel, rejected Dreyfus's appeal.

Although the verdict had somewhat allayed his anxiety, General Mercier was not yet easy in his mind. He could not make out how it was that Dreyfus had not confessed his crime, and, with the object of obtaining such a confession, he ordered du Paty de Clam to go and see him in his cell. In the course of this visit, which took place on December 31st and lasted an hour, du Paty declared to the prisoner that he had never been suspected until the appearance of the *bordereau*, but that the Service was aware that there was an officer somewhere or other who was giving information to the German military attachés. Dreyfus asked him how it was that Henry had not had the officers watched as far back as February, since it was in February that he had been told of the presence of a traitor on the General Staff. Then he again protested his innocence, and said it was bound to be recognized in the end. Meantime, he begged the Government to do everything in its power to discover the key to the mystery. Then, once again, he affirmed his innocence.

"If you are innocent," said du Paty de Clam, "you are undergoing the most terrible martyrdom that ever was."

That same evening, du Paty sent Mercier a note saying that Dreyfus had refused to confess. Then he drew up a report of his visit, which has never been discovered. Next day, January 1, 1895, Dreyfus himself wrote in the following terms to Mercier:

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

I have been visited, on your instructions, by M. le Commandant du Paty de Clam, to whom I have declared that I am innocent and that I have never committed the slightest imprudence. I am condemned, and I am not asking you to show me any clemency, but, for the sake of my good name which I hope will

one day be restored to me, it is my duty to beg you to continue your inquiries.

When I am gone, let those inquiries still continue. That is the sole favour that I ask of you.

ALFRED DREYFUS.

On January 2nd Dreyfus was allowed to see his wife. The interview took place behind a double grille in the presence of Forzinetti and his chief warder. A second interview took place later in Forzinetti's office, Forzinetti having obtained this favour from General Saussier. Then, on Saturday, January 5th, under a grey sky, in the courtyard of the École Militaire, the ceremony of degradation took place.

At seven o'clock in the morning, Captain Lebrun-Renault, of the Republican Guards, proceeded to the Cherche-Midi, to take charge of Dreyfus. Before the prisoner was handcuffed, Forzinetti pressed his hand and told him to keep up his courage.

A few minutes later the prison-van, escorted by a detachment of the Republican Guard, drove into the courtyard. Dreyfus got out and was taken into the office of the adjutants of the garrison, where he remained for a whole hour in conversation with Lebrun-Renault. Wishing to justify himself in the eyes of this officer, he assured him that he was the victim of a terrible mistake.

"You never thought of committing suicide?" said Lebrun-Renault, who remained unconvinced.

"Yes; the day I was condemned. But then I realized that, being innocent, I had no right to kill myself. In two years, or three years, justice will be done me."

Feeling that Lebrun-Renault had no faith in him, he tried to convince him, told him about his life and all he knew about his case. A student at the Polytechnique at eighteen, it was a splendid future he had before him, 400,000 francs of his own, no need to worry about money. Why should he have played the traitor? What was the

importance of the *bordereau*? Out of four documents, one only was confidential. The rest were valueless. And then the trial with closed doors! Besides, the Minister knew he was innocent since he sent Commandant du Paty de Clam to the prison to see him and to ask him whether he had not given some worthless document to the Germans as a bait to get something worth having in exchange. But he said he was as incapable of trickery as he was of treason.

And now the hour of the degradation had come. Four artillerymen came to escort Dreyfus to the parade-ground, where detachments from all the regiments were drawn up in a huge square. Nine o'clock struck. General Darras, mounted on his charger, and surrounded by his staff, raised his sword aloft, the drums rolled and the bugles rang out. Dreyfus halted before the General with head erect. Vallecalle, the usher, read out the verdict, and General Darras spoke these words: "Alfred Dreyfus, you are unworthy to bear arms. In the name of the French People we here degrade you."

Dreyfus, raising his arms aloft, cried, "Soldiers, I am innocent! It is an innocent man who is being dishonoured. *Vive la France! Vive l'Armée!*"

The crowd that had gathered together in the Place Fontenay hissed and shouted, "*A mort! A mort!*—Kill him! Kill him!"

A sergeant went up to Dreyfus. With stern, rapid gestures, he tore off his gold stripes and the buttons of his pelisse. Then he took his sword and broke it across his knee. "I am innocent," cried the condemned man. "You are degrading an innocent man!"

Again taking his place amid the four artillerymen, Dreyfus passed along in front of the troops, and, without lowering his gaze, continued to proclaim his innocence.

The ceremony had lasted ten minutes. From the École Militaire, Dreyfus was driven in a prison-van to the Dépôt, and thence to la Santé.

Among the comparatively few members of the public who

had been admitted as audience to this ceremony were several journalists. Almost all of them remained unmoved by the doomed man's protestations of innocence: Barrès, Léon Daudet, Edmond Lepelletier, Rochefort only saw in them further evidence of the traitor's cunning. But a few—F. de Roday, editor of the *Figaro*, Bataille, law-reporter on the same paper, Paul Brulat, and others—had their doubts about the culpability of Dreyfus. Ajalbert, in *Gil Blas*, recorded his disgust at the cruelty of these artists and men-of-letters who had not blenched or betrayed any emotion at the sight of so much suffering.

During the day a rumour got abroad that Dreyfus had confessed. He was reported to have said to Lebrun-Renault: "I am innocent; if I gave away documents to Germany, it was only as a bait, and in order to get more important ones in exchange. Before three years are over, the truth will have come out, and the War Minister himself will be taking up my case again."

This story came out in the *Libre Parole* of the 6th. Now, in his report to General Saussier, Captain Lebrun-Renault briefly recorded the times at which he went on and off duty and, in the remarks column, merely said, "Nothing to report."

Finally, Colonel Guérin, who had been instructed by Saussier to be present at the ceremony, wired him, when it was all over, saying, "Dreyfus protested his innocence and shouted '*Vive la France.*' No other incident." But this telegram was kept quiet and was only known later on.

Thus in 1904 the Supreme Court of Appeal learned that M. de Civry, editor of *L'Echo de l'Armée*, who had written to Sandherr on January 5, 1895, asking whether Dreyfus had confessed, received a letter saying, "Dreyfus did not confess to the Captain of the Garde Républicaine, as was reported to you."

After Dreyfus's condemnation, Count von Munster was somewhat annoyed to see that the Press continued to bring the German Embassy into the affair, although he had

affirmed, times without number, that Germany knew nothing whatever about Dreyfus. There were some who gave out that the Emperor William had insisted on the case being heard *in camera*. Hoping to put a stop to these rumours, Count von Munster had caused the following statement to be published in the *Figaro* of December 26th :

“The German Embassy has never had the slightest communication, direct or indirect, with Captain Dreyfus. No document emanating from him has ever been stolen from the Embassy, nor was any request made that the trial should be heard behind closed doors.”

Of course the Press took no notice of the statement. On the same day of the degradation ceremony, Count von Munster forwarded to M. Dupuy, the Prime Minister, the following dispatch, which he had just received from Prince von Hohenlohe, the German Chancellor :

“His Imperial Majesty, having every confidence in the good faith of the President and Government of the Republic, requests Your Excellency to inform M. Casimir-Perier that if it is proved that the German Embassy has never been implicated in the Dreyfus Affair, His Majesty hopes that the Government of the Republic will not hesitate to declare it.

Without such formal declaration, the legends which the Press continues to disseminate regarding the German Embassy will persist and will compromise the position of the Emperor’s representative.”

This communication, which was not given to the Press, caused considerable vexation to Casimir-Perier and his Ministers, who thought that they were finally quit of the business. Another circumstance, commonplace enough in itself, soon added considerably to their worries. On the night of the degradation, Captain Lebrun-Renault, who happened to be at the Moulin Rouge, fell in there with Clisson the journalist, and told him all about Dreyfus’s long mono-

logue, his protestations of innocence, his hope that it would one day be proved, as well as the origin of the *bordereau* that had been stolen from the German Embassy. Clisson dished all this up in an article which appeared next day in the *Figaro*. This greatly added to the Government's perplexities.

Casimir-Perier sent for Lebrun-Renault, tried in vain to get some further definite information out of him, and gave him a severe reprimand; then he decided to give an audience to Count von Munster. In the course of that interview he told him that it was a fact that the *bordereau* had been found at the German Embassy, but, he added, that did not imply that it had been solicited, "the German Embassy being no more responsible for papers sent to it than the French Government would be for papers it might receive."

Count von Munster accepted this reply, and next day, January 7th, the *Agence Havas* published the following:

"Seeing that, after the condemnation of ex-Captain Dreyfus by Court-Martial, certain newspapers continue to associate certain foreign Embassies in Paris with the case, we are authorized, in order that the public may not be misled, to remind them of the statement published regarding this matter on November 30, 1894."

This note had a soothing effect on public opinion, which, moreover, was soon diverted by a most unexpected event. In consequence of a political attack directed against him, Casimir-Perier resigned his office on January 16th. Next day Félix Faure was elected, on the second rota, by 430 votes against 361 recorded for Brisson.

On the night of the election, Dreyfus was put into a convict train which reached La Rochelle the following morning. News of his arrival rapidly spread, and groups had collected round the station. The sentries, with fixed bayonets, were immediately doubled. At night the prisoner was ordered to leave the cell-like compartment in which he had travelled. At the sight of him the mob broke through the cordon of troops; there was a wild rush, and the

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demonstrators dealt savage blows at Dreyfus with their fists and sticks. At last the gendarmes came up and succeeded in getting him on board the vessel that was to convey him to the Ile de Ré, where he was put in the convicts' dépôt.

His wife was allowed twice weekly to pay him a short visit of half an hour's duration, but she was not permitted to embrace him. On February 20th she begged that she might have leave to press his hand, but Picqué, the prison governor, who took a pleasure in exceeding his orders, brutally refused her. She then went back to Paris to apply for permission to accompany her husband to the convict prison. That same evening, in sixteen degrees of frost, Dreyfus was thrust into a cell on board the *Ville de Saint Nazaire* bound for Devil's Island.

CHAPTER III

DREYFUS ON DEVIL'S ISLAND.—MATHIEU DREYFUS LEARNS ABOUT THE SECRET PAPERS.—PICQUART SUCCEEDS SANDHERR.—THE *PETIT BLEU*.—INQUIRIES ABOUT ESTERHAZY.—THE INTERVIEW AT BASLE.—PICQUART ADVISES DE BOISDEFFRE AND GONSE THAT DREYFUS HAS BEEN THE VICTIM OF AN ERROR.—FALSE REPORT THAT DREYFUS HAD ESCAPED.—ANDRÉ LEBON ORDERS THE PRECAUTIONS TO BE REDOUBLED.—THE FORGED LETTER SIGNED WEILER.—HENRY FORGES THREE DOCUMENTS, AMONG THEM THE LETTER SIGNED *ALEXANDRINE*.—*LE MATIN* COMES OUT WITH A FACSIMILE OF THE *BORDEREAU*.—CASTELLIN'S INTERPELLATION IN PARLIAMENT.—PICQUART IS SENT ON SPECIAL SERVICE.

THE group of islands known as the *Iles de Salut* is composed of three islands situated in the Atlantic at a distance of twenty-seven miles from Cayenne and separated one from another by narrow straits. The largest of these islands is *Ile Royale*, the next largest *Ile Saint Joseph*, and the smallest *Ile du Diable*—Devil's Island. On these little islets of volcanic origin, where the sole vegetation consists of stunted trees, the heat is terrific and the atmosphere pestilential. In the time of the Empire, hundreds of Republicans were sent there cheek by jowl with convicted criminals. In 1856, out of 7,000 prisoners landed on *Ile Royale*, 2,500 died within the year.

Since the beginning of the Republic, *Ile Royale* had been reserved for such criminals as were reported dangerous, and *Ile Saint Joseph* for anarchists. A leper-station was established on Devil's Island, but it was soon discontinued, owing to the unhealthy nature of the climate. Before the arrival of Dreyfus, the remaining lepers had been sent away and their huts destroyed by fire.

A stone cabin, four metres square, was built for the condemned man; the windows were barred; the door, also barred, opened into a lobby in which a warder was on

duty night and day. Six warders, armed with revolvers, were told off to guard the prisoner, and relieved each other every two hours. This was a degree of penal severity which had not been contemplated in the sentence, but which Mercier took it upon himself to inflict, on his own authority.

The voyage on board the *Saint Nazaire* was particularly trying. Shut up in a sort of cage in which he shook with cold, Dreyfus was permitted to go up on deck for an hour every day, escorted by two armed warders. On arriving at the island he was taken seriously ill. He had to cook his own food and, having no utensils, he employed his ingenuity in making some out of old iron. After a few days had elapsed, Dr. Patriarche found him in such a weak state that he took pity on him and gave orders that some victuals, supplied from Cayenne, should be added to his rations. Dreyfus, realizing that it was his duty to live, compelled himself to keep a diary, writing up on paper every sheet of which had been numbered and initialled; he also buried himself in books and set himself to study the Napoleonic wars, his sole distraction being the letters which he received from his wife; but these, before they were given to him, were read by the authorities.

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After he had received his sentence, Madame Dreyfus wrote to him saying she would join him. "Wherever you go, I will go too." This she was entitled to do by law, but the Government refused her request.

After the departure of his brother for Devil's Island, Mathieu Dreyfus resolved that he would leave no stone unturned to get at the truth. In the first place he called on various politicians and journalists whose assistance he hoped to enlist. A few of them consented to hear what he had to say. Siegfried, a member of the Senate; Lalance, a former Deputy for Mulhouse; General Jung, Deputy for le Nord and formerly General Boulanger's chief private secretary, all told him that they believed in his brother's innocence. Jung said, "Concentrate your attention on Sandherr and du Paty." Pierre Lefèvre, editor of *le Rappel*; Fernand Xau of

le Journal; de Rodays of the *Figaro*; Yves Guyot of the *Sidcle*, advised him to wait until popular feeling had subsided a little.

Scheurer-Kestner, a member of the Senate and an old Alsatian from Mulhouse, had had his doubts about the matter. At the urgent request of his colleague Ranc and of Joseph Reinach, he put questions to Freycinet, and then to Berthelot and General Billot. They all assured him that Dreyfus was guilty, giving him to understand that indisputable proofs of his treason had been furnished to the judges at the court-martial. Far from convinced, he urged Mathieu Dreyfus to pursue his investigations.

Early in March 1895 he was told that an intimate friend of Félix Faure's, Dr. Gilbert of le Havre, held the belief that Dreyfus was innocent. He accordingly went to see him. He then learnt that the new President of the Republic, in order to set his compatriot's mind at rest, had confessed to him that Dreyfus had been condemned, not on the documents produced at the hearing of the case, but on the strength of a secret paper privately submitted to the judges. And at this very juncture, three of the judges—Echemann, Freystaetter, and Florentin—made a similar statement to a number of different people. At the War Office there were several officers who knew about this secret *dossier*. The new Minister of Justice, Trarieux, having his doubts about the prisoner's guilt, broached the matter to Hanotaux, who replied that Mercier had shown him a document in which the initial of Dreyfus's name appeared, thus justifying the conclusion that he had had relations with a foreign Power. Yet none of these men—President, politicians, officers, or journalists—evinced any surprise that an accused man should have been condemned on documents of whose existence neither he nor his counsel was aware. The prisoner's guilt having been taken for granted, the legality of the procedure was of very minor importance.

This was very far from being the view of Mathieu Dreyfus and Maître Demange, who, having now learnt beyond all

manner of doubt that the prisoner had been condemned on the strength of certain documents which they had had no opportunity of examining, one of which contained the initial "D," began to entertain fresh hopes. Mathieu's suspicions lighted on a former colleague of his brother's on the General Staff, Donin de Rosières, who was in straitened circumstances and did not enjoy the best of reputations. But his suspicions proved unfounded. Finally, as he had obtained from Forzinetti a copy of d'Ormescheville's report, the only documentary evidence of guilt that had been read out at the court-martial, he decided to make it public. Out of regard, however, for Forzinetti and Demange, whom he was anxious not to compromise, he abandoned that idea and resolved instead to bring out a brochure which he asked a young literary man named Bernard Lazare to draw up for him. Lazare compiled an account in which he summarized d'Ormescheville's report, Dreyfus's notes, and the statements of the handwriting experts, adding thereto an account of the ordeal inflicted on the prisoner by du Paty and all the facts familiar to those behind the scenes, but of which the general public were unaware. His conclusion was that the *bordereau* was the work of a forger. When, however, the brochure was completed, Mathieu Dreyfus hesitated to publish it, thinking it would perhaps be better to let things take their course.

In 1895 Colonel Sandherr, who for some time had been suffering from incipient general paralysis, was obliged to give up his post in the Secret Service. At the suggestion of de Boisdeffre and Zurlinden, who in January 1895 had succeeded Mercier at the War Office, Picquart, who had just been promoted Lieutenant-Colonel, was appointed to the vacant post, as from July 1st. Born at Strassburg on September 6, 1854, Picquart had received his early education at the Lycée of that city. Entering as a student at Saint Cyr, he came out fifth on the list of successful candidates. At twenty-six he obtained second place at the École d'État-Major. The scene of his subsequent career was

Africa, where, in 1878, he was captain of Zouaves; he afterwards served in Tonkin and on the Chinese frontier, where, as a member of General de Courcy's staff, he was promoted major and awarded the Legion of Honour. He was then twenty-three. On his return home, he was appointed professor at the École de Guerre, and, thereafter, to a post on General de Galliffet's staff.

Picquart had that alert, inquiring sort of mind that is always anxious to get to the bottom of things. He was fond of reading, of art, and, above all, of music; in addition to which he read and spoke several European languages. When he took over from Sandherr, the latter told him that de Boisdeffre was still cudgelling his brains over the Dreyfus case, and said that if any proof were wanted, all he had to do was to ask Henry for the little *dossier* that had been privately submitted to the judges.

In point of fact, Picquart had no sooner taken up his duties than de Boisdeffre came to him and said, "This Dreyfus business is not done with yet. It's only just beginning." Being at a loss to understand why an officer of Dreyfus's reputation and prosperous circumstances should go in for playing the traitor, he considered it his duty to look into things and try to find out what had never yet been discovered, namely, the motive for the crime, and whether any other leakages apart from those referred to in the *bordereau* had taken place. Picquart wished to apply to the police headquarters, but was dissuaded by Henry. The latter, who had hoped to come in for Sandherr's post, had been greatly annoyed that Picquart, a younger man than he, should have been promoted over his head. This, however, he kept to himself. He had risen from the ranks, and had all the cunning and duplicity of the typical peasant. He flattered his new chief and gained his confidence. Knowing his anti-Jewish sentiments, he warned him against the Civil Service people, saying that the Jews had got them all in the palm of their hand. He advised him, rather, to make use of Guénée's services. Guénée was therefore instructed to

make fresh inquiries. They lasted several months, and only resulted in a quantity of vague hearsay.

Picquart, who was convinced that Dreyfus was guilty, made some investigations on his own account. Thinking that the prisoner and his family might possibly be corresponding in invisible ink, he had their letters heated with an iron to see if he could find any traces of clandestine communications. There was no result.

In October 1895 Henry, without consulting his chief, laid a trap for Dreyfus. He persuaded the *Administration Pénitentiaire* to forward him a letter, quite an ordinary, harmless sort of letter signed "Your old cousin, L. Blenheim." Dreyfus, who had already received other letters of this kind, which he imagined to be some curious form of practical joke, tossed it into a drawer. Between the lines, however, Henry had caused to be written, in an ink that only became visible after being exposed for a certain time to the light, a message reading as follows :

"Thread broken. Try and renew it. Both our attempts were failures. We are obliged to go very carefully. Whole thing nearly found out. State whereabouts 2249. Jura 34 known."

Henry thought that these lines would show up in the course of transit from Paris to Devil's Island, and that the General Staff would see that an accomplice was still keeping up correspondence with the traitor. However, the thing being in an envelope, the light had had no effect upon it. It was not until long afterwards, when he had got back to France and was sorting out his papers, that Dreyfus noticed the trap they had tried to set for him.

Pursuing his investigations, Picquart received in the course of the next few months a certain number of alleged proofs of the prisoner's guilt. In July an Italian woman notified him of the existence of two letters of Dreyfus's which were in the hands of a senior officer in the Italian Army. They were dated December 1892 and May 1893 respectively. Picquart

was by no means convinced. Nevertheless he showed the woman's letter to Cordier and Sandherr. They had already been approached by the same woman and, having had anything but a flattering account of her, advised Picquart to be on his guard.

In October 1895 the woman Bastian handed him a torn fragment in Schwartzkoppen's writing, consisting of about twenty lines. When the pieces were joined together the name Dreyfus appeared, followed by the first four letters of the name Boisdeffre. After this came a gap, followed by some words crossed out and, farther on, "I can't here," and, finally, the following :

"The paper got into the hands of the military attaché or of the General Staff in Berlin. What I can say for certain is that it really reached the hands of one of the military attachés and afterwards found its way back again to the Intelligence Department."

On other fragments the following names appeared : Berger, Giovaninelli, Saussier, Négrier ; then the words of a toast proposed by the Russian General Bogolubof at the conclusion of the manœuvres. Picquart showed this paper to his chiefs who, like him, attached no importance to it. It was apparently part of a report drawn up by Schwartzkoppen on the manœuvres at which he had been present. In it he seems merely to have been repeating what de Boisdeffre had said about Dreyfus.

On December 28, 1895, there reached the office by the normal channel—that is to say, through the woman Bastian—a sort of memorandum written by Schwartzkoppen, half in French, half in German, the translation of which read as follows :

"Third letter *re* 120 allotted to 9th Army artillery. Find out why the 9th Army has not had any up to now."

Other papers came to hand, but they were of no importance. But still the leakages went on. Indeed, they had never

ceased. Even while the Dreyfus trial was in progress, Schwartzkoppen had sent to General Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff, documents concerning "manœuvres de forteresse" at Paris and Toul. A watch was kept on an ex-officer called Hequet d'Orval, a cousin of du Paty de Clam's, but nothing came of it. At this juncture Picquart thought he would make a few changes in the working of his department. Hitherto the woman Bastian had always handed the papers she collected to Henry. Henry took them home, picked out what he wanted, burned what he considered of no value, put together the pieces that were in French, and handed on to Lauth those that were in foreign languages. In due course the whole lot were given to the chief of the department.

Picquart now gave orders that, in future, all papers should be brought direct to him. He would do the initial sorting, and then hand on such fragments as he thought fit to Lauth to be pieced together. Furthermore, since neither he nor his coadjutors knew anything about law, he decided to refer all contentious matters to an old friend whom he had known from childhood, a man named Leblois, an ex-magistrate at present practising at the Paris bar and Deputy-Maire of the 7th Arrondissement. Thus it came about that, early in 1896, he submitted to Leblois an ordinary case of espionage involving a man named Boulot, a non-commissioned officer in the engineers at Toul, who had sold a plan to the Germans. Several civilians were said to be implicated. Following an inquiry held on the spot by Henry, it was established that Boulot had had no civilian accomplices, and that he was in consequence solely amenable to the military courts. Picquart forwarded this ruling to Cavaignac, the then Minister for War, who duly ratified it.

The other matter submitted to Leblois in April 1896 had reference to carrier-pigeons. Picquart wanted to know whether the order of September 15, 1895, concerning the registration of these birds, and the regulations regarding their employment, carried with them any penalty in case of

infringement. There were two files, one of them secret, the other containing official documents, newspaper articles, brochures, etc. Picquart called for these files from the registrar, Gribelin, kept the first one himself, and passed on the other to Leblois, requesting him to examine it in an office adjoining his own. After scrutinizing the documents, Leblois gave it as his opinion that the acts in question were only punishable by a trivial fine. There the matter rested for the moment. But some time afterwards the Chamber made the requisite amendment to the existing regulations.

At this juncture an event took place which was destined to throw fresh light on the obscurity in which the Dreyfus affair was enshrouded. In March 1896 Henry, who had already been compelled to absent himself in connection with the Boulot affair, extended his absence and went on to Pogny, where his mother was lying ill. The day before he went he had an interview with the woman Bastian, who gave him several packages containing her booty. As he was in a hurry to get away, he took them straight to Picquart, who passed them on next day to Lauth.

The latter set to work, and in one of the packages lighted upon the fragments of an express letter (*petit bleu*) that had been torn into about thirty pieces. These he joined together with transparent paper. The form was not stamped, and the writer, having decided not to send it, had torn it up. The wording and address of the missive were as follows :

M. LE COMMANDANT ESTERHAZY,
27, rue de la Bienfaisance, Paris.

MONSIEUR,

What I am specially anxious to have is a more detailed explanation than you gave me the other day concerning the matter that is pending. I beg, therefore, that you will let me have it in writing, so that I may know whether I may continue my relations with the Maison R. or not.

(Signed) C.

When he gave the express letter to Picquart, Lauth said, "This is awful. Have we got another one?" Although he had quite made up his mind that Dreyfus was guilty, Picquart considered that the thing had been made public too soon. If this was another traitor, he was going to take care that his name should not be published prematurely, and so, before even mentioning the matter to his chiefs, he made up his mind to conduct some preliminary inquiries on his own account.

Esterhazy* belonged to the 74th Regiment of the line quartered in Paris. Picquart, who had a friend, a Major Curé, in the same regiment, asked him to come to his office, and, without saying a word to him about the *petit bleu*, asked him what he knew about Esterhazy. Curé answered that he had no use for a bounder like that, and gave anything but a flattering portrait of him:—a loose liver, always short of money, a Stock Exchange plunger, always touting for secret information; especially interested in artillery and gunnery; managed to get himself twice nominated for the gunnery schools, and went a third time at his own expense. Lastly, he got privates to come and copy out all sorts of papers at his rooms. Then he added that Esterhazy had borrowed a collection of gunnery instructions from the Colonel, and various other documents from Captain Dagenet.

After receiving this information, Picquart asked Henry whether *he* knew anything about Esterhazy. Henry replied

* Marie Charles Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy, born 23 rue de Clichy, Paris, December 16, 1847, came of an old Hungarian family. He had lost his father when he was ten. His mother, though by no means well off, sent him to school at the Lycée Bonaparte. He was nineteen when his mother died. Realizing how restricted were his means, Esterhazy betook himself to Rome, entered the Roman Legion in 1869, from which he resigned a year later to enroll himself in the Foreign Legion. In 1870 he was appointed sub-lieutenant. About 1878 we find him attached to the Intelligence Department, where he became acquainted with Henry and Weil. He relinquished this post in order to join the Tunisian expedition. In 1886 he married the daughter of the Marquis de Nettancourt.

that he had known him a long time ago, when they were working together in the Secret Service Department with a man named Maurice Weil, but that since those days he had lost sight of him. Picquart determined to make some private inquiries regarding Esterhazy. Not caring to entrust Guénée with these investigations—he did not think him cautious enough—he consulted Henry and, on his advice, applied to Desvernine, one of two special commissioners of police told off for duty at the War Office. The results of the inquiry confirmed what Curé had said in his report and established that Esterhazy kept a mistress, a *demi-mondaine* called Pays, to whom he gave an allowance of five hundred francs a month. He had taken a flat for her at No. 49 rue de Douai, where he visited her every evening, not returning home till a very advanced hour.

While these inquiries were being made, Picquart had the *petit bleu* photographed by Lauth. The first proofs, which reproduced all the mutilations in the card, looked like a black mass. Picquart asked Lauth to let him have some more proofs, requesting him to do away with the marks so that the wording might be more legible. He also asked, in the event of these proofs being circulated about the department, that they should show no indication of the origin of the document.

At the end of May Picquart had to obtain leave to go and visit his mother who was lying dangerously ill at Versailles, and who died on June 12th. Then he went off on a tour with General de Boisdeffre and the General Staff. In the course of this journey Commandant Pauffin de Saint-Maurel, the adjutant, showed him a letter from Colonel Foucault, the French military attaché in Berlin. In this letter Foucault told Boisdeffre that he had had a visit from a man named Richard Cuers, lately a spy in the German Secret Service, from which he had just been dismissed by Major Dome, who was at the head of it. Cuers knew that the French had a lot of papers that were very compromising for him, and was afraid of being blackmailed. He

begged for considerate treatment, and asked for an interview with a representative of the General Staff.

Not long afterwards Colonel Foucault came to Paris and gave Picquart a full account of his interview with Cuers. Cuers had told him that the German Headquarters Staff were still wondering for whom it was that Dreyfus had been working. General Schlieffen had been trying to find out, but the inquiries made by his agents at Brussels and elsewhere had been without result. On the other hand, Cuers had told him that the German General Staff had a French officer in their employ, the Commandant in an infantry battalion, aged between forty and fifty, who had given Schwartzkoppen a great deal of information about the French artillery, though none of it was of any particular value. He was ready to go into further details if they would arrange an interview.

Picquart, who was greatly exercised in his mind at the apparent resemblance between Esterhazy and the officer described, asked Foucault to arrange for an interview at Basle between Cuers and an officer he would send there for the purpose. Then he instructed Desvernine to let him have some specimens of Esterhazy's writing and to intercept letters addressed to him through the post.

Picquart picked on Lauth to go to Basle, and then, because Lauth did not care about going by himself, selected Henry to go with him. These two, as well as the detectives Tomps and Vuillecard, who had been placed at their disposal, reached Basle on the morning of August 6th. Cuers arrived soon after, and was taken by Vuillecard to the hotel in which the two officers had taken up their quarters. For more than two hours the discussion went on between the officers and Cuers. Afterwards, all three had lunch together. At three o'clock Henry turned his steps towards the station and declared to the men that there was nothing to be got out of that fellow. Lauth and Cuers, however, continued their talk and, towards evening, went and sat down on a seat on one of the promenades. Henry

again told Toms they had done no good ; Toms, knowing that Cuers had a taste for absinthe, offered to see what he could do ; but Henry would not allow it.

On their return next day to Paris, Lauth and Henry both told Picquart that Cuers had done nothing but repeat over again what he had already told Foucault, with this addition, however : that the suspected Commandant was a member of the Legion of Honour. Cuers had also enumerated four documents which it was said had been sent to Berlin, viz. reports on the rifle that was being tried at Châlons, on the quick-firing gun, on the entrenchments at Toul, and on the fortifications in the neighbourhood of Nancy. But he could not remember whether the date when these were sent was August 1893 or August 1894. In October 1895 the German General Staff became convinced that their correspondent was a spy on the other side, and instructed Schwartzkoppen to have nothing more to do with him. No one knew what happened after that.

Lauth and Henry both asserted that they had urged Cuers to tell them the traitor's name, but that Cuers had refused to reveal it despite the inducements that had been held out to him. Disappointed at this negative result, it was Picquart's idea that his two emissaries had played their cards badly. Colonel Foucault, however, who came back to Paris a few weeks later, expressed his astonishment at the strange emissaries that had been sent to Basle. Cuers had again been to see him, and had told him that these envoys had treated him in a most strange fashion. One of them, "the stout, red-faced man"—he meant Henry—had kept on breaking in to prevent his speaking. Subsequently, in a letter written to the *Figaro*, dated July 15, 1899, Cuers declared that he had told Lauth that Dreyfus had never been in the service of Germany, and that the only man Schwartzkoppen had had in his pay was a French major of Austrian extraction, who began his treasonable activities in the spring of 1893.

The evening of the very day when Lauth and Henry set out for Basle, General de Boisdeffre returned to Paris from

Vichy, where he had been taking a cure. Picquart, who went to the station to meet him, said, "I believe we have found another traitor," and he mentioned Esterhazy's name. De Boisdeffre listened with great attention, and complimented him on the prudent way in which he had gone to work. He told him to pursue his investigations, and authorized him to mention the matter to the War Minister. This Picquart did next day. Billot approved his conduct and, like de Boisdeffre, urged him to continue his inquiries.

Just at this time, however, either because he did not know he was being watched or because he *did* know it and thought he would brazen it out, Major Esterhazy took very active measures to try to get back to the War Office. He got some Deputies, as well as his friend Maurice Weil, to endorse his application. But seeing nothing in the offing, Esterhazy wrote to Jules Roche, the Deputy, who, he knew, was a friend of Billot's. Next he applied to Calmon, Billot's chief civilian secretary. Calmon spoke about the matter to Picquart, who at once informed Billot and de Boisdeffre. Billot told Calmon to hand over any letters he got from Esterhazy to the chief of the Secret Service. This was how Picquart obtained specimens of Esterhazy's handwriting. At the very first glance he was struck with the resemblance it bore to the writing of the *bordereau*. He at once hastened to compare them, and the identity between the two was as plain as daylight.

Hitherto he had never had any serious doubts that Dreyfus was guilty; but this time doubt got hold of him in real earnest. He was utterly dumbfounded. Unwilling to trust his own impressions, he had two of Esterhazy's letters photographed by Lauth, *minus* the dates and the signature. These he showed to du Paty de Clam and to Bertillon. "It's Mathieu Dreyfus's writing," exclaimed the former. "It's the same as the writing on the *bordereau*," cried the latter. Picquart pointed out that the letter was a recent production. "Well, then, the Jews have been training someone for a year past to imitate the writing," said Bertillon.

imperturbably, "and at last they've got it perfect." Then Picquart said he could tell him the name of the man who wrote the letter. "If you told me it was the President of the Republic himself, I shouldn't alter my opinion," retorted Bertillon.

Bertillon, in fact, had got it into his head that the Dreyfus family had discovered some crook or other who was training himself to imitate the condemned man's writing, so that at the required moment he might denounce himself as the writer of the *bordereau*.

Picquart left it at that. The two experiments he had just made confirmed him in his belief that the handwriting of Esterhazy was the handwriting of the *bordereau*. He therefore set himself to study that document very carefully, and began to wonder whether or not Esterhazy could have been an accomplice of Dreyfus. His examination showed him that the sentence "I'm just off to manœuvres," though hardly applicable to Dreyfus, fitted Esterhazy's case perfectly. So also did the manual on gunnery. As for the other particulars, there was nothing to prove that they had emanated from an officer on the Staff.

Feeling that his conviction of Dreyfus's guilt was being rudely shaken, Picquart resolved that he would have a look at the "little dossier," which the judges alone had seen. It was brought to him by Gribelin, the registrar. It was night, and Picquart, alone in his office, opened the envelope, which bore no seal, and on which Henry had written his initials in blue pencil. Here, if anywhere, he thought, he would find those sure proofs of which Gonse, Sandherr, du Paty, and Henry had so often spoken to him. Great was his amazement when he realized the insignificance of these paltry documents, not one of which necessarily applied to Dreyfus at all. Now, for the first time, it was borne in upon him that the prisoner on Devil's Island was unquestionably an innocent man. The very next day Picquart drew up a memorandum in which he brought out all the points that told against Esterhazy and handed it to General de Bois-

deffre, telling him what he had discovered. When he mentioned the "secret *dossier*," the General started violently and exclaimed, "Why wasn't that burnt as arranged?" Picquart, taken aback at this question, answered that when he took over from Sandherr, the latter had specially mentioned the secret *dossier*.

De Boisdeffre, who thus learnt for the first time that Sandherr had disobeyed orders, listened right through to what Picquart had to say, and then told him to go and report his discovery to General Gonse. Picquart went to see Gonse, who was then at Corneilles-en-Parisis, and repeated all that he had said to de Boisdeffre. Gonse listened patiently, and then merely remarked, "So it looks as if there has been a mistake." And when Picquart asked him what he had better do, he said, "Keep the two things quite distinct, the Dreyfus affair and the Esterhazy affair." When he got back to Paris, Picquart reported to de Boisdeffre what Gonse had said to him. De Boisdeffre told him to act accordingly.

While these events were taking place behind the scenes, Mathieu Dreyfus was going on with his inquiries. He pursued them with the greater energy seeing that his brother's letters were becoming more and more heart-rending. The unfortunate prisoner was nearly at the end of his tether. Mathieu Dreyfus, realizing that he was making no progress, at last made up his mind to publish Bernard Lazare's pamphlet. But he thought he ought first to arouse public opinion, to reawaken interest in the affair, lest the brochure should pass unnoticed. With this idea in mind he got into touch with an English journalist, who gave out in the columns of the *South Wales Argus* a false report of Dreyfus's escape. The whole British Press repeated the announcement, and the news-agencies telegraphed it to Paris on September 3rd. André Lebon, the Colonial Minister, at once cabled out to Guiana, and received a denial, which was immediately published by all the French newspapers. At first the rumour had caused no great sensation. But a little later Drumont and Rochefort decided they would make

the most of it. They gave out that the Jew financiers had tried to bribe the judges in 1894. Brisset, they said, had been offered a million. The hostile demonstrations which took place at La Rochelle, when Dreyfus was being put on board ship, were pure humbug. The crowd was made up of the condemned man's friends, who pretended to hoot and jeer, but who only wanted to get near enough to him to effect a rescue and carry him off, etc. In the face of this outburst of the anti-Jewish Press, André Lebon felt uneasy about his position. He had become a Minister of State at thirty-seven, and was extremely ambitious; now he grew alarmed, and resolved to do something to soothe Messrs. Drumont and Rochefort. He knew, of course, perfectly well that an escape was utterly impossible, nor was he unaware, from the reports of the prison authorities, that the behaviour of the prisoner was perfectly submissive and resigned. Nevertheless he cabled the Governor of Guiana as follows:

"Until further orders Dreyfus is to be kept in his hut under double lock by night. The airing-ground round his cabin must be surrounded by a strong fence with a sentry on guard outside, in addition to the one inside."

He also gave orders that a sloop should be anchored in the roads of the Iles du Salut, and that all access to Devil's Island was to be strictly prohibited. On the morning of Sunday, September 6th, Lebar, the head-warder, came to bring this news to his prisoner. He would no longer be permitted to walk in that part of the island which had been hitherto reserved for him, but only in the space immediately surrounding his hut. He then told him he would be put in irons during the night. At the foot of his bed, which consisted of three planks, a bar of iron was riveted. It was shaped like a spit, with a pair of iron manacles in the middle, each fitted with a double lock. These were to encircle the prisoner's ankles. The torture of such a contrivance in the stifling nights was agonizing.

At daybreak the warders released the prisoner, but when

he first got up he could hardly stand. He was forbidden to quit his hut, in which he was now forced to remain day and night. At night, he was again put into irons, and for forty subsequent nights this treatment went on. In time his ankles became raw and bleeding and had to be surgically dressed. His warders, moved to compassion, secretly banded his feet before putting them in irons. Dreyfus, who was completely in the dark regarding the reason for this new torture, asked his warders why it was inflicted. None of them, except Lebar, who was a perfect specimen of the brute, could give any reason; but they showed by their looks how much they pitied him. The Governor-General of the islands, who came to see him, said, with some degree of compassion, that this new treatment was not to be looked on as a punishment, for they had no fault to find with him, but only as a precautionary measure. Fearing that he would not be able to hold out much longer, Dreyfus abandoned the diary he was writing, and concluded with the following appeal to the President of the Republic:

"I beg to request that you will authorize this diary, which I have written up day by day, to be handed over to my wife. There will perhaps be found in it, Monsieur le Président, explosions of anger, outbursts of horror against the most frightful sentence which has ever been inflicted on a human being who never forfeited his good name. I do not think that I have courage enough to re-read it and to go through that terrible journey again.

"I indulge in no recriminations against anybody. Everyone believed he was doing to the full what his rights and his conscience dictated. I merely repeat once more that I am innocent, and I still make but one request, one and the same, namely, that he who is really guilty, the perpetrator of this abominable crime, should be sought out and exposed.

"On the day when light shall be thrown on this matter let all the pity that so great a misfortune can inspire be showered upon my beloved wife and children."

Finally, on November 12th, the two palisades ordered by André Lebon, both of them ten feet high, were constructed and put into position. The first was five feet from the cabin, the second surrounded an airing court sixteen yards long and forty wide. Dreyfus was allowed to walk there in the daytime accompanied by a warder, but he could no longer see the shrubs of the island, nor the waves of the sea. The day after Lebon had sent orders to put Dreyfus in irons, a letter addressed to the prisoner arrived at his office. It was written in a round hand, and the signature, more or less illegible, might have been Weill, Weiss, or Weyler. The letter in itself was quite ordinary, and spoke about the marriage of a young girl to a Jew in Basle. But between the lines the following words in invisible ink were quite easy to read :

“Impossible to make out last communication. Go back to old plan for reply. State clearly where interesting documents were and how cupboard worked. The active party ready to act immediately.”

The contents of this letter were made known by Lebon to Billot, the War Minister, and to Picquart, who spoke of it to de Boisdeffre. The original was sent by Lebon to Bertillon ; Picquart called on the latter in order to examine the handwriting. Bertillon showed him the document, and declared that he saw in it a fresh proof that the Dreyfus family had trained some worthless fellow to imitate the writing of the *bordereau*.

Picquart, although he was quite certain now that Dreyfus had been unjustly condemned, could not help wondering whether Mathieu Dreyfus had been driven in desperation to get round some poor devil to take upon himself the crime imputed to his brother. He therefore considered that he ought to waste no time in completing his inquiries about Esterhazy. So he went to see Colonel Abria and asked him for some more specimens of Esterhazy's writing. These made

him only the more certain in his mind that Esterhazy was the author of the *bordereau*.

In possession of these documents, Picquart wrote on September 5th to Gonse, who was then at Cormeilles-en-Parisis, to tell him of his new proofs, and suggested that they should be submitted to the experts of 1894. On the 7th, the General replied telling him to wait a little longer, for submitting the papers to experts would mean letting more people into the secret. Picquart kept his patience, but on the 8th he wrote to Gonse saying he would carry out his instructions, although it was his duty to point out that several signs, and one grave occurrence—the letter signed Weill, Weiss, or Weyler—showed that some people, who were convinced that a mistake had been committed in 1894, were going to create a big scandal.

"If," he added, "we lose too much time, someone else will take the initiative, and this, quite apart from loftier considerations, won't make us show up any too well. . . . It would be a nasty business, which can easily be avoided by doing what ought to be done in time."

This was followed by another letter from Gonse, who advised extreme circumspection and said he would be back in Paris on September 15th. The day before these occurrences, the *Éclair* came out with an anonymous article entitled *The Traitor*, in which the writer, after a general survey of the case, declared that in 1894 the General Staff had intercepted a letter in cipher which was addressed by the German military attachés to their Italian colleagues and contained the following sentence: "There is no doubt that this hound Dreyfus is getting too exacting by half." A few days afterwards an officer attached to the Secret Service had sent Sandherr another letter, unsigned, which had been found at the German Embassy. It announced the despatch of five documents. The paper quoted the exact wording of this letter, which was none other than the famous *bordereau*. This document—added the writer of the article—was submitted to a number of officers, and one of them, on

comparing the writing with that of Dreyfus, who had served for a time in his office, pointed out the resemblance to General Mercier, who said, "I was already aware of it." Dreyfus's guilt was therefore established by these two documents. The writer wound up his article by relating the story of Dreyfus's arrest, the dictation test which du Paty de Clam had made him undergo, and then added that the letter in which Dreyfus was mentioned by name had been secretly submitted to the judges while they were deliberating in private.

When Picquart saw this article, he put it down to Mathieu Dreyfus, and sent it off at once to Gonse, adding that it looked as if his words were coming true. Gonse immediately returned to Paris and had Picquart round to his office. The conversation turned upon the article in the *Éclair*. Picquart wanted to have the offices of the paper searched and the manuscript impounded. Gonse replied that this would be *ultra vires*, and that he would refer the matter to de Boisdeffre, who was attending some manoeuvres in Charente. Then the possibility of there having been a miscarriage of justice was touched upon, and the following conversation ensued:

"What does it matter to you," asked Gonse, "if this Jew is kept on Devil's Island?"

"But, *mon Général*, he is innocent!"

"The case can't be reopened. General Mercier and General Saussier were both mixed up in it."

"Yes; but if he is an innocent man . . ."

"If you keep your mouth shut, no one will be any the wiser."

"That is an abominable thing to say, *mon Général*. I don't know what course I shall take, but, anyhow, I'm not going to take this secret with me into the grave."

That ended the interview. Next day, Gonse sent for Picquart and, without referring to the scene of the previous day, asked him what he was going to do about Esterhazy. Picquart reminded him of the memorandum he had written

on September 1st, in which it was suggested that Esterhazy should be summoned to the War Office and there questioned about his relations with Schwartzkoppen, the *petit bleu*, and the *bordereau*. Gonse said, "That would be going too fast; we haven't got facts enough yet." Picquart suggested that Esterhazy should be arrested and sent to the Cherche-Midi. Gonse would not hear of it. Picquart, knowing that Esterhazy was attending the manœuvres, proposed that they should send him a telegram bringing in some of the phrases of the *petit bleu*, and asking him to come to Paris. If he came, a police officer would be posted at the station with orders to follow him and keep an eye on him wherever he went. Gonse approved, but said he would have to see de Boisdeffre about it, and he waited till the latter came back, which he did on the 18th. The previous day, Henry, who had been on leave of absence, returned to duty. De Boisdeffre, on being informed of Picquart's proposal, rejected the idea of searching the *Éclair* offices, and also of placing Esterhazy under arrest. With regard to sending a telegram, it was very late in the day, as the manœuvres were nearly over, but he told Picquart to see the War Minister about it. Picquart did so, unfolded his plan, and added that, if it came off, Esterhazy would have to be arrested immediately.

"Ah, no," cried Billot, "I'm not going to be another Mercier!"

Picquart said he would not act without orders, and Billot would not give them; so there for a time the matter rested. Seeing, however, that the article in the *Éclair* was not officially denied, Madame Dreyfus sent a petition to the Chamber on September 16th, in which she pointed out that a French officer had been condemned on the strength of a document which had been included in the evidence against him without his knowledge, and which he had had no opportunity of rebutting. And she went on to pray that justice might be done.

In view of the small encouragement his efforts had received, Picquart was rather at a loss as to how he should

continue his investigations. True, de Boisdeffre and Gonse had both said, "Go ahead, but do it guardedly." As, however, they refused to grant him the means of acting at all, he was distinctly in a quandary. However, he questioned Mulot, a private, who had at one time been secretary to Esterhazy, and also Captain Le Rond. Mulot confessed that he had made copies of several documents relating to artillery and gunnery, but he did not recognize the manual. Le Rond declared that Esterhazy had put questions to him about the artillery, and also about some shell or other. At the end of September, Esterhazy's regiment was ordered to Rouen. The Major himself, who was frequently in desperate need of money, was often in Paris. He raised loans, sold some of his securities, allowed bills to be protested, consented to let his name appear on the board of some financial company or other, and, finally, having made up his mind to bluff it out, renewed his application for a post in the War Office. Two Deputies, Roche and Montebello, General Giovaninelli and his friend Weil, used their influence on his behalf with the War Minister. Not only did Billot refuse to be talked over, but he authorized Picquart to have Esterhazy's rooms searched. Desvernine, a police officer, accordingly went to Esterhazy's rooms. They were up to let, and all he found was a couple of visiting-cards of Drumont's, on one of which he thanked Esterhazy for his sympathy, and on the other referred to some information that had passed between them.

Meanwhile Picquart, having business with Cavard, the Chief Secretary of the Prefect of Police, made mention of the letter in invisible ink signed Weill, Weiss, or Weyler.

"The Dreyfus family," he said, "are going to do a foolish thing. They will only get themselves into hot water."

"H'm. . . . Yes," answered Cavard, "unless the letter is a forgery."

That remark was like a flash of light for Picquart, who realized his mistake in putting the letter down to Mathieu Dreyfus. He at once hurried round to Bertillon to put him on his guard. It happened that just before he arrived

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Bertillon had had a replica of the letter made by one of his employees. It was a perfect copy. Only the sentences in invisible ink had been left out. Proud of his work, Bertillon told Picquart that the facsimile was going to be sent out to Dreyfus. They would then see what he did. Picquart said nothing, and the experiment was carried out. Dreyfus received the letter, but could make nothing of it, and stowed it away with the letter from "Cousin Blenheim" which Henry had sent in October 1895.

A few days after he got back from leave, Henry drew Gonse's attention to a paper that had been filed away in the secret *dossiers* and dated by the office, March 1894. This was a letter in pencil from Panizzardi to a colleague of Schwartzkoppen's. It ran as follows :

MY DEAR FRIEND,

Last night I ended up by sending for the doctor, who told me I mustn't go out. As I can't get to you to-morrow, I should be very glad if you would come round and see me in the morning as . . . has brought me a number of interesting things, and we must split up the work as we have only ten days to do it in. See, therefore, if you can't tell the Embassy that you cannot put in an appearance.

In this note the bringer of the interesting things was denoted by the initial "P," but the "P" had been rubbed out—doubtless by Henry—and a "D" put in its place. Gonse did not notice this, and Henry filed it away without letting Picquart see it.

These various things had all contributed to make matters rather uncomfortable in the Intelligence Department. Not only was Picquart not backed up, he was positively obstructed by his chiefs de Boisdoffre and Gonse, and he felt all the time that his subordinates, Lauth, Henry, and Gribelin, were secretly hostile. They were all beginning to look on him as rather a trying person, the sort of man who

will insist on bothering over things which everyone else regards as over and done with. He would have to be got out of the way, and quickly too, because Parliament would be meeting again on October 27th, and the Deputy Castelin was down to interpellate Billot on recent incidents connected with Dreyfus: the attempted escape, the articles in the *Éclair*. They had got, therefore, to act promptly. De Boisdeffre and Gonse undertook to do the necessary. They hinted to the War Minister that for some time past Picquart had had his head so full of the Dreyfus case that his work had been suffering in consequence. They reminded him that the young Colonel had cut an excellent figure at Tonking and suggested that, for his own sake and quite apart from anything else, it would be a good thing to send him back there. At first Billot did not quite fall in with the idea, but after a while he allowed himself to be talked over and agreed to send him on special service, not to Tonking, but to the Eastern Frontier, where he should have charge of the Intelligence Department.

When he heard about this, Picquart, who still had complete confidence in Henry, spoke to him at length for the first time about Dreyfus and told him how he had become convinced of his innocence. And somehow, as he was telling him, he got the impression that Henry had already had the whole from Gonse.

Billot signed the order for Picquart's mission on October 27th, but he did not want to notify Picquart himself officially until after Castelin's interpellation in the Chamber. However, on October 30th, General Gonse asked the Colonel to let him have the secret *dossier* that Gribelin had given him. Picquart gave it him, and suggested that the documents should be re-sorted, but Gonse refused.

Castelin's interpellation, which was making Billot so nervous, was down for November 18th. Two weeks before, Henry executed the most notorious of his forgeries, the one which afterwards became known as "le faux Henry." It was destined to play so important a part in the case that it

will be well to describe it here, so that the full measure of its cunning may be thoroughly understood.

On November 1st Henry was sorting out the contents of a packet of papers which the Bastian woman had given him the day before when he came across some pieces of a letter, complete with envelope, which Panizzardi had written to Schwartzkoppen. This letter—it was about an appointment, and was quite insignificant in itself—was written in blue pencil on square-ruled paper with faint blue lines. It was signed *Alexandrine*, one of the names assumed by the Italian attaché, and began with the words "Mon cher ami." Henry asked Gonse for the *dossier* which Picquart had just given him. From it he detached a short note of Schwartzkoppen's and a letter from Panizzardi which resembled the one he had just found among la Bastian's collection. This letter, also signed *Alexandrine*, was an invitation to dinner two or three years before, which Henry had pieced together, and which was also written on square-ruled paper but in faint mauve lines. Moreover, the space between the lines differed slightly from that on the new letter.

Henry used these two letters to fabricate one new one, entrusting the actual execution of the task to one of his men, Lemercier-Picard. From the recent letter from Panizzardi, Henry cut out the blank spaces which he put end to end, and, on them, Lemercier-Picard, imitating Panizzardi's hand, wrote the following words:

"I have read that a Deputy is going to ask some questions about Dreyfus. If they want some further explanations from Rome, I shall say that I never had anything to do with this Jew. That's understood. If anyone asks you, say the same thing, for no one must ever know about our business with him."

Then he did the same thing with Panizzardi's earlier letter, the one taken from the secret *dossier*, on the blank spaces of which Lemercier-Picard wrote as follows:

"Here is the manual, for which I paid (180) for you as arranged. It will be all right, Wednesday at eight p.m. at Laurent's. I've invited three from my Embassy, one of them a Jew. Mind you turn up."

The first sentence and the third were invented by Henry. The second was in the original. These tasks completed, there remained of the two genuine letters the two beginnings: *Mon cher ami*, and the two signatures: *Alexandrine*. On each of the letters fabricated by Lemer cier-Picard, Henry gummed a beginning and a signature. The result was that he had two letters of which the first three words (*Mon cher ami*) and the signature, *Alexandrine*, were in Panizzardi's own hand, but of which all the rest was an imitation of the Italian attaché's writing executed by Lemer cier-Picard. The work done, Henry wrote in red ink in the corner of the "Here is the manual" letter, the date June 14, 1894, so that it should be available for purposes of comparison.

However, in gumming the different pieces together, Henry made one fatal mistake which, later on, gave the whole thing away. He gummed the pieces with the faint blue lines on to the letter with the mauve lines, and vice-versa, so that the squares on the forged letters were not of the same colour, nor exactly of the same size. Henry also made another mistake when he dated the letter beginning "Here is the manual" June 1894, for at that time there was no Jew on the Italian Embassy Staff. A few days later Henry made use of Schwartzkoppen's note, which he had taken from the file, to get a reply forged by Lemer cier-Picard in which the German attaché was supposed to be reassuring his Italian colleague.

On November 2nd, the day after he had manufactured it, Henry went to Gonse with the faked Panizzardi letter, signed *Alexandrine*, about Castelin's interpellation, together with the envelope which he had been careful to keep. The General betrayed no astonishment at this providential arrival of a letter which, containing as it did the name of Dreyfus,

would afford convincing evidence of his guilt. By a tacit understanding between them, it was agreed that the letter should not be shown to Picquart; but they submitted it to de Boisdeffre, who, having compared it with the "Here is the manual" letter, dated June 14, 1894, satisfied himself that the writing in both cases was the same. He also agreed that it should not be shown to Picquart. Then de Boisdeffre went to Billot and told him about the new document, and Billot, also without evincing any particular emotion at its timely appearance, was genuinely relieved to think that Picquart had been on a false track.

During these months—October and November 1896—Mathieu Dreyfus, who was of course in the dark as to what was going on at Headquarters, and was also ignorant of the measures Lebon had taken against his brother, was very pleased at the stir made in the newspapers about the prisoner's reported escape. He also reflected with satisfaction that Castelin's interpellation would arouse public interest in the matter. Finally, he had recently received information that confirmed the confidential statements made by Félix Faure to Dr. Gibert and the revelations of the *Éclair* concerning the secret *dossier*.

On October 20th Maître Demange, happening to meet his confrère Maître Salles, told him that he was convinced of Dreyfus's innocence. Salles replied that he did not know all the evidence on which the charge was based. He went on to say that he had it on the authority of one of the judges that he and his colleagues brought in their verdict on the strength of documents that would have convinced Demange if he had seen them. From that day Demange never doubted that an illegality had been committed, and Mathieu Dreyfus resolved to publish Bernard Lazare's pamphlet which was entitled "A Miscarriage of Justice, the Truth about the Dreyfus Case." He had it printed in Brussels in an edition of three thousand copies, which he sent out on November 6th to all the Members of Parliament as well as to the Press. Bernard Lazare had made a few alterations in his original

draft and, refuting the article in the *Éclair*, pointed out that the secret document did not contain the full name "Dreyfus," but simply the initial "D—," for if the full name had appeared in the secret document the General Staff, which had not suspected Dreyfus before the appearance of the *bordereau*, would never have been in any doubt as to the identity of the culprit.

As soon as the brochure appeared, Lazare went and saw several journalists. De Rodays, editor of the *Figaro*, told him he believed Dreyfus was innocent, but said he couldn't drag his newspaper into the thing. Jaurès cold-shouldered him. Rochefort received him kindly, but said it was no good trying to stem the current of public opinion. Zévaès of the *Petite République* was hostile. Drumont said the "Syndicate" had been buying some confidential documents.

And now something occurred which threw a fresh light on the drama. On November 10, 1896, the *Matin* published a facsimile of the *bordereau* which Teyssonnières, one of the 1894 experts, had sold them. This was a great joy to Mathieu Dreyfus, who would now at last be in a position to have it examined by experts and show that the handwriting was not his brother's. De Boisdeffre and Gonse, on the other hand, were seriously perturbed. They thought someone was bound to notice that the writing was Esterhazy's.

Esterhazy, who had been at Dommartin, came back to Paris just before the *bordereau* was published. Recent events had unnerved him. In a letter dated November 6th to his friend Weil, he compared himself to an animal hunted by dogs. He was very hard up, and implored Weil to get some money for him out of the Jews, who were at the root of all his troubles. Drumont, his old friend Drumont, would surely be able to requite him.

But when, on the very day after his return, Esterhazy clapped eyes on the *bordereau* in the *Matin*, his misgivings changed to positive terror. Thinking the game was up, he wrote to Colonel Abria saying he was ill and found himself compelled to defer his return to Rouen. For three or four

days he was rushing about all over Paris, first to his mistress, then to Weil, then to his club, then to the post-office. Desvernine, the detective who was keeping on his track, informed Picquart of his restless activities, but by this time Picquart was powerless. Under pressure from de Boisdeffre and Gonse, to whom Henry's latest forgery had lent fresh confidence, Billot gave instructions that Picquart should be packed off on his special duty. Picquart bowed to the inevitable, handed over his duties to Gonse, and gave back the *petit bleu* to Henry. He left Paris on November 16th. On the 18th Castelin made his promised interpellation in the Chamber. The speaker, after declaring that Dreyfus was a traitor and therefore no longer a Frenchman, launched an attack on his defenders, and demanded that Bernard Lazare should be prosecuted for divulging official secrets. Billot intervened, and said that Dreyfus had been duly and lawfully tried and condemned. The Chamber approved and, with only five dissentients, passed on to other business.

Madame Dreyfus's petition was shelved and forgotten.

CHAPTER IV

HENRY SUCCEEDS PICQUART.—THE *SPERANZA* FORGERY.—THE ERASURE ON THE *PETIT BLEU*.—ESTERHAZY AND HIS COUSIN CHRISTIAN.—BERNARD LAZARE'S SECOND BROCHURE.—HENRY'S BACKSTAIRS MOVE AGAINST PICQUART.—PICQUART COMES TO PARIS.—HE TELLS LEBLOIS OF DREYFUS'S INNOCENCE.—ENTER SCHEURER-KESTNER.—ESTERHAZY ON HALF-PAY.—COLLUSION BETWEEN ESTERHAZY AND HEADQUARTERS.—THE *ESPÉRANCE* LETTER.—LEBRUN-RENAULT'S MEMORANDUM.—THE ULTRA-SECRET *DOSSIER*.—FORGED LETTERS FROM DREYFUS TO THE EMPEROR AND THE ANNOTATED *BORDEREAU*.—THE INTERVIEW IN THE PARC MONTSOURIS.—THE EUPATORIA ROMANCE.—ESTERHAZY'S LETTERS TO BILLOT AND FÉLIX FAURE.—THE CONVINCING DOCUMENT.—THE *SPERANZA* AND *BLANCHE* TELEGRAMS.—THE *VIDI* AND *DIXI* ARTICLES.—MATHIEU DREYFUS DENOUNCES ESTERHAZY.

AFTER Picquart's departure, Henry became the effective head of the Intelligence Department, Gonse being no more than its titular chief. Adopting the methods of the Secret Service, he took upon himself to open all personal letters addressed to Picquart before sending them on. At the end of November he came upon a letter, dated the 27th of that month, written half in French and half in Spanish. This communication, which was signed J., was from an ex-private named Germain Ducasse, who had been employed by Picquart in the Intelligence Department, and was animated by feelings of grateful affection for his former chief. He had subsequently taken up an appointment as secretary to an old friend of the Colonel's, the Comtesse Blanche de Comminges. Ducasse still retained one habit he had acquired in his old secret-service days, and that was a craze for wrapping up the most ordinary items of news in words of portentous mysteriousness. Thus it happened that, in the letter in question, the following cryptic sentence occurred :

"The great work is accomplished: Cagliostro is again Robert-Houdin . . . the demigod inquires every day of the Countess when he will be able to see *le bon Dieu*."

Now, this is the explanation of this mumbo-jumbo announcement. After he had succeeded Sandherr, Picquart had got Desvernine to fix up microphones in the chimneys of the suite of rooms occupied by the German attachés in a house immediately opposite their Embassy. The flat above had been taken by the Intelligence Department, so that their men could listen-in to all that their attachés said. Early in November 1896 the chimneys were swept, after which the microphones, which had been temporarily removed, were put back in their places. This was the news that Ducasse was announcing to his former chief. The "great work" was the chimney-sweeping; Cagliostro was Desvernine, now once more Robert-Houdin; the demigod was Captain Lallemand, a frequent visitor at the Comtesse de Comminges', where they used to nickname Picquart, *le bon Dieu*!

Henry, puzzled by this letter, had a copy made of it before sending it on; then, himself making use of the strange phraseology, he had another letter made up, signed *Speranza*, and purporting to be addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Georges Picquart. Henry's idea was that this forged letter would make it look as if his ex-chief was in the service of that Jewish syndicate which the anti-Semite Press talked so much about. This was how it ran:

Paris, 12.35 a.m.—I have just left the house; our friends are in a state of consternation; your unfortunate departure has upset everything. Come back as soon as you can—don't lose a moment. As the holiday-time will be very favourable for the cause, we shall count on you for the 20th. *She* is ready, but *she* cannot and will not act until she has had a talk with you. When the demigod has spoken we shall get to work.

Henry showed this to Gonse on December 15th, saying that he had opened it inadvertently, thinking it was some-

thing that concerned the department. Then he filed away, on the Picquart *dossier*, the copy of Ducasse's letter and the forged letter signed *Speranza*. In addition to all this, Henry, some time before Picquart's departure, had suggested to Toms, the detective who had been detailed to investigate the publication of the *bordereau* by the *Matin*, that he should say it was Picquart who had given the *bordereau* to the newspaper. Now that Picquart had gone, Henry repeated his suggestion. But Toms, whose investigations left no room for doubt, replied that the facsimile had been submitted by Teyssonnières, the handwriting expert, and he refused to alter his report.

But Henry had not yet done. Taking the *petit bleu* that Picquart had given him, he scratched out the name Esterhazy on the address, and then wrote it in again over the partially obliterated characters, but without joining the letters up, and employing a different handwriting from that of the communication itself. His idea was to make people think that the message had been intended, not for Esterhazy, but for someone living at the same address, and that Picquart had scratched out the real name and written in Esterhazy's instead. He then took his handiwork to Gonse, who, pretending not to see the erasure, put it away in his cabinet.

Henry was something of a past-master in the art of forgery; but he was not quite careful enough. Thus, when he "faked" the *petit bleu*, he quite forgot that Picquart had had it photographed by Lauth, and so he omitted to destroy the negative and the prints. We shall see later on what came of this oversight.

Three weeks later, on January 4, 1897, the death occurred of the Marquis de Nettancourt, Esterhazy's father-in-law. The *Éclair* published an obituary notice. Henry cut it out and wrote on it in red pencil January 6, 1896, and filed it away at the beginning of the *dossier* which Picquart had collected regarding Esterhazy. As Picquart had declared that he had never heard or seen Esterhazy's name till the arrival of the *petit bleu*, in March 1896, the notice thus

ante-dated would lead people to suppose that he knew Esterhazy as far back as January 1896, and had already started compiling a *dossier* about him.

While events were thus taking their course in Paris, Picquart was busily employed on his mission. On November 17th and 18th he sent in two reports to Gonse, who thanked him and told him not to hurry unduly. After the 6th Corps he would have to visit the 7th. As it had not occurred to him that his absence might be prolonged, Picquart had started with just an ordinary suitcase; but now, in view of Gonse's instructions, he applied to him for leave to pay a flying visit to Paris before going on to Besançon. Gonse wired him to do nothing of the sort, following up his message with a letter to the effect that the War Minister definitely wanted him to inspect the 7th Corps before doing anything else. Moreover, he would also be required to inspect the 14th and 15th districts.

Picquart, who was beginning to realize that they wanted to keep him permanently out of the way, obeyed orders and continued to send in report after report. Thus he went to Châlons, Besançon, Grenoble, Chambéry, Briançon, after which he was sent to Nice and Marseilles. There he received a notification from Gonse that his mission was to be extended to Algeria and Tunisia. The General told him he was not to worry about expenses, that his pay would be increased from 10 to 20 francs per day, and that he would, further, receive a special grant of 1,000 francs. Lastly, in order that he might go where he liked without attracting the attention of the police, the Minister for War had decided to attach him temporarily to the 4th *tirailleurs*. The cost of his new uniform would, of course, be defrayed by the Government.

This time Picquart understood that they wanted to keep him away for good. He foresaw that an "accident" might happen to him, and he remembered what he had told Gonse, "I will not take this secret with me to the grave." From that moment his mind was made up. While he was at Susa in Tunisia he made a will, dated April 2, 1897, in which

he gave an account of the various things that had happened since the discovery of the *petit bleu* which had led him to the conviction that Dreyfus was innocent. He put this narrative into a sealed envelope on which he wrote these words:

"In the event of the death of the undersigned, this packet is to be forwarded to the President of the Republic, for whose eyes alone it is intended."

G. PICQUART,

Lieutenant-Colonel, 4th tirailleurs.

Esterhazy, on the other hand, who had been greatly relieved at Picquart's departure, now took it into his head that he would get into touch with Schwartzkoppen again; but Schwartzkoppen, noticing the facsimile of the *bordereau* in the *Matin*, perceived at once that Esterhazy was the author of it and that Dreyfus was the victim of a monstrous error. He felt a terrible remorse; but, having told the Ambassador, Count von Munster, that he had nothing to do with spies, his hands were completely tied.

When Esterhazy came into his office, he said, "You are the author of the *bordereau*." "Write me a letter," replied Esterhazy, "saying that you have had dealings with Dreyfus, and I will keep you supplied with important and invariably correct information." Springing from his chair, Schwartzkoppen told him to get out, exclaiming, "You are the biggest blackguard that ever existed!"

Foiled, and terribly in need of money, Esterhazy had recourse to Weil; and Weil managed to collect a dozen thousand-franc notes which he sent off to his friend's creditors. At Rouen, Esterhazy was becoming an object of ever-increasing suspicion with his chiefs. General Guerrier, having noticed that he had made a false entry on his service paper, gave orders that it should be cancelled; while Colonel Abria, who had seen the facsimile of the *bordereau*, had been struck with its similarity to the writing of Esterhazy.

Realizing that his position was becoming ever more and more desperate, Esterhazy decided on a bold stroke. Three months had now passed since Picquart's departure; he knew that Henry was the virtual head of the Intelligence Department. Now, he thought, as things were, he had nothing more to be afraid of. Once more he put in an application for a post in the War Office, obtaining the support of Montbello, Jules Roche, and Grenier, the son of one of his former chiefs. Furthermore, he begged Henry to plead his cause. Henry promised, but did nothing. Worried out of his life with all these people buzzing around him, Billot at last flew into a rage; he told Grenier that Esterhazy was a scoundrel and a bandit, and Roche that his protégé was suspected of being guilty of the gravest charge that could be made against a Frenchman.

Finding himself forsaken by his protectors, and even by his old friend Weil, Esterhazy betook himself to the Press and let loose Drumont, Rochefort, and Cassagnac against Billot, and even against Henry. Violent articles appeared in *la Libre Parole*, *l'Intransigeant*, and *l'Autorité*, in which Billot and the High Command were represented as a set of incapables. Henry was denounced as not knowing a word of German, Italian, or English, and as one who used the funds at his disposal to spy on his friends. Then, all of a sudden, the Press campaign stopped short. De Boisdeffre, who knew how to go to work to appease the newspapers, had done the necessary.

Esterhazy then bethought himself of his family connections. In October 1896 he heard of the death of one of his cousins, who had left a widow and four children—three girls and a boy, Christian, now a young man of twenty. Although he had only seen his cousin's wife once, four years before her husband's death, Esterhazy sent her son the warmest expressions of sympathy and condolence, and made inquiries as to his circumstances. Christian replied that his father's estate did not exceed 5,000 francs, but that his mother had just disposed of a property for 170,000 francs, which

sum she was anxious to invest to the best advantage and which she had been recommended to put into Turkish bonds. Esterhazy advised her to do nothing of the sort. He was, he said, on excellent terms with the Rothschilds, and undertook to get her 25 per cent for her money. Madame Esterhazy let him have 5,000 francs, on which he sent her the interest the following month. Some time later, in February 1897, Christian sent him 15,000 francs out of a legacy he had received. Esterhazy sent him word that he would invest this sum as he had done with his mother's. At the same time he pointed out that it was not on the income of a sum like that that he would be enabled to cut a figure in the world; what he had to do was to marry someone with money. He knew a great number of people, and would undertake to find him a suitable bride.

And so, straightway, without waiting to hear what Christian had to say, he got busy and put himself in touch with a courtesan who kept a *maison de rendezvous* somewhere in the neighbourhood of the Gare Saint-Lazare, in which he had invested a sum of 5,000 francs. Next he opened negotiations one after another with a priest, a Jew, an ex-officer, and a ladies' tailor. But none of his plans came off. Moreover, Christian gave him to understand that he had not yet been through his military service. This was a blow to Esterhazy, but he put him up to various ways of getting exemption. Then he persuaded him to come to Paris, and told him what a pity it was that he could not prevail on his mother to put more money into the very profitable investments he suggested. The widow, however, would not be convinced.

While Esterhazy was battling thus desperately with his financial embarrassments, Mathieu Dreyfus was pursuing his inquiries. Now that he possessed the facsimile of the *bordereau*, he hoped that, somehow or other, chance would bring him face to face with its real author. The first thing to do was to make it quite clear that the writing on the *bordereau* was not his brother's. With this end in view he

had recourse to a number of experts, among them Monod the historian, Crépieux Janin and Rougemont the graphologists, and several others. All unanimously declared that the writing on the *bordereau* was not the writing of Alfred Dreyfus.

Through one of his agents, who got the information from the concierge at the German Embassy, Mathieu Dreyfus learned that the document published by the *Éclair*—in which the words *ce canaille de D*— had been replaced by *cet animal de Dreyfus*—was not a letter from Panizzardi to Schwartzkoppen, but the other way round, and that the name Dreyfus had not figured in it at all.

Next, on November 16th, Bernard Lazare brought out a second edition of his brochure, which, this time, included the facsimile reproduced by the *Matin*. It appeared under the imprint of a Paris publisher, Stock. He then went round to a few well-known men-of-letters and politicians, and tried to win them over. Coppée and Zola praised his courage; Claretie and Sarcey remained unconvinced; Octave Mirbeau and Pierre Quillard did not know what to think; Judet and Lepelletier sat on the fence; Goblet and Alfred de Mun declined to see him; Ranc received him with great cordiality; and lastly, Joseph Reinach, whom Madame Dreyfus had got to listen to her husband's letters, was deeply moved and determined to take his stand by Mathieu Dreyfus.

It immediately occurred to Reinach that it would be a good thing if they could enlist the help and support of Scheurer-Kestner, Vice-President of the Senate, where he was universally esteemed. Already a few Alsatian friends, notably Lalance, *Député protestataire* in the Reichstag, had told the senator of their doubts. The latter agreed to look into the affair, and spent the early part of 1897 in a careful study of the writing on the *bordereau* and specimens of the handwriting of Alfred Dreyfus. He came to the conclusion that they were not identical. He spent the vacation in Alsace, and there, on May 24th, he heard of the death of Sandherr. On his way back, at Belfort, he met Lieutenant-Colonel Bertin-Mouroit, whom he knew, and who had had

Dreyfus under his command. Scheurer-Kestner asked him what he thought about the affair, and Bertin-Mourore replied that those who knew the exact truth were just five in number, and that he was one of them. He added that it had been Dreyfus's intention to leave the army and to settle down in Belfort, where he would have gone on giving information to the Germans. He told Scheurer-Kestner that he ought to write to Billot.

On reaching Paris, Scheurer told his colleague Trarieux what he was inclined to think about the matter, and Trarieux confessed that he, too, had a sort of misgiving that an error had been committed. Then he saw Teyssonnières, the expert who had sold the facsimile of the *bordereau* to the *Matin*. Teyssonnières, of course, stuck to his opinion. Scheurer-Kestner also called on Maître Demange, who told him he was convinced that Dreyfus was innocent, and having learned through Maître Salles that a secret document had been communicated to the Court-Martial, urged him to ask Billot to let him see it. Scheurer-Kestner applied to Billot, but he, put on his guard by Bertin-Mourore, told him they could not let him see the *dossier*, but added, by way of setting his mind at rest, that shortly before Castelin's interpellation he had been shown a letter from Panizzardi to Schwartzkoppen which had been found torn up at the German Embassy and in which Dreyfus's name appeared. The letter to which Billot alluded was none other than the forgery which Henry had concocted on November 1, 1896. Scheurer-Kestner was not convinced; all the same, after these inquiries, which had now been going on for more than three months, he felt disheartened and inclined to throw the whole thing up.

At the time when Scheurer was beginning to interest himself in the case, the manœuvres against Picquart were growing more pronounced. When Billot had sent him off on special service he had not had the courage to relieve him of his functions at the Intelligence Department. Thus it happened that various agents, supposing him to be still on

duty there, continued to address their letters to him, though they were surprised at his being away so long. When they asked how this was, they were told that Picquart was on a journey. Some of them wrote to him to tell him of their disappointment. Picquart, who had an idea that his correspondence was being read, received a letter on May 18, 1897, from a certain special commissioner. This he sent back to Henry, adding the following note:

"Let people be told at once that I have been relieved of my functions or that I am not discharging them. I have no reason to blush at that. What *does* make me blush is the lying and mystery in which my mission has been involved for the past six months."

Henry showed this letter to Gonse, saying that he would answer it with a stiff reply. Now, at that same time, Bertin-Mouroit had just been telling Billot and de Boisdeffre about the conversation he had had with Scheurer-Kestner at Belfort. Gonse was also told about it. From that, to accusing Picquart of having given information to the senator was but a single step. Henry did not hesitate to take it. He drew up a letter (which he submitted to Gonse, who in turn showed it to de Boisdeffre), in which he informed Picquart that, according to an inquiry made in connection with his note, the word "mystery" in it applied to three orders of facts which had occurred in 1896 in the Intelligence Department:

1. Opening of a correspondence that had nothing to do with the Service and for a purpose which no one here understood.
2. Proposals made to two members of the staff of the *Section de Statistique* that they should bear witness, if necessary, that a paper belonging to the department had been intercepted in the post and that it emanated from a person whose identity was known.
3. Opening of a secret *dossier* and examining documents contained therein regarding which divulgations had been made for a non-official purpose.

This letter, which was dated May 31, 1897, arrived at Gabès on June 7th. Picquart was at once undeceived in regard to Henry. Henceforth he was under no illusion. He realized that such a note, emanating from a subordinate, could only have been written with the sanction of Gonse and de Boisdeffre. And as he knew well enough how an innocent man could be sent to Devil's Island, he thought it wise to be on his guard. The first thing he did was to send this laconic note to Henry on June 10th:

"Letter of May 31st received. I strongly protest against the insinuations it contains and the manner in which they are set forth."

Then he applied to his chief, General Leclerc, for leave to go to Paris. His request was granted, and he arrived on June 20th. He immediately went to see his friend Leblois, whom he told—without going into details and without mentioning the *petit bleu*—that he had discovered that Dreyfus was an innocent man and Esterhazy a traitor. To bear out what he said, he made him read fourteen letters from Gonse instructing him to go on with his investigations regarding Esterhazy. Several other conversations took place between the two friends, and finally, on June 29th, the day before he left, Picquart entrusted Leblois with the task of defending him. He relied on him as an old friend to act for the best, and not to hesitate even to apply to the Government to free him from the machinations by which he felt himself surrounded. On the other hand he wanted nothing said either to Dreyfus's brother or his counsel.

Leblois was in a quandary. He had been told, and he believed, that Dreyfus was innocent, but documentary evidence was lacking and, though he had been invested with full powers, he was at a loss how to act or whom to approach. He was wondering what he should do when, in the course of a conversation with Risler, whose deputy he was at the Mairie of the 7th arrondissement, the latter told him how troubled his uncle Scheurer-Kestner had been

about the Dreyfus affair. Leblois said that he would be very glad to meet him. The interview took place on July 13th, when Leblois gave the Vice-President of the Senate a full account of the conversations he had had with Picquart and showed him Gonse's letters, but asked him to keep the matter secret.

Scheurer-Kestner, who had been feeling rather discouraged, took fresh hope. But his position was an exceedingly difficult one. How could he act, if he was not allowed to open his mouth? After having discussed with Leblois various ways and means, Scheurer-Kestner decided that he would begin by telling his friends of his belief in the innocence of Dreyfus. He also decided that he would obtain some specimens of Esterhazy's writing. With this end in view he got into touch with a retired detective named Jaulme, after which he set out for Thann in Alsace, where he was to spend the holidays. While he was there Jaulme sent him four letters of Esterhazy's which he had managed to procure. Scheurer-Kestner compared them with the facsimile of the *bordereau*, and came to the conclusion that the writing was the same.

At the same time Billot, who had made up his mind as to the sort of man Esterhazy was, caused it to be discreetly suggested to him that he should be put on the retired list owing to temporary infirmity. To this Esterhazy, who felt that things were taking a bad turn, signified his agreement. The order was signed on August 17th, but was not officially gazetted.

A few days later, on September 2nd to be precise, Billot, who had wind of Scheurer-Kestner's intentions, sent Lieutenant-Colonel Bertin-Mouroto to him to find out if possible what proofs he possessed and whence he had obtained them. Scheurer-Kestner merely told the officer that he was convinced of Dreyfus's innocence and that he would do all he could to save him. In the face of this rebuff, Billot sent Martinie, the Controller-General, to M. Hadamard, the prisoner's father-in-law, and also to Mathieu

Dreyfus to see what he could find out. Here, too, he met with no success. Reinach, on his side, endeavoured to convince M. Darlan, the Minister of Justice; but he, after promising to demand a detailed account of the trial of 1894, did nothing. Reinach also went to see Lebon in order to get leave from him for Scheurer-Kestner to write to Dreyfus and tell him that he was going to see about getting his case retried. Lebon, who had just had his prisoner transferred to a new blockhouse with barred windows and an augmented guard, said he would do nothing of the kind.

Thus all through the summer of 1897 efforts were being made in various quarters to befriend Dreyfus. But, as ill-luck would have it, the people who were making these efforts either did not know one another (such was the case, for example, with Picquart and Scheurer-Kestner) or else they thought themselves in duty bound to keep certain information to themselves (as was the case with Leblois in regard to Scheurer-Kestner). It was very different on the General Staff. Esterhazy, who had retired to Dommartin, whence he would come up every now and again for a short visit to Paris, was kept posted by Henry as to the course that events were taking. In September, feeling that things were getting hot for him, he was on the point of starting for Italy. But Henry eased his mind, and told him that the big people would not desert him. Esterhazy promised not to do anything rash, and as he had great need of money, he got his cousin Christian to come to Dommartin and wormed another 17,000 francs out of him.

It was during the latter part of October that the officers of the 2nd Bureau resolved to come to Esterhazy's rescue. On the 16th of the month, at a meeting at which Henry, Lauth, and du Paty de Clam were present, General Gonse gave them to understand that there was a campaign on foot to substitute Esterhazy for Dreyfus. He told them that if Esterhazy was not forewarned, he might commit some regrettable act which might bring disaster on the country and on some of its military leaders.

On the 18th, having received a letter from Henry telling him about Scheurer-Kestner's interview with Bertin-Mouro, Esterhazy hastened to Paris. The same day Billot received an anonymous letter informing him that Picquart and Scheurer had concocted a plot to substitute Esterhazy for Dreyfus. This letter, which had points of resemblance with the Weyler forgery, was written in invisible ink. It was afterwards attributed to du Paty de Clam, who denied its authorship. It is possible that Henry was responsible for it. Billot handed it to Gonse, who had a developed copy of it made with the intention of sending it to Esterhazy. But Billot would not hear of it. When he mentioned this to Henry and du Paty, Gonse said how greatly he regretted the chief's decision. Henry and du Paty, who were not slow to see what was at the back of this remark, realized that their chief would not be sorry to see the order disobeyed. At all events, Esterhazy next day received a letter written in block capitals.

This letter was anonymous, and the proper names in it were purposely misspelt. It informed Esterhazy that the "Dreffus" family were going to accuse him of being the author of the *bordereau*; that it was a Colonel of the name of "Picart," now in Tonkin, who had put them up to it; that the said Colonel had paid some non-commissioned officers in his regiment at Rouen to let him have some specimens of his handwriting, and so on. In conclusion they told him not to get into a panic, since that would make it look as if he were guilty. Then, in a postscript, followed these words: "Don't show this letter to a soul. It is for you alone, and is intended to save you from the dangers which threaten you." The letter was signed: *Amie dévouée, Espérance.*

Esterhazy afterwards gave out that he had received this letter at Dommartin on a date which he gave variously as October 20th and 29th. But he could never produce the envelope. He swore that he had burnt it. This forgery was afterwards ascribed to du Paty; but du Paty stoutly denied that he had had anything to do with it. It is extremely

probable that it was the joint work of du Paty and Henry, and that it was Henry who delivered it at its destination. By signing it *Espérance*, he hoped it would be thought that the letter came from the same person who, in December 1896, had written the *Speranza* letter to Picquart, to apprise him that his plans had all been upset by his going away, which letter, as we have seen, was the handiwork of Henry himself.

The very same day that the *Espérance* letter was delivered to Esterhazy, de Boisdeffre sent orders to General Leclerc to keep Picquart at Susa and to see that he stuck to his work. As for Gonse, he instructed Lebrun-Renault, who had acted as escort to Dreyfus at the degradation ceremony, to come and see him in his office. In his report, Lebrun-Renault had not recorded any particular incident, and the same evening, at the Moulin Rouge, he had stated, in the presence of a journalist, that Dreyfus had consistently protested his innocence. When sent for, two days afterwards, by President Casimir-Perier, he made no mention of any confession. This time, however, yielding to the suggestions of Gonse and Henry, he drew up a memorandum saying that Dreyfus had made the following sort of half-confession :

"I am innocent; within three years my innocence will be established. The War Minister knows that, if I gave away documents of trivial importance, it was to obtain others of real importance from the Germans."

This document Lebrun-Renault signed and dated October 20, 1897. Lastly, two emissaries were sent to the village of les Sarreix, near Thiers, the home of a peasant woman who had been nurse to Dreyfus's daughter. They offered her money if she would declare that it was she who had posted the envelope containing the *bordereau*. But she refused.

Henry, knowing that the ex-detective Lajoux had learnt the real truth from Cuers and afraid that he would blab, had him shut up at Sainte-Anne. A few weeks later he made a bargain with Lajoux, who agreed to betake himself

to Brazil in return for a stipulated sum, which Gribelin only gave him just as he was going on board at Antwerp, so as to make sure that he really started.

Finally, about the same time, Henry produced from his cupboard the "ultra-secret" *dossier* which Sandherr, he said, had collected in 1894. Although the investigations subsequently made have not established it for certain, Joseph Reinach, in his *Histoire de l'Affaire Dreyfus*, believes it possible to state positively that this *dossier* consisted of photographs of seven letters alleged to have been written by Dreyfus to the Emperor William II, and of a letter from the Emperor to his Ambassador von Munster, all of which were alleged to have been taken from the German Embassy and of which the originals had had to be restored in response to a peremptory demand from Berlin. In his letter to von Munster the Emperor is represented as having referred to Dreyfus by name. According to Reinach, the second part of the *dossier* included seven photographs of a document which afterwards came to be called the *bordereau annoté* and was a variant of the Emperor's letter to his Ambassador. The object of this document was to make it appear that the real *bordereau*, written on ordinary paper with the amount asked for by Dreyfus opposite each item, had been submitted to the Emperor by Schwartzkoppen, who thought the prices too high. The Emperor was alleged to have sent it back to von Munster with the following note in his own handwriting: "That swine Dreyfus is getting very grasping; all the same we must get hold of the documents mentioned as soon as we can." This was signed, they said, with the initial W. This *bordereau* was said to have been discovered at the Embassy. In order to avoid war, Mercier had given it back to von Munster after having it photographed. Then Sandherr was said to have had it copied on tracing-paper by Esterhazy, but without the annotations. It was on the strength of this copy that Dreyfus was said to have been condemned by the Court-Martial. These forgeries may have existed as Reinach holds, but we cannot say for certain. What is

certain, however, is that Henry mesmerized his chiefs into believing that the *bordereau* existed and that, at any rate, they pretended to believe him. Simple common sense however, ought to have made them understand that if the letters to the Emperor and the *bordereau annoté* had not been forgeries, Sandherr would never have omitted to produce them. Moreover, if these documents had existed in 1894, it would not have been necessary to send the tracing-paper *bordereau* about from office to office to try to find out who had written it. Lastly, Mercier would not have sent du Paty to the Cherche-Midi to extract a confession from Dreyfus; and when, later on, in 1895, Picquart became head of the Intelligence Department, his superiors would not have told him to go and look for fresh proofs of Dreyfus's guilt. The *bordereau annoté* would have amply sufficed, and Gonse would have shown it to Picquart in order to put his conscience at rest.

Esterhazy, who did not know what the General Staff were doing to protect him, was living in a state of perpetual anxiety. He had shown the letter signed *Espérance* to his mistress, telling her that they were going to denounce him as the author of the *bordereau*, but that he was determined to kill himself. And so, in order that his furniture should not be taken away from her, he called on the agent for the flat he had taken and asked him to put the agreement in the name of Mlle Pays.

Determined to strike a blow for himself, he went to an agency known as the Alibi Office, which undertook to dispatch letters bearing the postmark of any town that might be desired. Esterhazy handed them in a letter addressed to M. Hadamard, Dreyfus's father-in-law, with a request that it should be posted from Lyons. The manager of the agency who, in order to carry on his business, had to let the police into the know, opened the envelope and sent a copy of the letter to the Prefecture. The letter was anonymous, and threatened Hadamard and Mathieu Dreyfus with death if they went on with their inquiries.

THE DREYFUS CASE

It was at this time that Henry, who felt that he had his chiefs behind him, resolved to reassure Esterhazy through the medium of Gribelin and du Paty de Clam. Gribelin went to Esterhazy's with an anonymous letter inviting him to turn up on the following Saturday, October 23rd, in the Parc Montsouris. Before going to keep the appointment Esterhazy called on Schwartzkoppen, and told him that he had been found out, and was in danger of being sent to Devil's Island to take the place of Dreyfus. He, Schwartzkoppen, would thereby find himself in a mess, and to avoid such a disaster he asked him to go and see Madame Dreyfus and tell her that her husband was really and truly guilty. Schwartzkoppen told him he was mad, and when Esterhazy threatened to kill himself on the spot he said to him, "I would save you right enough if the other man was not where he is." This rather soothed Esterhazy, who then showed him the letter which Gribelin had delivered at his flat, and added that he was going to keep the appointment. So he departed.

On arriving at the Parc Montsouris, he found Gribelin and du Paty de Clam already there. Both were in civilian dress, the former wearing blue spectacles and the latter a false beard. Esterhazy afterwards said that he had recognized them despite their disguise. Anyhow, he did not show it. Du Paty de Clam opened the proceedings with these words: "Commandant, you know what's in the wind." Then he told him that Scheurer-Kestner, who had thrown in his lot with the Jews, was hatching a plot to substitute him for Dreyfus, but he could be easy in his mind. The heads of the army would see him through. He should trust them and put in an appearance every night at the military club, where the necessary instructions would be given him.

Esterhazy, cursing Scheurer-Kestner for all he was worth, showed du Paty the *Espérance* letter, and then flew into a violent rage, saying that forged documents were being prepared to ruin him, but that if the worst came to the worst he would appeal to the German Emperor. Then he

went off and called again at the German Embassy, and told Schwartzkoppen that he had just had an interview with two officers from the War Office, and that they had promised him Government help against the machinations of Dreyfus's friends.

As soon as Esterhazy left, Schwartzkoppen, who realized that his continued stay in Paris would soon become impossible, went and called on the Count von Munster. As a matter of fact, the general rule in the diplomatic world is that when a spy has been detected, the military attaché who employed him is immediately recalled by his Government. After the arrest of Dreyfus, Schwartzkoppen had remained at his post in order to make it quite clear that he had never had any dealings with that unhappy man. With Esterhazy, however, the case was quite different. He *had* employed *him*.

Hitherto Schwartzkoppen had said nothing to von Munster about his relations with Esterhazy, for he knew that the Ambassador had forbidden him to have anything to do with spies. He now confessed his disobedience, and gave him an account of what Esterhazy had done. Having administered a reprimand, von Munster ordered him to send a detailed report on the matter to General von Schlieffen, chief of the secret service in Berlin. In the course of the next few days Schwartzkoppen, paying a farewell visit to his colleague Panizzardi, disclosed the name of Esterhazy, which up till then he had kept secret. He also said that for some time past he had been receiving anonymous letters containing threats which he judged came from agents in the Intelligence Department.

On the day following the interview in the Parc Montsouris, du Paty had a second encounter with Esterhazy, this time in the cemetery at Montmartre, in the course of which he advised him to appeal, not to the German Emperor, but to the Minister for War. Esterhazy acquiesced, and himself took to the War Office a request for an interview. Billot asked General Millet, Director-General of Infantry, to

receive him. In the course of the interview, which took place on October 25th, Esterhazy told General Millet that when he was in the country he had received a letter from an anonymous woman friend—he was alluding to the letter signed *Espérance*—telling him that a plot, of which Picquart was the ringleader, was being got up with the object of sending him out to Devil's Island in substitution for Dreyfus. He went on to say that, having examined the facsimile of the *bordereau*, he had come to the conclusion that the writing was so like his own that anyone might think it had been traced. Unfortunately for him, he added, there were numerous letters of his knocking about at bankers', jewellers', and other places where Dreyfus may have had acquaintances. Then he went on to relate a long, rambling story which he and Henry had concocted together. He made out that he remembered having been approached, early in 1894, by an officer in the War Office, a Captain Brô, who, being engaged on a work dealing with the Battle of Eupatoria, asked him to be good enough to furnish him with certain particulars regarding it. His father, Count Esterhazy, having fought with distinction on that occasion, it was perfectly natural that Captain Brô should apply to his son for the details he required. He had therefore sent him, but to an address he no longer recalled, a fairly complete account of the affair in question. It might be that this account had come into the hands of Dreyfus, and that he had made use of it to make a tracing of his handwriting in order to concoct the *bordereau*.

Having listened to this extraordinary story, General Millet advised Esterhazy to put all the particulars in writing and send them to the Minister for War. That same evening, with de Boisdeffre's approval, Esterhazy wrote a long letter to Billot, which wound up as follows:

"My life is much less than nothing, but I have the heritage of a great name to defend. If it comes to the point, I shall write to the German Emperor. A foe he may be; but he is at all events a soldier."

Quite contrary to what he had hoped and expected, Billot made no mention of this letter to de Boisdeffre. Gonse, Henry, and du Paty were no less astonished at this silence, and on their advice Esterhazy asked de Boisdeffre to make inquiries of Captain Brô. If Brô had never asked for information about the Battle of Eupatoria, the inference would be that the letter Esterhazy made out he had received in 1894 really came from Dreyfus, he having adopted this ruse in order to obtain a specimen of his handwriting.

To gauge the depth of Henry's and Esterhazy's cunning at this juncture, it is necessary to bear in mind that, in the course of the first examination which du Paty had made Dreyfus undergo in the Cherche-Midi, when he was shown five words out of the *bordereau*, the prisoner had said: "It seems to me that this writing is rather like Captain Brault's." This statement, by the way, he had subsequently retracted. The officer in question had been one of his colleagues on the General Staff. Now it happened that a report recently sent in by Guénée had informed Henry that a person named Braut (without the *l*) had lived in the same block of flats in the rue de Châteaudun as M. Hadamard, Dreyfus's father-in-law. As Esterhazy afterwards confessed, it was Dreyfus's involuntary exclamation and the similarity of the name uttered with that of Hadamard's neighbour which had inspired Henry with all this romantic story about Eupatoria which he thought would make people suppose that in 1894 Esterhazy had been the victim of a ruse to get hold of a specimen of his handwriting. The whole thing was puerile, for why should Dreyfus have taken it into his head to copy Esterhazy's writing, seeing that the resemblance between it and his own was calculated to make him choose someone quite different, or better still, make use of a type-writer? Moreover, if Dreyfus *had* imitated Esterhazy's writing, the first thing he would have done in 1894 would have been to accuse Esterhazy of the crime.

Notwithstanding all this, it was agreed that Esterhazy should write to Captain Brault to ask him if he remembered

lending the paper about Eupatoria to an officer in the War Office, and sending it to him at an address in the rue de Châteaudun. Brault replied that he had never asked for any such paper, and that he knew no one at the address mentioned. Henry, who was satisfied with this reply because it would bolster up the Eupatoria story, put it away carefully for possible future use in defence of Esterhazy; for he was preparing the defence with the complicity of Gonse and du Paty. For this reason, in order to avoid Esterhazy's being seen talking with an officer on the General Staff, supposing Mathieu Dreyfus was having him watched, it was arranged that all communications between him and the General Staff should be carried on through a third party. Several people were thought of for this purpose, but the choice—it was Esterhazy's own proposal—finally lighted on his mistress, Mlle Pays. Her part was sometimes taken by the Marquise du Paty de Clam, who took the letters to Esterhazy herself.

While these secret confabulations were going on between Esterhazy and the officers of the Intelligence Department, Scheurer-Kestner wrote on October 23rd to Lucie Faure, the President's daughter, to ask her to try to get him an interview with her father. Four days later Félix Faure wrote to him that he would see him with pleasure. In the interval Scheurer, who still trusted Billot, told him what he was doing. Billot immediately passed on the news to de Boisdeffre, who, a few days before, had telegraphed to General Leclerc instructing him to order Colonel Picquart to extend his mission to the frontiers of Tripoli. The General was greatly astonished at this, for he knew that that part of Tunisia was overrun with pirates. He sent for Picquart to come to him at Tunis, and asked him to explain the matter. Realizing that his former chiefs meant to send him to his death, Picquart broke silence for the first time and told the whole story to General Leclerc. Leclerc told him not to be in any hurry to set out, and forbade him to go beyond Gabès.

When de Boisdeffre learnt from Billot of Scheurer-

Kestner's coming visit to the Élysée, he told Gonse, who told Henry. Fearing that Félix Faure would let himself be influenced by Scheurer-Kestner, Henry counselled Esterhazy to write to the President of the Republic himself, since Billot had not the energy to defend him. But Esterhazy was not invited to compose the letter. On October 28th du Paty de Clam, in the course of a meeting on the Esplanade des Invalides, gave him a copy of what he was to write. He had written it himself, and as a precautionary measure had had it copied out by his wife. Esterhazy copied it in turn, and next day sent it off to Félix Faure. In this communication he gave out that he had been warned, in a letter bearing the fictitious signature *Espérance*, that the friends of Dreyfus were about to denounce him as being the author of the *bordereau*, that he had applied in vain for protection to the Minister for War, to whom he had naturally looked to befriend him, and that he was now appealing to the President of the Republic to put a stop to the scandal. In conclusion, he said that, if he had the misfortune not to be heard, he would claim protection from "the suzerain of the Esterhazy family, the Emperor of Germany."

On the very day that Félix Faure received this letter, Scheurer-Kestner presented himself at the Élysée. The interview between the two men was a short one. The Vice-President of the Senate was ready to confide his views in the President of the Republic, but the latter refused to hear them and made no allusion to Esterhazy's letter. Somewhat crestfallen, Scheurer took his departure, asking Félix Faure at all events to extend to him a benevolent neutrality.

Next day, October 30th, Scheurer called on Billot. He told him about his investigations, and said that he had learned that a senior officer had just been put on the retired list for temporary ill-health, that this officer, Esterhazy, was the real culprit, and that he had satisfied himself that Dreyfus was an innocent man. Finally, he implored him to inquire into the matter himself, or else to give him definite proof of Dreyfus's guilt.

Billot was fully aware that Dreyfus had been illegally condemned, and he knew also that Esterhazy was a spy. Nevertheless, he solemnly affirmed to Scheurer that he had certain knowledge of Dreyfus's guilt, and he quoted to him the forged letter from Panizzardi signed *Alexandrine*.

Scheurer-Kestner declared that he was not convinced, and asked Billot to make investigations on his own account, giving him a fortnight to do so. "I warn you," he said, as he turned to depart, "that if you do not do your duty, I shall not fail to do mine."

An hour later Esterhazy received the following letter written by Henry, or by du Paty:

"The chief has just left Scheurer-Kestner with whom he has been lunching. It was a long and confidential interview. All goes perfectly well. The enemy is check-mated."

Although these events had been taking place behind a curtain of secrecy, the rumour got about that Scheurer-Kestner was convinced of Dreyfus's innocence, and that he proposed to put a question to the Government in regard to the matter as soon as Parliament reassembled. There was a storm of fury in the Press against the man who, they said, wanted to stir up trouble in the country. The newspapers, which in 1894 had inflamed public opinion by affirming that Dreyfus was guilty before he had even been tried, began again on the same task. *La Libre Parole*, *Le Gaulois*, *L'Echo de Paris*, *L'Éclair*, *Le Petit Journal*, *La Croix*, *L'Intransigeant* made themselves conspicuous by the violence of their attacks on Scheurer-Kestner, who was in some cases denounced as having sold himself to the financiers and being in the pay of Prussia, and in others as a simpleton or a fool. Joseph Reinach was attacked still more intemperately. There were some papers, such as *Le Temps*, *Le Figaro*, *Le Radical*, which endeavoured to restore calm. Cassagnac, in *L'Autorité*, declared that he had always been haunted by the idea that Dreyfus was innocent; while Clemenceau, who had just

taken over the editorship of *L'Aurore*, recently founded by Vaughan, said, "If there are solid grounds for supposing that an error has been committed, then the case ought to be retried."

Having promised Billot that he would do nothing during the fortnight he had given him to make his own personal inquiries, Scheurer-Kestner was true to his word, and let the torrent of insults pass unnoticed. On the other hand, seeing that the Press was almost solid against Dreyfus, Henry advised Esterhazy to write again to Félix Faure. This he did. In his letter, which was dated October 31st, Esterhazy complained that neither the Chief of Staff nor the head of the army had replied to his appeal, despite the services which his ancestors had rendered to France. That being so, he would look after himself and seek aid of no one. In obedience to Henry's instructions, he wrote and told Félix Faure that a "generous woman" had handed him a stolen document of the highest importance, a photograph of which he would publish if he did not obtain satisfaction.

On the same day *La Libre Parole*, with which Henry and Esterhazy were in close touch, gave out that "an important personage in the War Office had handed over documents to Scheurer."

Félix Faure said nothing to anybody concerning the blackmail with which he had been threatened. Esterhazy was not even requested to give back the alleged secret document which Henry, by the way, had not yet let him have. On the other hand, the information published in *La Libre Parole* met with the result that had been foreseen. Billot telegraphed on November 1st to General Leclerc, stating that Picquart had let himself be robbed by a woman of a secret document of the utmost importance, and asked him to interrogate the officer at once. Picquart told the General that no woman had ever succeeded in robbing him of a document of this nature, for the simple reason that he had never taken an official document out of the office.

Henry, who knew of the dispatch of Billot's telegram,

realized that further intimidation would have to be applied to the President of the Republic. On November 5th Esterhazy, on his advice, sent a third letter to Félix Faure in which he alluded to this highly important document.

"This document," he said, "is a protection for me since it proves the rascality of Dreyfus, and a danger for my country because its publication with the facsimile of the writing would compel France either to climb down or to go to war."

And he concluded on this note :

"Only let them come to my defence, and I will send back the document to the Minister for War without anybody in the world having set eyes on it, but let them do so quickly, for I can wait no longer and I will stop at nothing in order to vindicate or avenge my honour, which has been so ignobly sacrificed."

Félix Faure conveyed this letter to Billot and de Boisdeffre, both of whom had received similar communications.

In other circumstances the heads of the army would have had Esterhazy arrested for improperly detaining a secret document and for attempted blackmail. But they took care to do nothing of the kind, for Esterhazy, as he afterwards declared before the French Consul in London, on February 22, 1900, was merely doing what they had told him to do. Billot merely instructed du Paty to ask General Saussier to interrogate Esterhazy regarding his letter to Félix Faure, of which he had a copy sent him. Esterhazy obeyed the summons of the Military Governor of Paris, but declined to say what the document was that he had in his possession, remarking that he had sent it to England for safe custody. Saussier said that he could make allowance for his anger, but urged him not to write any more such letters, and to send back the document he was holding to the Minister for War. Esterhazy promised; but he never sent back the document, for the simple reason that he had never had it.

Meantime, on November 9th, the Cabinet for the first time took cognizance of a matter which was being discussed in all the newspapers up and down the country. The Premier, Méline, declared that he had given his word to Castelin, the deputy, to issue an official statement making clear the attitude of the Government. Barthou, who was responsible for the statement, had put in these words: "Dreyfus was regularly and justly condemned." The Keeper of the Seals, Darlan, pointed out that, in view of the possibility of their being served with an application for a new trial, it was risky to assert in advance that Dreyfus had been legally condemned.

Félix Faure, who knew that certain secret documents had been privily shown to the judges, and to them alone, and had confessed as much to Dr. Gibert of le Havre, insisted that Barthou's words should be allowed to stand. Billot, Hanotaux, and Lebon, who were likewise aware of the irregularity, kept silence. In the end, Barthou's reading was adopted.

Darlan then asked Billot to let him know what was in the 1894 *dossier*, so that he might be in a position to reply to any questions that might be raised. Billot promised but did not keep his word. Whereas Henry, who was getting increasingly apprehensive as to the rôle that Picquart was going to play, tried to discredit him more and more in the eyes of the High Command. At his dictation, Esterhazy sent him a threatening letter in which he accused him of having suborned non-commissioned officers to procure specimens of his handwriting and of having made up a whole *dossier* against him, adding that one of these documents was in his possession; and he called upon him to say what justification he could offer for such conduct. On his side, Scheurer received, on November 9th, an anonymous letter-card written in capitals, in which he was told that Picquart was a scoundrel and that he would soon have the proof of it. The writer of the card spelt the name "Piquart" (without a *c*).

Then, on November 10th, during the morning, Esterhazy sent Picquart an anonymous letter and a telegram. The letter, which was written in block capitals, read: "Look out; the whole business discovered; back out quietly; don't write anything." The telegram, which was signed *Speranza*, was worded as follows: "Stop the demi-god; whole thing found out; position very grave." The demi-god, in Esterhazy's mind, would be taken to mean Scheurer, because Henry supposed that the senator had got his information from Picquart. Furthermore, so that his writing should not give him away, Esterhazy had the telegram written by his mistress, the woman Pays, and took it to the post office himself.

On the evening of the same day Esterhazy sent a second telegram: "Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart, Susa. It has been proved that the *petit bleu* was concocted by Georges." This telegram was in plain language and was signed "Blanche," the Christian name of the Comtesse de Comminges, in order to convey the impression that Picquart was the ringleader of the syndicate and that she was warning him of the danger he was in.

Both these telegrams had been concocted by Henry simply because he knew they would be intercepted at the post-office. They were in due course seized, then shown by Gonse to Billot and photographed before being sent on.

Picquart, when he got them, knew perfectly well that they came from Esterhazy, and he sent a complaint to Billot asking him to look into the matter. He pointed out in his protest that the telegram signed "Blanche" could only come from someone who was in the secrets of the Intelligence Department. The *petit bleu* referred to was in fact only known to a few officers. He mentioned no name, but, in his own mind, he was inclined to think that the telegram signed "Blanche" had been sent by du Paty de Clam who, for reasons of his own, had a grudge against the Comtesse Blanche de Comminges; or it might be that Henry was responsible for it. Just when Picquart was drawing up his

protest Commandant Henry was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel (November 12, 1897).

The fortnight that Scheurer-Kestner had given Billot for carrying out his personal inquiries was drawing to an end. Not only had Billot done nothing at all, but he had shut his eyes to the machinations of his officers against Picquart and had not intervened in the Cabinet Council. Scheurer, realizing that his old friend had been bamboozled, resolved to serve a requisition on the Minister of Justice. In drawing it up he would have liked Leblois's authority to state what he knew about the result of Picquart's investigations. But Leblois, who had been told by Picquart not to mention his name, did not consider he was in a position to comply with Scheurer's wishes. Thus, while the officers who were protecting Esterhazy were united in their plans, Dreyfus's defenders, erring from excess of scruple, kept what they knew from one another. Scheurer knew nothing about the story of the *petit bleu*; Mathieu Dreyfus had never heard of Esterhazy, and Picquart had no idea that politicians and intellectuals were beginning to interest themselves in the fate of Dreyfus.

But chance once again intervened in the drama. Whilst Scheurer was thinking about the form he should give to his question, Bernard Lazare brought out his second brochure, which included expert reports regarding the handwriting of Dreyfus, together with the facsimile of the *bordereau*, whilst Mathieu Dreyfus had leaflets printed and exposed for sale in which specimens of his brother's writing and the writing on the *bordereau* were exhibited side by side for purposes of comparison.

It happened that one of these leaflets came under the notice of Castro, the banker, who had had business transactions with Esterhazy. He at once recognized that the *bordereau* was in Esterhazy's writing, for he had a quantity of letters from him in his possession. One of his friends conveyed this news to Mathieu Dreyfus, who, overjoyed at being able at last to identify the writer of the *bordereau*,

hurried off to see Scheurer and to find out from him whether his investigations pointed to the same person. Scheurer told him that they did.

At the same time Emmanuel Arène, a deputy and a journalist, who was a friend of Scheurer's, brought out in the *Figaro*, on November 14th, an article setting forth the main arguments on which the senator based his demand for a rehearing of the case. This article was signed with the pseudonym *Vidi*. Though he did not actually mention Esterhazy, he made it sufficiently clear for those who were behind the scenes to recognize the man he had in mind. Next day *La Libre Parole* came out with an article signed *Dixi*, in reply to the *Figaro*, which Henry had drafted and du Paty had corrected. It affirmed that a senior officer belonging to the War Office was the heart and soul of a plot to rescue Dreyfus, that Dreyfus had elaborated a mode of secret correspondence with his family whereby he had revealed from Devil's Island that in order to communicate with the foreign military attachés he had been in the habit of making use of transparent paper so as to trace hand-writings that were like his own. Thus in the case of the *bordereau* he had imitated, by tracing, the writing of a certain Commandant. In 1896 the Jewish syndicate had got hold of the aforesaid senior officer in the War Office who had procured specimens of the Commandant's handwriting in order that the authorship of the *bordereau* might be ascribed to him. In September 1896 the plot was ripe for execution, but it came to grief, because its instigator, who had been discovered in the nick of time, had been sent away from Paris. Moreover, the *bordereau* was not the only proof of Dreyfus's treachery. A hundred others were in existence.

It was that same day that Esterhazy received from Henry the famous *document libérateur*, or saving document, to which allusion had been made in his letters to Félix Faure. This document, which was none other than the paper containing the words *Ce canaille de D—*, was put in an envelope together with a letter from Esterhazy and taken

that night to the War Minister's office by one of Henry's own men. Two days later the newspapers gave out that Esterhazy had just returned the fateful document. On the other hand, as a sequel to the article in the *Figaro*, a journalist on the staff of *La Liberté* got it into his head that the officer referred to by *Vidi* was a retired artillery captain named Denis de Rougemont, and he denounced him by name in his paper. Scheurer, who knew de Rougemont, immediately wrote to him to protest against this charge. Then, realizing that the time had come for action, he invited Mathieu Dreyfus to denounce Esterhazy himself. Mathieu agreed to do so, and sent the following letter to Billot:

November 15, 1897.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

The only foundation for the charge which, in 1894, was brought against my unfortunate brother was a covering letter, without signature and without date, which showed that military documents of a confidential nature had been handed over to the agent of a foreign Power.

I have the honour to inform you that the author of that document is M. le Comte Walsin-Esterhazy, *Commandant d'infanterie*, who, for reasons of ill-health, was placed on the retired list in the spring of last year. The handwriting of Major Esterhazy is identical with that on the document. It will not be difficult for you to obtain specimens of the writing of the officer in question. I am, moreover, in a position to indicate where you may find letters from him, letters of undoubted authenticity and bearing a date prior to that of my brother's arrest.

I cannot doubt, *Monsieur le Ministre*, that knowing the author of the act of treason for which my brother was condemned, you will see that prompt justice is done.

MATHIEU DREYFUS.

THE DREYFUS CASE

On the very day when Mathieu Dreyfus was writing this letter Schwartzkoppen was received in farewell audience by the President of the Republic. Desiring to ease his conscience, so far as was in his power, he declared to Félix Faure that he had never known Dreyfus.

CHAPTER V

PELLIEUX'S INVESTIGATIONS AND THE REPORT OF RAVARY.—
COLLUSION OF THE GENERAL STAFF WITH ESTERHAZY.—HIS
TRIAL AND ACQUITTAL.—ZOLA PUBLISHES HIS FAMOUS LETTER,
"J'ACCUSE!"—PICQUART IS SENT TO MONT-VALÉRIEN.—THE
TRIAL OF ZOLA.—VERDICT.—THE SENTENCE QUASHED.

WHEN, on November 16, 1897, Esterhazy saw Mathieu Dreyfus's denunciation of him in the newspapers, he sent the following brief letter to Billot:

"I read in this morning's papers the infamous accusation that has been brought against me. I ask you to institute an inquiry, and I hold myself in readiness to reply to all charges."

In the Chamber of Deputies that same day Prince d'Hénin rose and questioned the Minister for War. Billot replied that he had invited Scheurer-Kestner to bring the matter before the Keeper of the Seals, but now that the Dreyfus family had intervened he was going "to put the accuser in a position to justify his charges." The Chamber gave a perfunctory applause to this statement, and the incident closed. In the Lobby, where the deputies gave free vent to their ideas, Rochefort grew very eloquent and accused Billot of lack of energy. That very morning he had had a visit from Commandant Pauffin de Saint-Morel, General de Boisdeffre's Chief-of-Staff. That officer had come to inform him that the General Staff had incontestable proofs of Dreyfus's guilt, proofs of which his defenders were unaware. And the editor of *L'Intransigeant* told his confrère all that Pauffin had confided in him. On regaining his office, Billot instructed his Chief-of-Staff, General de Torcy, to write two letters to Esterhazy. One was to acknowledge receipt of the famous *document libérateur*, which for two whole days had been lying about on his desk; the other was to request him to hold himself at the disposal of General

Saussier, the Military Governor of Paris, in connection with the inquiry which he had asked for.

Profiting by the fact that he was allowed to remain at liberty, Esterhazy went the round of all the newspaper offices, impressing the journalists by his haughty bearing and forceful speech, flourishing about Billot's letter of acknowledgment, and telling the most fantastic stories. Picquart and Scheurer, for example, had, according to him, both been bought over by the Jewish syndicate, who wanted to compass his ruin; or again, his writing had been traced by Dreyfus—this was apropos of the Eupatoria yarn. Then there were mysterious meetings with a veiled lady; the famous *bordereau*, seized at the German Embassy, when a fire had broken out there, by detectives disguised as firemen, and so on.

Next day the papers were full of these stories, and, the more far-fetched they were, the more readily were they swallowed by the public. Few and far between were the papers that tried to be impartial. Only one, the *Figaro*, after instituting two inquiries, one in London, the other at Rouen, had the courage to show up Esterhazy as the unmitigated liar he was. Then, in its issue of November 30th, it published facsimiles of the *bordereau*, and of Dreyfus's and Esterhazy's handwriting. This paper, however, only circulated in the more fashionable and literary circles, and could do but little to counteract the influence of the popular papers with their huge circulations.

And it was not merely the mob that were influenced by the popular Press, but the politicians as well. In Parliament deputies who had any doubts regarding Dreyfus's guilt kept their misgivings to themselves, for fear of being accused of belonging to the syndicate. This was especially the case with Léon Bourgeois.

On the other hand, Alphonse Humbert, who had forsaken his revolutionary ideals to become an ardent supporter of the State, and Cavaignac, who thought he was destined to become President of the Republic, became violent partisans

of the General Staff, whose tales they sedulously disseminated. As for the little group of Socialists, they remained undecided.

In the face of these outbursts of indignation and these accusations of lukewarmness, Billot decided on two measures. The first was to order de Boisdeffre to inflict a month's confinement to barracks on Pauffin de Saint-Morel for his visit to Rochefort; the second was to relieve Commandant Forzinetti of his duties at the Cherche-Midi, as a punishment for having visited the same journalist. Forzinetti revenged himself by publishing an account of Dreyfus's incarceration in the Cherche-Midi, adding that he believed in his innocence. This appeared in the *Figaro* of November 21st.

Though Billot may have recaptured his equanimity by taking these steps, it was certainly not so with his colleague Hanotaux, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. In 1894 Hanotaux had advised Mercier not to take proceedings against Dreyfus; and ever since then he had had his doubts about the prisoner's guilt. Quite recently, at some diplomatic reception, Count von Munster, speaking in the name of his sovereign, had again told him that Germany had never had any relations, direct or indirect, with Captain Dreyfus. Hanotaux was too familiar with diplomatic usage not to realize that, in going out of his way to make this statement when he need have said nothing at all, he was undoubtedly speaking the truth. In order, therefore, to be on the safe side, he sent one of the officials in his department, M. Paléologue, to Henry, with Count Munster's declaration, as well as a copy of a telegram which the *chargé d'affaires* at Vienna had sent him a few days before, and which read as follows:

"Schwartzkoppen had no dealings with Dreyfus; he made this statement on his word of honour to the Minister for War before he left. Of course, the German Government is unable to say whether Dreyfus had any suspicious relations with an agent of any other Power."

Without turning a hair, Henry said to Paléologue, "We've never asserted that Dreyfus had had any direct relations with Germany. As you know perfectly well, Panizzardi was the go-between." Paléologue then asked him what he made of the telegram of November 2nd, in which Panizzardi had asked his chiefs to publish an official denial if, like him, they had never had any dealings with Dreyfus. Henry, quite calmly, went and opened his safe and took out a bundle of papers, by which action he designed to convey that he had all the proof one could want of Dreyfus's treachery, and, as General Gonse, who had just come into the room, signified his assent, the young diplomat, who had carried out his instructions, did not think it became him to press the matter further.

On the other hand, in spite of Panizzardi's official denials, the newspapers continued to refer to the paper containing the words *ce canaille de Dreyfus* as having emanated from him. Greatly annoyed at the continuance of this misrepresentation, the Italian attaché requested his ambassador to intervene. Count Tornielli accordingly called on Hanotaux, repeated once more that Panizzardi had never had anything to do with Dreyfus, and added on his word of honour that any document concerning him that purported to come from Panizzardi was necessarily a forgery. These various communications, quite gratuitous as they were, caused Hanotaux not a little uneasiness.

Although the statements of the German and Italian ambassadors were kept studiously secret, and had no repercussion in France, it was by no means so abroad, where great interest in the affair was beginning to be aroused in diplomatic circles. The Queen of England, desiring to get at the real facts, wrote to the Emperor William, her grandson, and his reply was that Dreyfus was innocent. She showed the letter to the Empress Eugénie, who from that day onwards took the liveliest interest in the case. The other European sovereigns soon learned the truth about Dreyfus, and the Pope himself informed his nephews that Esterhazy was the real traitor.

While these sensational reports were being passed along from Embassy to Embassy, General Saussier was arranging with General de Pellieux to see what he could find out about Esterhazy. De Pellieux successively summoned Mathieu Dreyfus and Esterhazy, Scheurer-Kestner and Leblois to appear before him. Of the first he inquired what grounds he had for his accusation. Mathieu Dreyfus replied that he based his charge on the similarity between Esterhazy's handwriting and the writing on the *bordereau*. For this reason, he begged the General to have a further expert examination carried out, and also asked him to hear what Scheurer-Kestner had to say.

In the course of the same day the General also received Esterhazy, whom he had formerly known in Tunisia. Esterhazy again served up the same highly coloured tales which he had already given out to the newspapers. De Pellieux said he would not deprive him of his liberty and that he would not have his rooms searched.

Next day, November 18th, it was Scheurer's turn. De Pellieux asked him whether he had any documents. He replied that he had not, but that he had had it from Leblois that there was, at the War Office, a *dossier* regarding Esterhazy, in which there was one document which afforded ample proof of that officer's guilt. Next he advised him to get Picquart on the scene since, without him, no proper investigations could be carried out.

Leblois, who was told to appear on the 19th, informed de Pellieux of all that he had learnt, and showed him the letters from General Gonse. He also declared that he knew of the existence of a *dossier* which contained a document highly compromising for Esterhazy. Then he handed him the anonymous letter sent on November 9th by Esterhazy to Scheurer, in which there occurred, with a deliberate mistake in the spelling, the words "Picquart is a scoundrel."

After this interview, which lasted three hours, de Pellieux considered himself sufficiently posted, and did not think he would get Picquart to attend. He knew that both Billot and de Boisdeffre were against getting any evidence from

that source. In view, however, of the protests made by certain members of the Press, Billot decided that Picquart should be heard, and telegraphed to General Leclerc to tell him to come to Paris.

About the time Picquart was embarking for France, de Pellieux received orders to institute a second inquiry in his capacity as officer of the judicial police. De Boisdeffre summoned him, and told Gonse to show him the forged letter alleged to have come from Panizzardi, in which Dreyfus was mentioned by name, and, in addition to that, several other documents of Henry's manufacture. Henry himself brought de Pellieux the secret *dossiers* he had compiled, one a document concerning Dreyfus containing the words *ce canaille de D—*, as well as the story of the alleged confession which Lebrun-Renault had recently produced; the other concerning Esterhazy, and containing the *petit bleu*, the address on which had been scratched out and then written in again. Henry added that the writing on the *bordereau* had been copied by Dreyfus from Esterhazy's. He also gave his own version of the interview he had had at Basle with Cuers. Then he accused Picquart of having told Leblois about the secret *dossier* in the Dreyfus trial, especially the document with the words *ce canaille de D—*. He went into details, and said that one evening, when he went into his chief's room, he had seen him and Leblois poring over the secret *dossier*. He then had the effrontery to insinuate that this paper could not have been taken out of the office except with the connivance of Picquart, the truth being that he himself had given it to Esterhazy.

These statements, coming as they did from a General in whom he had full confidence, and from a Lieutenant-Colonel who was in charge of the Intelligence Department, were enough to confirm de Pellieux in the belief that Dreyfus was guilty and Esterhazy innocent. Nevertheless he asked for the assistance of a magistrate, and Henry referred him to Bertulus, who for years past had been engaged on matters connected with espionage.

Since Esterhazy had been denounced by Mathieu Dreyfus, General de Boisdeffre and General Gonse had both forbidden du Paty to hold any communication with him. Esterhazy, who was anxious to keep in touch with the Intelligence Department, had recourse to his cousin Christian, who, on seeing Mathieu Dreyfus's letter in the papers, had hurried off to Paris. Esterhazy soon managed to convince him that he was the victim of a conspiracy that had been hatched by the Jews. Christian, deeply impressed by his tale, said, "Do what you will with me; my person, my life, are at your disposal." He thought that his money was still with Rothschild's; but Esterhazy told him that he could not very well go to Rothschild's just now, as he was being shadowed. But he put him in touch with du Paty.

The pair of them—Christian and du Paty—had numerous meetings after dark on the banks of the Seine. In this manner Esterhazy continued to get information and advice. Thus he received from du Paty a sort of note—afterwards known as "the note in the two handwritings," because the first few lines were written in block letters, and the remainder in ordinary cursive style. By means of this note, du Paty made known to Esterhazy what he should say to de Pellieux about their connection with one another. He laid stress on the fact that General de Boisdeffre was well aware of these relations, and that, in fact, his sole idea had been to prevent him (Esterhazy) from doing anything desperate. He added that the person who went to the post-office to get the letters written by Picquart in the agreed code, and had sent him the telegram signed "Blanche," was none other than Mlle Blanche de Comminges, whereat Esterhazy must have laughed in his sleeve, for he had a very good reason for knowing all about the dispatch of that telegram.

General de Pellieux began the second inquiry on November 24th. On that same day he received a letter from Esterhazy telling him that his mysterious protectress had made known to him that in a garret in a certain house in the rue Yvon de Villarceau, where Picquart had lived before

he went to Tunisia, he—Picquart—had hidden away a whole mass of compromising documents.

At the request of de Pellieux, Aymard, commissioner of police, accompanied by Henry in civilian attire, and assisted by a locksmith and three inspectors of police, carried out a search not only in the attic but also in Picquart's rooms, for which he paid a rent of 700 francs a year. A wine-case crammed with papers was discovered in the attic, and bundles of letters were seized in the drawers of various pieces of furniture. The whole collection was taken away and examined, but the letters were all family communications and the papers were solely the personal concern of their owner. Nothing in the least suspicious was brought to light, and de Pellieux afterwards had them duly returned.

De Pellieux went on with his inquiry, and heard again what Mathieu Dreyfus, Scheurer, and Esterhazy had to say. The latter, who was getting more and more confident, declared that Picquart had vainly endeavoured to get the postal authorities to stamp the *petit bleu* which he alleged had been sent to him.

Picquart arrived in Paris on the 26th. He was immediately summoned to attend the inquiry. His examination occupied two sittings. He related the circumstances in which his attention had been called to Esterhazy, the results of the inquiry which he had set on foot, his conversations with his chiefs, Gonse and de Boisdeffre, etc. General de Pellieux showed him the *petit bleu*, and asked him if he recognized it. Picquart said that he did, but that it seemed to him that the writing on the address was formerly more of a piece, less smudgy. Pellieux then told him that the document was not authentic, asked him why he had obliterated on the photograph of this letter all traces of the mutilations, and accused him of having committed a grave breach of duty. Picquart defended his action. Then, when he was going on to speak of the *bordereau*, the General pulled him up, saying that as that document had been attributed to Dreyfus by the Court, it behoved them to respect their verdict. Finally,

he showed him the conclusive document, the one containing the words *ce canaille de D—*, asking him whether he knew a woman of the name of Speranza, and handed him the letter signed in that name which Henry said he had intercepted in December 1896, but which in reality he had fabricated.

Picquart immediately realized that this letter had reference to the letter from his former secretary Ducasse, and that both were linked up with the telegrams he had had in Tunis; and he saw through the trap that had been laid for him. Quite imperturbably, he explained the meaning of the code used by Ducasse in his letter: "The great work is accomplished; Cagliostro has become Robert-Houdin, etc." During the next day or two de Pellieux heard the evidence of Lauth and Gribelin, first separately, and then in confrontation with Picquart. He was looking on his inquiry as ended, when, on November 28th, the *Figaro* published some letters which Esterhazy had addressed to one of his mistresses, Madame de Boulancy. The latter, whom he had subsequently exploited for his own advantage, showed these letters to a barrister who was looking after her family affairs, leaving it to him to publish them.

In these letters, which were written between the years 1881 and 1884, after the Tunisian expedition, Esterhazy, who thought he had a grievance against his chiefs, gave vent to diatribes of which the following will serve as a specimen:

"All these grotesque Generals have still got the mark of the Prussian boot on their backsides. They quake at their own shadow. . . . When a real war comes, all these ridiculous brass-hats, a lot of ignorant cowards with their tails down, will go to fill the German prisons which, once again, won't be big enough to hold them. . . . Before very long the Germans will put all those gentry in their proper places. . . . General Saussier is a clown, and if he was in Germany they would put

him in a circus. The patience of this stupid French mob, which is the most unlikeable that I know, is unlimited, but mine is nearly exhausted. I shall not stay much longer with these stupid imbeciles who are already doomed to defeat."

Among these letters there was one more violent than the others. It was afterwards known as "the Uhlan letter." It contained passages such as this :

"If anyone were to come to me to-night and tell me I should meet my death as an Uhlan while putting Frenchmen to the sword, I should be perfectly happy. I wouldn't harm a little dog, but I would kill a hundred thousand Frenchmen with pleasure. . . . What a sorry figure all that crowd would cut in the lurid glare of the battlefield, in Paris taken by storm and given over to be sacked by a hundred thousand drunken soldiers. . . . That is the sort of banquet I have in my dreams."

When Esterhazy saw the *Figaro*, he thought the game was up and was on the point of fleeing to Belgium. But Henry told him that, if he did so, it would be all over with him, because they would arrest him at the frontier. His best course would be to deny that he had ever written the letters. Esterhazy took this advice, and the public were mystified. However, as there was no getting away from the fact that the letters were genuine, he acknowledged in the end that he had written them in a moment of fury—all, that is to say, except the Uhlan letter. The nationalist press explained that these were not the letters of a traitor, but the sort of thing that might be written by a mortified, excitable person, and that they afforded no proof whatever that their author was also the author of the *bordereau*.

De Pellieux announced his intention of having the Uhlan letter submitted to expert examination. Scheurer-Kestner urged him to have an expert comparison made of the *bordereau* with Esterhazy's writing, but this de Pellieux would

not do. In his report he stated that there was no case against Esterhazy; and, secondly, that a grave irregularity had been committed by Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart in the discharge of his duty.

When Henry heard of these findings, he advised Esterhazy to apply for a Court-Martial, where he would certainly get a favourable verdict. This advice was confirmed by Maître Tézenas, to whom Esterhazy had entrusted his defence and who, having heard only what his client had to say, never doubted his innocence. Esterhazy acted on this counsel, and wrote to de Pellieux asking to be tried by Court-Martial. General Saussier acceded to his request, signed the necessary order on December 4, 1897, and entrusted the conduct of the proceedings to a retired major of the name of Ravary.

Ravary began by going over again the whole ground that had already been covered by de Pellieux, hearing the same witnesses, repeating the same charges. Gonse, who, on de Boisdeffre's instructions, had shown de Pellieux the forged letter signed *Alexandrine* purporting to come from Panizzardi, the letter in which Dreyfus was mentioned, did likewise with Ravary. Every night the latter sent Gonse a report of the witnesses' examination; but while he divulged it to Esterhazy, he carefully concealed from Picquart and Leblois the charges which Gonse, Henry, Lauth, and Gribelin had brought against them.

Never doubting that what the High Command said was true, and that Dreyfus was guilty, Ravary looked on the duties he had been ordered to carry out as a mere formality. Nevertheless, he had to resign himself to having the *bordereau* submitted to expert examination. De Pellieux had entrusted the Uhlan letter to three experts: Charavay, an autograph collector; Belhomme, a former secondary school-inspector; and Varinard, an architect. Ravary applied to the same men. Charavay, having attributed the *bordereau* to Dreyfus in 1894, declined to act, and his place was taken by Couard, an expert in ancient documents. No sooner were the three

experts designated than du Paty wrote off to Esterhazy: "To-morrow you will have their names. They will be seen, don't you worry."

Maître Tézenas, who still believed in Esterhazy's innocence, wrote to Ravary and asked him to get the experts to compare his client's writing with that of Dreyfus. Ravary refused. This surprised Tézenas, but Esterhazy allayed his scruples by telling him that the High Command, whom he referred to as his friends, would not reopen the Dreyfus case at any price, because of the danger that might ensue.

This being the case, the task of the experts was limited merely to comparing Esterhazy's writing with that of the *bordereau*. They found unanimously that the *bordereau* was not the work of Esterhazy, and that it presented all the appearance of a forgery of which some of the characters had been traced. "This document," they said, "has been written on paper of such a transparent nature that it at once suggests the probability that it has been used for tracing from other documents from which words, or parts of words, have been borrowed."

As to the Uhlan letter, Charavay, Belhomme, and Varinard declared that it might be a forgery. But Madame de Boulancy, in a letter to the *Temps*, declared that it was just as genuine as the others. The preliminary proceedings were brought to an end on December 30, 1897.

Ravary then drew up his report. The first part of it was a fulsome panegyric of Esterhazy. He told the story of his meetings with the mysterious woman who had, at the outset, demanded that he should respect her incognito, and he commended him for not having hesitated to hand over to the War Minister the vital document with which she had entrusted him. As to the charge brought forward by Mathieu Dreyfus, that was entirely disposed of by the report of the experts, who had stated that the *bordereau* could not possibly be the work of Esterhazy. Nor could he have procured the documents enumerated in the *bordereau*. Certainly Esterhazy's private life could not be held up as a pattern for young

officers, but you could not say that, because a man's conduct was irregular, he was necessarily a traitor.

In the second part of his report Ravary dwelt on all the charges that Henry, Lauth, and Gribelin had laid at the door of Picquart, going to the length of saying that the *petit bleu* was apparently a fake. Then he wound up by saying that there was clearly no case against Esterhazy, and left it to the military authorities to take what cognizance they thought fit of Picquart's conduct.

When General Saussier read this report, he brushed aside the conclusions of the examining magistrate, and ordered Esterhazy to go before the Court-Martial. The Court was presided over by General de Luxer, assisted by two Colonels, Bougon and de Ramel; two Lieutenant-Colonels, Marcy and Gaudelette; and two Majors, Cardon and Rivals. The Court sat for the first time on January 8, 1898. Maître Demange, who represented the plaintiffs, asked leave to intervene in the discussion on behalf of Madame Dreyfus and Mathieu Dreyfus. His request was unanimously refused. Then, by five to two, it was decided that the case should be heard in public, unless and until it became evident that the national interest demanded that it should be heard in private.

Esterhazy, who was the first to be called, once again related the sensational story of the veiled lady; but refused to reveal the contents of the *document libérateur*. To all the questions put to him by General Luxer he gave the same answers as he had previously given to de Pellieux and Ravary, and protested that he was innocent. The President glossed over the letters to Madame Boulancy, the most violent of which Esterhazy denied that he had written. The public were favourably disposed towards him.

Mathieu Dreyfus was the next witness. He enumerated the reasons which had led him to denounce Esterhazy as the author of the *bordereau*. Scheurer, who followed, told the Court how his inquiries had led him to the conviction that Dreyfus was innocent. Next came the proprietor of the

house in which Esterhazy had taken rooms for his mistress. He was confronted with the latter, who denied having said what he had alleged. Then Weil was called and told of the measures he had taken to assist Esterhazy.

Then came the evidence of Colonel Picquart, and the Court was ordered to be cleared. His depositions occupied all the remainder of the sitting. As he had not been present when Ravary's report was read, he was ignorant of the charges preferred against him, and confined himself to a statement of his case against Esterhazy. On being asked by de Luxer for Gonse's letters, he handed them over immediately; but they were not read out.

Next morning Picquart, having read Ravary's report in the newspapers, brought his evidence to a conclusion. De Pellieux, who was seated behind de Luxer, subjected the witness to such a browbeating that Major Rivals, one of the judges, exclaimed, "I see that Colonel Picquart is the real defendant in this case." Picquart, having got through his cross-examination, demanded to be confronted with the witnesses whose evidence was at variance with his own. Gonse, Lauth, and Henry followed and formulated their charges against him. Henry having accused Picquart of showing the secret *dossier* to Leblois, the two officers were confronted with each other. Picquart showed that at the date mentioned by Henry his friend was not in Paris, and he demanded to be confronted with Lauth and Gribelin. This request was not granted, and when Leblois was called to give evidence the discussion was confined to the question whether the secret *dossier* had been on Picquart's desk when, whatever the exact date of the visit, Leblois came to see him. Leblois stated that he had not seen it and asked for an inquiry. De Pellieux and Tézenas objected.

Further witnesses were called, notably du Paty and Bertillon, in order that they might state what questions Picquart had put to them when he was pursuing his inquiries about Esterhazy. De Pellieux told the Court what the experts had reported regarding the letters to Madame de

Boulancy, after which the public prosecutor spoke a few brief words, intimating that he abandoned the charge.

Maître Tézenas addressed the Court on behalf of the defendant. The judges consulted together about three minutes, and then General de Luxer gave out that Esterhazy was unanimously acquitted. The verdict was greeted with loud applause, and when Esterhazy left the Court he was cheered by a crowd of several thousands, who shouted "Vive Esterhazy!" "Vive l'Armée!"

The nationalist and anti-Semite papers were jubilant. In their eyes the whole thing was now dead and buried. In point of fact, it was about to break out again with renewed vigour. The day after the verdict Picquart was arrested in his rooms by an officer of the *gendarmerie* and taken to Mont Valérien. Three days later, on January 13th, Zola, in the *Aurore*, published an "Open Letter to Félix Faure, President of the Republic," which Clemenceau printed under the heading "J'accuse!"

Zola, who had taken no notice of Bernard Lazare's first pamphlet, had had his interest aroused in the case in consequence of a meeting with Leblois in the previous October, in the course of which he had learnt of the correspondence between Gonse and Picquart. Some days later he was invited, together with Leblois and Marcel Prévost, to an At Home at Scheurer-Kestner's, who told him about his interview with Billot. From that day forward Zola took a passionate interest in the *Affaire*.

Fernand de Rodays, the editor of the *Figaro*, who had always believed that Dreyfus was innocent, gave hospitality to Zola's articles. The first was devoted to Scheurer-Kestner, and appeared on November 25, 1897. In it Zola spoke in terms of high praise of the senator's life, "a life as transparent as crystal," a life without blemish. He concluded with these words, which afterwards became famous: "Truth is advancing, and nothing will stop it."

The second article, entitled "The Syndicate," appeared on December 1st. Zola laid bare the absurdity of the legend.

On the 5th he published his third article, "The Evidence," which was a recapitulation of events.

But as numerous readers withdrew their subscriptions in consequence of these articles, Zola was compelled to discontinue his campaign in its columns. Then it was that he published, in the form of a pamphlet, his "Letter to Youth," urging them to take their stand on the side of justice. This was dated December 14th, and was followed on January 6, 1898, by the "Letter to France."

In his letter "J'accuse" Zola began by declaring that he refused to be a party to the iniquity that had been committed, for his nights would be haunted by the ghost of an innocent man suffering, in that far island, unimaginable tortures in expiation of a crime that he had never committed. Then he exposed the emptiness of the charges on which Dreyfus had been condemned:

"Dreyfus knows several languages: a crime. No compromising papers were found in his possession: a crime. He sometimes visited his native country: a crime. He is industrious and likes to find out about everything: a crime. He is calm: a crime. He is worried: a crime. . . ."

Finally, the letter concluded with these terrible indictments:

"I accuse Lieutenant-Colonel du Paty de Clam of having been the diabolical, but I would fain believe the unwitting, artisan of the miscarriage of justice, and thereafter of having defended his unhallowed work for three years by the most clumsy and culpable machinations.

"I accuse General Mercier of having become, at all events through weakness, an accomplice in one of the greatest iniquities of the age.

"I accuse General Billot of having had in his hands sure proofs of the innocence of Dreyfus and of having hushed them up, of having incurred the guilt of crimes



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against humanity and justice, for political ends and to save the face of the General Staff.

"I accuse General de Boisdeffre and General Gonse of having been participators in the same crime, actuated, the one no doubt by clerical partisanship, the other, it may be, by that *esprit de corps* which would make the Army and the War Office the sacred Ark of the Covenant.

"I accuse General de Pellieux and Major Ravary of conducting a disgraceful inquiry, by which I mean an inquiry characterized by the most monstrous partiality, of which we have, in the report of the latter of these two men, an imperishable monument of stupid audacity.

"I accuse the three handwriting experts, MM. Belhomme, Varinard, and Couard, of drawing up misleading and lying reports, unless, indeed, a medical examination should reveal them to be suffering from some pathological abnormality of sight and judgment.

"I accuse the War Office of conducting an abominable campaign in the Press, and particularly in the newspapers *l'Éclair* and *l'Echo de Paris*, in order to mislead public opinion and to conceal their own misdeeds.

"I accuse the first Court-Martial of acting contrary to law by condemning an accused man on the strength of a secret document; and I accuse the second Court-Martial of having, in obedience to orders, concealed that illegality, and of committing in its turn the crime of knowingly acquitting a guilty man.

"In bringing these charges, I am not unaware that I render myself liable to prosecution under Clauses 30 and 31 of the Act of the 29th of July, which deals with defamation of character in the public Press. But I do so of my own free will and with my eyes open.

"As for those whom I accuse, I do not know them, I have never seen them. I entertain for them neither hatred nor ill-will. They are so far as I am concerned mere entities, spirits of social maleficence, and the

action to which I have here committed myself is but a revolutionary means of hastening the explosion of Truth and Justice.

"I have but one passion, and that is for light, and I plead in the name of that humanity which has so greatly suffered and has a right to happiness. My fiery protest is but the outcry of my soul. Let them drag me, then, into a Court of Justice and let the matter be thrashed out in broad daylight. I am ready."

These charges broke like a thunderclap on the ears of the startled Parisians that morning. They reverberated in the Chamber of Deputies. The Comte de Mun demanded leave to interpellate the War Office. Méline, who was not at all in favour of prosecuting Zola, advised the deputies to trust to his firmness and good sense. But de Mun insisted that Billot should be brought in. Billot affirmed that Zola's charges were powerless to besmirch the good name of the Army. Jaurès, who had so far played no part in the case, warned the Republicans that they looked like "delivering over the Republic into the hands of the Generals." Cavaignac, who had been told by de Boisdeffre that Dreyfus had confessed, called on Méline to produce the "contemporary evidence" which proved that he had done so. Dupuy, Barthou, Poincaré, Hanotaux, who knew that Dreyfus had made no confession, held their peace. Méline told Cavaignac that to do as he suggested would have the effect of bringing the case up for retrial before Parliament. At that he backed out, preferring that the matter should be handed over to the lawyers. The Chamber endorsed his attitude by 295 votes to 128, with 100 abstentions.

The first result of Zola's letter was to bring an accession to the number of Dreyfus's supporters, which caused Clemenceau to exclaim, "The Syndicate is growing." A certain number of younger writers drew up a petition calling for a revision of the trial. Within a week it had been copiously signed, among the signatories being people of first-rate

importance, such as Duclaux, Grimaux, Anatole France, Frédéric Passy, Claude Monet, Maurice Bouchor, Gabriel Séailles, Charles Richet, Darlu, Stapfer, A. Briand, Renan's son and son-in-law, Victor Margueritte, Octave Mirbeau, Jean Ajalbert, Paul Brulat, Lugné-Poë, Marcel Proust, Georges Lecomte, Pierre Valdagne, Gustave Kahn, Armand Charpentier, etc.

In view of the circle to which they belonged, these early petitioners for a new trial were given the name of "Intellectuals."

In order to put a spoke in their wheel, the anti-Semite party made great play with Cavaignac's speech. "Since Dreyfus had confessed, what more was there to say?" The records of the alleged confession, to which reference had been made by Cavaignac, consisted of two documents, viz. the statement that had been dictated to Lebrun-Renault in October 1897, and a memorandum by Gonse relating to a conversation in which Mercier had told him that the prisoner's words reported by Lebrun-Renault on the day of degradation were tantamount to a confession. Madame Dreyfus, who had been greatly upset by Cavaignac's speech, wrote to him saying that her husband, who on Mercier's instructions had been visited in his cell by du Paty with the intention of extorting a confession, had protested his innocence, and that, moreover, when du Paty had gone, he had written to the same effect to Mercier.

Fearing lest du Paty, when he was cross-examined by his cousin Cavaignac, would acknowledge these facts, Gonse asked him to draw up a memorandum regarding his last interview with Dreyfus at the Cherche-Midi in 1894. Du Paty agreed, and his memorandum was dated September 1897. But Gonse was not satisfied with this one forgery. He fabricated a letter which he was supposed to have sent on January 6, 1895, to de Boisdeffre, following on a visit from Lebrun-Renault to Casimir-Perier. In the course of that interview Lebrun-Renault is supposed to have told him that Dreyfus had made an implied confession, alleging in

particular that the Minister for War knew that he was innocent, that he had told him as much through du Paty de Clam, and that if he had parted with any documents, and quite trivial ones at that, it was in order to get some really important ones out of the Germans.

Having given out in the Chamber that he would proceed against Zola, Méline at first thought of making a police-court case of it. Then he decided that it should be brought up at the Assizes. Billot confined his case to the fifteen lines in which Zola accused the Court-Martial of acquitting Esterhazy to order, and of wilfully condoning a felony. The writ was issued on January 20th, and the trial was fixed for February 7th. Zola entrusted his defence to a young barrister named Fernand Labori; Albert Clemenceau appeared for the managing director of the *Aurore*, and it was arranged that Georges Clemenceau, though not a barrister, should represent the newspaper itself.

On January 22nd Cavaignac again interpellated Méline. Primed by de Boisdeffre, he asserted that two documents were in existence showing that Dreyfus had confessed, one a letter written by General Gonse on January 6, 1895, the other a declaration made by Lebrun-Renault and signed at a subsequent date. What he did not say was that the said declaration was hardly four months old. He then called on Méline and Billot to produce them. Méline, profiting by the fact that Cavaignac had not revealed the date of Lebrun-Renault's declaration, astutely equivocated, saying that there was in truth extant a declaration by Captain Lebrun-Renault of which a record had been taken on the very day that sentence had been executed on Dreyfus. The Chamber, who interpreted this to mean that Dreyfus had confessed, forbore to ask for further particulars, and, despite an eloquent and courageous intervention on the part of Jaurès, passed a vote of confidence in the Government by 360 to 126.

This reported confession, which brought Germany into the matter, gave umbrage to the Emperor, who considered

it necessary to clear his country by an official declaration. Thus we find Count von Bülow, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, making the following statement in the Reichstag on January 24th:

"I will therefore confine myself to stating in the clearest and most explicit terms that no relations of any kind ever existed between ex-Captain Dreyfus, now a prisoner on Devil's Island, and any German agents whatsoever."

A few days later the Emperor William himself repeated this statement to the French Ambassador, the Marquis de Noailles, and von Munster verbally reported both statements to Hanotaux.

A declaration to the like effect was made on February 1st in the Italian Parliament by Count Bonin, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Before the Zola trial began Picquart was brought up before a Committee of Inquiry presided over by General de Saint Germain, a personal friend of Mercier's, one of the members of which was Colonel Boucher, an intimate friend of de Boisdeffre's. General Dumont accused Picquart of having shown the secret Dreyfus *dossier*, and two other confidential files, to Leblois, and of handing him fourteen letters from Gonse as well as putting forward misleading suggestions to Lauth. His former chiefs associated themselves with the charge, and, although General de Gallifet entered a plea on his behalf, the council decided by a majority of four to one that Picquart should be put on half-pay for a serious offence against discipline. Billot, however, knowing well that Picquart was Zola's principal witness, did not give immediate effect to the decision, but sent him back to Mont-Valérien.

On February 7th the Zola trial opened at the Assizes, Delegorgue presiding. The Advocate-General, van Cassel, at once demanded that the arguments on either side should be confined to the single indictment formulated by Billot.

Labori and Albert Clemenceau protested, but the Court decided against them. The discussion of this question and other preliminary matters took up the whole of the first day's hearing. Next day the first witness to be called was Madame Dreyfus. Scarcely had Labori put the first of the fifteen questions he proposed to ask her when Delegorgue pulled him up, refusing to allow the questions to be put. Leblois came next, and told the Court all about the faked telegrams that had been sent to Picquart. Scheurer-Kestner was anxious to read out the letter that had passed between Gonse and Picquart in September 1896, when the latter was making his inquiries about Esterhazy. Delegorgue vetoed this, but Joseph Reinach published them next day in the Dreyfusard Press. The sitting was brought to an end with the evidence of the banker de Castro, who deposed that somewhere about the end of October 1897 he bought a paper containing a facsimile of the *bordereau* and had been struck by the likeness between the writing on it and that of some letters from Esterhazy which he had in his possession.

As the Court emptied the anti-Semites hooted Zola, who, under the protection of a few friends—Bruneau the musician, Desmoulin the engraver, and Fasquelle the publisher—had great difficulty in regaining his carriage. Demonstrators galloped along behind shouting, "Drown him! . . . Throw him in the Seine."

The next four sittings were occupied by the evidence of the generals and officers of the Intelligence Department. De Boisdeffre declared that he knew nothing about any inquiries regarding Esterhazy. Of the so-called *document libérateur* he declined to speak, since it referred to the Dreyfus case. But he knew, he said, that all those officers against whom Zola had launched his accusations were good and upright men. Picquart was the only one whose conduct was open to complaint. As regards Dreyfus, he had never at any time doubted that he was guilty.

Gonse, who followed him, affirmed that the letters he had

written to Picquart referred solely to Esterhazy. It had never entered his head to reopen the Dreyfus affair.

Lauth reiterated his charges against Picquart, and Gribelin, the registrar, swore he had seen Picquart open the secret *dossier* and show it to Leblois. Leblois gave him the lie, and said that at the time of the alleged occurrence he was not in Paris. Gribelin flew into a passion, declaring that that night "the lamp was lit." Delegorgue took it from this that he was the lamplighter, whose duty it was to see to the lighting up. This amusing mistake brought a gleam of merriment into the dreary proceedings.

Next came General Mercier. Labori, who wanted to make him acknowledge that secret documents had been communicated, asked him about the *document libérateur*, which he described as "a paper on which the postscript begins with the words *cette canaille de D—*." As a matter of fact the exact phrase, *ce canaille de D—*, was not a postscript, but was contained in the body of Schwartzkoppen's letter to Panizzardi. Mercier, making the most of this little slip, equivocated, and said that he knew no such document. He went on to deny that he had ever boasted of having "communicated" any secret document to the Court-Martial. But as to whether they were in fact put before it he refused to make any statement. He concluded by saying that he was not going back on Dreyfus's condemnation, but that, if he did so, it would be to say that Dreyfus was a traitor who had been lawfully and justly condemned.

Labori pointed out that Mercier's silence regarding the secret *dossier* was tantamount to a confession.

Delegorgue, who had allowed Mercier to say that the verdict of 1894 was in accordance with the law, refused to question Charles Dupuy and Guérin, his colleague, or Trarieux the Senator concerning what they knew of the illegality of the proceedings.

Thévenet, a former Minister of Justice, managed to state that the question whether any clandestine and illegal use

had been made of a secret *dossier* was one which profoundly afflicted the public conscience. If nothing of the kind had occurred, why should they not be told so clearly and definitely?

The next comer was Maître Salles. Without waiting to hear what questions Labori was preparing to put, Delegorgue asked him whether he had anything to say about the Esterhazy affair. Salles replied in the negative. Before he withdrew, however, Albert Clemenceau intervened as follows:

"We suggest that the witness had it from the lips of one of the judges on the Court-Martial that a secret document was put in. Let the witness tell us whether this was so or not." Before he could say a word Delegorgue broke in. "Monsieur, do not reply," he said.

Major Ravary declared that he was proud to have played a part in Esterhazy's acquittal, and thus to have proved that there were not two traitors in the Army. Senator Trarieux explained what had led him to make up his mind; he was followed by du Paty de Clam. His first words were to make answer to Leblois, who had stated in his evidence that the Christian name Blanche, which was the signature on the telegram sent to Picquart, belonged to a young girl whom du Paty was to have married. He asked the Court to rule that the discussion of such matters was out of order.

Labori retorted that this "young girl," the Comtesse Blanche de Comminges, was fifty years of age, and that the reason why she had been brought into the affair was that the faked telegrams had been sent in her name.

Henry's cue was to screen himself as far as possible behind his chiefs, and to leave his defence in their hands. He had not put in an appearance at the earlier sittings, but the defence served him with a *subpoena* and he had no alternative but to attend. He dragged himself up to the bar of the Court with the air of a sick man and gave out that he had been suffering from a chill. Labori questioned him about the famous secret *dossier*, which he alleged had been

filched from his cabinet. Henry replied that he was away when the *dossier* was removed by Picquart. He admitted, however, that the envelope bore his initials, though he refused to say what was in it. Then he trumped up the charge about the information regarding carrier pigeons which Picquart had revealed to Leblois.

To this Leblois's answer was that what Henry blamed Picquart for doing Henry had done himself, for he had consulted him on a matter of espionage. Henry retorted that he had "conferred with," but not "consulted," him. Gonse, seeing that Henry was getting rather embarrassed, interposed and informed the Court that Colonel Henry was extremely unwell and asked leave for him to retire.

General de Pellieux, who genuinely believed that Dreyfus was guilty, could not for the life of him make out why his colleagues took refuge behind the veil of professional secrecy, hearings *in camera*, and so forth. Since there were so many proofs of Dreyfus's treason in existence, why not bring them out and smash the Syndicate? Dominated, however, by that rule of silence by which officers are bound, he contented himself with a declaration as to the probity of the judges by whom Esterhazy had been acquitted. He accordingly stated that the Court-Martial was not called upon to try an accused person, since it had been twice decided that there was no case against him. He acquitted himself brilliantly under cross-examination, and was a great success.

After de Pellieux came Picquart. Dressed in his blue uniform he stepped smartly forward; his countenance was impassive, his gaze remote. For an hour on end he stood there explaining how he had found out Esterhazy, refuting one after another the various allegations that had been made against him. Out of an excessive regard for professional secrecy, by which he considered himself bound, he said nothing about the Basle interview, nothing about the Weyler forgery in invisible ink, nothing about Gonse's advice to him not to go worrying his head about the Dreyfus case. He was also silent regarding the letter from *Alexandrine*—the letter

Henry had forged—the arrival of which at the very moment of his departure had fortified the convictions of Billot. All he said was that, feeling an atmosphere of constraint about him after his unmasking of Esterhazy, it was borne in upon him that it would have been well for him not to pursue the matter.

In answer to Labori's questions Picquart stated that his chiefs had never regarded it as a physical impossibility that Esterhazy might have been the author of the *bordereau*. He added that Esterhazy had managed to get hold of some friends at the War Office who had aided and abetted him in concocting his letters and telegrams; that Ravary had declined to seek out the delinquents, and finally that the famous *document libérateur* was a photographic copy of the *ce canaille de D*—document which Gribelin accused him of having shown to Leblois. That was why so much stress was laid on Leblois's visit to him at his office.

Lauth, recalled, accused Picquart of having attempted to get an official stamp put on the *petit bleu* and of obliterating the traces of mutilation on the photograph, so as to be able to report to Headquarters that the missive came from the Post Office. He also accused him of endeavouring to get him to certify that the *petit bleu* was in the handwriting of a certain specific person—he meant Schwartzkoppen—whom he did not name. He said it was his impression that it was Picquart himself who had inserted the *petit bleu* among the papers which Henry had handed over to him before going on leave.

Picquart gave Lauth the lie direct, and asked him whether he had ever seen a single letter on which he had caused a seal to be affixed. Lauth did not answer. But Albert Clemenceau made it clear that if Picquart had intended to mislead his chiefs by having the *petit bleu* stamped with the official stamp and by getting rid of the mutilation marks on the photograph, such a manœuvre would have been childish, for his chiefs would not have failed to ask him for the original. It would be impossible to stamp a *petit bleu* that

was torn into thirty pieces without the trick becoming apparent, for the seal would have been affixed to the gummed edge. And if the missive was seized by the postal authorities it might be stamped, but not torn in pieces.

After this evidence came a confrontation of Picquart and Henry on the question of the secret *dossier*. Henry alleged that on a certain occasion towards the end of October 1896 he had caught Picquart with the *dossier* on the table, while he was showing the paper about *ce canaille de D*—— to Leblois. Picquart retorted that in October Leblois was away in the Grand Duchy of Baden, that he did not return to Paris till November 7th, and that Gonse had resumed possession of the *dossier* on October 30th. There was a lively passage of arms between the two men. Henry declared that Colonel Picquart had told a deliberate lie.

Stung to the quick at this insult, Picquart in a voice trembling with passion told the jury of the intolerable persecution inflicted on him by these officers, who had brought about the whole *affaire* and now wanted to hush up their mistake. He himself had a loftier idea of honour. He considered that to seek Truth and to promote Justice was to render a service alike to the Country and the Army. Delegorgue smoothed things over; merely saying that the two colonels were not in agreement regarding the facts. Gonse, on his side, by way of calming Picquart down, rose and said that Colonel Picquart had never been disgraced; on the contrary, he had been sent on important missions.

Finding that his chiefs were not giving him sufficient backing, Henry declared that he intended to thrash out this secret *dossier* business once and for all. "Now, let's get at it," he said, and he proceeded to explain that in November 1894 Colonel Sandherr had told him to look into everything that had to do with secret service matters for the past year. This was how it came about that a *dossier* had been referred to and how the *canaille de D*—— letter had been brought to light. The whole lot of papers had been put into an envelope, which was fastened down, initialled, and put away in his

cabinet, where it remained till the day Picquart asked for it from Gribelin. This was a very cunningly devised piece of evidence, for, without seeming to make any direct reference to it, it disposed of the idea that any secret documents had been covertly communicated to the judges at the Court-Martial.

Henry went on to say that, about this time, Sandherr told him that he had in his possession a document far more important, which he was keeping up his sleeve in case it was wanted. This was a vague allusion to the existence of the so-called annotated *bordereau*, that is, the *bordereau* on which the German Emperor himself was said to have written notes. But that document bore so many indications of forgery that Henry thought it expedient to say as little as possible about it.

Gonse and de Boisdeffre had a pretty shrewd idea what the document was. But Picquart, his counsel, and the public were completely in the dark. Three days afterwards the Nationalist Deputy, Millevoye, who had been primed by Henry, was present at a public meeting at Suresnes, and there read out the alleged notes on the *bordereau* as if they had been a letter addressed by the Emperor to his Ambassador, von Munster. There was a great burst of laughter in the hall. Millevoye was called over the coals by his Army friends and strongly advised to keep his mouth shut.

On the day when Henry gave evidence, Maître Demange was next called as witness. An advocate of long experience, well versed in all the tricks of the game, he began on a very quiet note, telling his listeners that he had always impressed on Mathieu Dreyfus how necessary it was to proceed with caution. Hearing these words of wisdom pronounced in a benign, fatherly sort of voice, Delegorgue thought that all was well, but Albert Clemenceau, who had his eyes and ears open, took advantage of a propitious moment to ask Demange if it was true that one of the Court-Martial judges had told Maître Salles that there *was* a secret document. In an instant Delegorgue pricked up

his ears, and was on the point of rapping out "Don't answer," when Maître Demange, who was just a little too quick for him, exclaimed, "Why, yes, of course!"

That answer shot a ray of light into the minds of a good many. The next few days were taken up in hearing evidence as to motive and good faith on the part of the accused. Duclaux, Ranc, Anatole France all gave utterance to their convictions. Jaurès directed the searchlight of his criticism on the verdict of 1894, declaring that it was vitiated by the communication of a secret document, while the trial of 1898 was discredited by the ludicrous nature of the inquiry and the *in camera* evidence of the handwriting experts. Gabriel Séailles, who was ill, sent a letter in which he compared Zola's action to that of a man who, being locked up in a room in which the air is becoming unfit to breathe, rushes to the window and, at the risk of bathing himself in blood, smashes a pane of glass in order to admit a little light and air.

Grimoux, the eminent chemist and professor at the École Polytechnique, although threatened with the loss of his position, affirmed his conviction. "Nothing," he said, "insults, threats, the loss of my post, nothing will touch me; truth has invested me with impenetrable armour." As he made his way from the Palais he was hooted all along the corridors.

After the professors came the handwriting experts. Bertillon opened the ball by declaring that his proofs were "scientific," that the *bordereau* followed a geometrical rhythm, the equation of which was to be found in the blotting book of the condemned man. It was possible to reconstruct Dreyfus's writing from that blotting book. He offered to do so. Labori urged him to proceed, and produced the diagram which Bertillon had drawn. Everyone present went into fits of laughter.

At the next sitting Bertillon appeared without the pieces of blotting paper which he had promised to bring, and declared that, inasmuch as the ruling of the Court precluded

any mention of the Dreyfus case, he was unable to proceed with his demonstration. Under the storm of questions that were fired at him by counsel he maintained an obstinate silence, and then explained that he was only too anxious to speak, but that innumerable obstacles stood in the way. He then withdrew, affirming that the *bordereau* could not possibly have been written by Esterhazy.

As he was leaving the Court, Labori called out after him, "There goes the accusation of 1894! There's only one count in the indictment—the *bordereau*—and there goes the principal expert!"

The other experts were then called. Teyssonnières explained how he had arrived at his conclusions. Charavay declared he would never condemn a man on the word of a handwriting expert. Couard, Belhomme, and Varinard refused to reply, on the grounds that their report had been produced at the Esterhazy trial. Gobert and Pelletier repeated what they had said in 1894, which was favourable to Dreyfus. Other witnesses, Members of the Institute, Professors at the Collège de France, the École des Chartes, and the École des Hautes Études, held that the *bordereau* was written in a flowing handwriting identical with Esterhazy's.

The same day the evidence given by Madame de Boulancy before Bertulus was read out in Court, evidence in which she stated that the letters of Esterhazy, including the "Uhlán letter," were all genuine.

De Pellieux, feeling that Zola looked like getting the best of the argument, returned to the charge. His tactics were now to abandon the handwriting business and to concentrate on the several documents enumerated in the *bordereau*. His aim was to show that nobody but Dreyfus could have known about them. He then proceeded to a consideration of the *petit bleu*, and stated that a military attaché of a Great Power would not dream of corresponding with a spy by such a means. He wound up by referring to the risk of war. What would become of the Army on the day of trial if the men thought they were being led into battle by officers who had

been shown up as worthless in their eyes? That was as much as to tell the jury, "If you acquit Zola, it means war!"

Feeling that this evidence had not been without its effect, the defence recalled Picquart, who showed that Esterhazy might quite easily have got all the information referred to in the *bordereau* from his own friends. There ensued a heated argument between Gonse, de Pellieux, and Picquart, in which the latter successfully rebutted all his opponents' arguments. De Pellieux, in a fury, repeated Henry's exclamation. "If they want more light on the matter," he cried, "they shall have it!" He went on to say that at the time of Castelin's interpellation—that is to say, in November 1896—the War Office received "absolute proof" of Dreyfus's guilt. This "absolute proof" he quoted from memory: "There is to be an interpellation in the Chamber about the Dreyfus case. Don't say a word about our connection with that Jew."

Zola's counsel demanded that the document containing these words should be produced in Court. It was, of course, Henry's forged telegram. Here Gonse intervened. First of all he confirmed what de Pellieux had said, but then added, "If, for the sake of defending its good name, the Army is not afraid to tell the whole truth, we must at least proceed with caution." De Pellieux requested Delegorgue to call de Boisdeffre, in order that he might confirm his words. The president told him that de Boisdeffre was due to be heard next day, whereupon de Pellieux, who was terribly excited, ordered one of his aides-de-camp to go and bring him along at once. The Court then adjourned.

When he heard the line de Pellieux had taken Hanotaux was decidedly annoyed. The Italian Ambassador had, as we know, given him his word of honour that any letter purporting to come from Panizzardi, in which Dreyfus was referred to as being in the pay of Italy or Germany, was unquestionably a forgery. For his part, de Boisdeffre, who, to put it mildly, had his doubts about the document, and was afraid of having it discussed in broad daylight, approved of Gonse's caution and decided that it should not be pro-

duced. When next day he rose to give evidence, he said, "I will be brief. I confirm in all its details everything that has been said by General de Pellieux. It is entirely correct, and I have nothing to add. Indeed, I have no right to do so; I repeat, gentlemen of the jury, I have no right to do so."

Labori tried to get a word in, but Delegorgue refused to let him speak. Recalled by Labori, Picquart declared that the document to which General de Pellieux had referred was a forgery. Gonse retorted that it was genuine, but that it was impossible for him to go into further details. De Pellieux, looking Picquart up and down, said he thought it was a strange thing that a gentleman who was still wearing his country's uniform should accuse three generals of having uttered and made use of a forgery. To this Picquart replied that the good faith of his chiefs was not in question.

Next it was Esterhazy's turn. Before the officers de Pellieux had forbidden him to reply, no matter what questions were put to him.

"But, General," he protested, "if those swine go for me, I can't take it lying down."

"You will have to, though; I order you to."

And so it was. Albert Clemenceau had come primed with about sixty questions, which he fired off one after another like an archer scoring a succession of bull's-eyes. He read the salient passages from the letters to Madame de Boulancy. Then he swung round on Esterhazy. "Does Monsieur le Commandant Esterhazy, Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur, know those letters?" Again, "Can Monsieur le Commandant Esterhazy explain these words of Mlle Pays, 'It's all over with him; he's going to kill himself'?"

Esterhazy, his eyes glaring, his arms folded, his fingers twitching, stood up and let the torrent sweep over him. When the questions were over he went and took his seat among the officers, who gave him a regular ovation. His counsel flung his arms about him. When he left the Court, accompanied by de Pellieux, the crowd cheered frantically, and Prince Henri d'Orléans patted him on the shoulder.

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A score or so of patriots bore him in triumph to his carriage amid shouts of "Death to the Jews!" from the mob.

On February 20th Van Cassel, the Advocate-General, delivered himself of a diffuse and dreary oration. Zola read a statement in which he solemnly declared his belief in Dreyfus's innocence:

"Everything and everybody," he said, "seems against me—Parliament, the civil power, the Army, the big newspapers, and the public whose minds they have poisoned. I have nothing on my side but an ideal, the ideal of truth and justice. And I am easy in my mind, for I shall conquer."

Next came the counsel's turn. Labori, who had been fierce and denunciatory in his cross-examination, now adopted a pleading and persuasive tone. He displayed much astuteness in quoting from some articles by Cavaignac in which the latter, notorious Bonapartist though he was, declared his conviction that Dreyfus was innocent, and protested against the Esterhazy charges being heard *in camera*, and against use being made of secret documents. Then he ran through the whole story of the case, demolishing the legend of the alleged confession, denouncing as a forgery the document read out in Court by de Pellieux, although it was no doubt a forgery perpetrated by some junior officer or other for which the General Staff could not properly be held responsible. Lastly, he read some letters from Dreyfus to his wife, and then appealed in passionate terms to the jury:

"Let your verdict signify many things: to begin with, 'Long live the Army.' I too would fain cry, 'Long live the Army! . . . but also 'Long live the Republic! Long live our country!' That is to say, 'Long live Justice and Truth!'"

Georges Clemenceau spoke in behalf of Perrenx, the managing editor of the *Aurore*. He began his speech with these words:

"There is a man out yonder, across the seas, who may be the worst criminal conceivable, or who may be a martyr, a victim of human fallibility."

Then, having read out the article which he published in 1894, the article in which he had said that it was a pity Dreyfus had not been shot, he used it as an argument to say that it was not his business to decide whether Dreyfus was or was not guilty, but merely that he had been illegally condemned. Then, swinging round and facing the jury, he concluded as follows:

"Your verdict will be a verdict, not so much upon us as upon yourselves. We appear before you; you take your stand before the bar of History!"

The jury retired to consider their verdict. By a majority of eight to four Zola and Perrenx were found guilty. As to the question of extenuating circumstances, the votes were equally divided. The Court sentenced Zola to a year's imprisonment, Perrenx to four months, and both alike to a fine of three thousand francs. The public in Court and the mob outside yelled "*Vive l'Armée!*" "Down with Zola!" "Death to the Jews!" "Cannibals!" muttered Zola, under his breath.

The verdict of the Assize Court was hailed with delight by the Nationalist Press. But the defendants gave notice of appeal. Maître Mornard supported the appeal on the ground that the action ought to have been brought, not by the Minister for War, but by the members of the Court-Martial whom Zola had accused in his letter. The Attorney-General, Manau, concurred, and the verdict was quashed on April 2nd. Six days later the officers who had served on the Court-Martial decided to bring an action. But they based their charge only on three lines of the letter, those three lines making no reference to the irregularity of the 1894 trial. The case was referred to the Versailles Assizes. Zola protested, and on May 23rd appealed against this decision. His appeal was

disallowed, and Zola was compelled to present himself at Versailles on July 18th. During the five months which elapsed between Zola's condemnation and his appearance at Versailles two or three notable events occurred.

The day after the result of the Zola case was made known, two Deputies, Gustave Hubbard and Viviani, questioned Billot regarding the attitude taken up by two general officers when called upon to give evidence before the Civil Court. Méline confessed that the generals in question had gone rather farther than was becoming, but he excused them on account of the wide field which the discussion had covered. On the other hand he made the Dreyfusards responsible for the crisis which, for four months past, had been disturbing the peace of the country, and he promised he would take steps to bring the sedition-mongers to book.

What this meant soon became apparent. On February 26th Billot got Félix Faure to sign a decree whereby Colonel Picquart, who was still at Mont Valérien, was put on half-pay for grave infraction of discipline. He was immediately granted his freedom, and his pension was fixed at 2,108 francs per annum. Grimaux was deprived of his professorship at the École Polytechnique and the Institut Agronomique. An artillery officer named Chaplin, a son of the artist of that name, was denounced by two brother officers and punished for having sent Zola a congratulatory letter. Barthou relieved Leblois of his duties as Deputy Maire, and the Legal Council suspended him for six months. Shortly afterwards Zola's name was struck off the roll of the Legion of Honour. As a protest, Grimaux, Monod, Anatole France, Jules Barbier, Maurice Bouchor, and Francis de Pressensé wrote to the Grand Chancellor stating that they would cease to wear their decorations.

At the same time two duels were fought. In consequence of an article which appeared in the *Libre Parole*, Clemenceau fought a duel with Drumont on February 26th. Three shots were exchanged, without result. Picquart, who had been called a liar by Henry at the Assize Court, sent him his

seconds. The duel was fought with swords on March 5th. Henry was slightly wounded in the arm in the second bout. In his turn, Esterhazy sent a challenge to Picquart, who told the seconds that he would not fight with their principal. "He belongs," he said, "to the law officers of his country. It would be wrong of me to rob them of their due."

An incident of another kind took place early in March. On the 3rd of that month Lemer cier-Picard was found hanging from the window-catch in the furnished apartments he occupied with his mistress in the rue de Sèvres. Lemer cier-Picard, whose real name was Leeman, could imitate any sort of handwriting to perfection, and Henry made use of him for producing his forgeries. For some time past the man had been in the direst poverty and, under various *aliases*, had vainly endeavoured to screw money out of all kinds of people, such as Séverine, Rochefort, the Baroness Hirsch, and Cardinal Richard, Archbishop of Paris. Henry, who knew all about Lemer cier-Picard and his goings-on, may have been afraid he would sell his secrets. Did he have him done away with? Some people thought so, among them Séverine, who wrote in the *Fronde* of March 7th to this effect: "The rue de Sèvres man did not hang himself. He was murdered." However, two police doctors, Brouardel and Socquet, certified the cause of death as suicide by hanging.

Side by side with these events, which arose directly out of the Dreyfus case, there were others of a political character that call for mention. Up to the time of Zola's trial the partisans of Dreyfus, who had been drawn from all points of the compass, had acted independently, like isolated sharp-shooters. The evidence of the generals at the Assize Court, the growing audacity of the anti-Semite factions, the wind of revolt which was beginning to blow in Royalist and Catholic circles, stimulated the Dreyfusards to form themselves into a united group. At the suggestion of Yves Guyot, the editor of the *Siècle*, a committee was formed consisting for the most part of "intellectuals." This com-

mittee, after two meetings, founded the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*, which later on rallied all the supporters of Dreyfus to its banner.

Meanwhile the Chamber had reached the term of its mandate, and the elections took place on May 8 and 22, 1898. The result brought about no very important change in the relative positions of the parties. Among the outgoing Deputies who were unsuccessful were the two Socialist leaders Jaurès and Guesde, Goblet, a former Radical Minister, Darlen, a Minister of moderate views, and others. On the other hand the principal Nationalist and anti-Semite agitators, Déroulède, Millevoye, and Drumont, got in.

The Minister for the Colonies, André Lebon, was defeated at Parthenay owing to the tactics of the supporters of Dreyfus, who, out of contempt for his persecutor, cast their votes for the Royalist candidate, the Marquis de Maussabre.

Between the end of Zola's trial and the opening meeting of the new Chamber, which took place on June 15th, the country, now wholly absorbed in the political aspect the struggle had assumed, might have taken it that, so far as the law and lawyers were concerned, the Dreyfus case was over and done with. It was soon to be seen that that was far from the case.

Although the verdict of the Court of Assizes was in its way a feather in his cap, Billot felt that the General Staff was going to have a pretty stiff fence to negotiate at the new hearing at Versailles. He made up his mind that all the documents tending to bring out Dreyfus's guilt, documents which were now dispersed among the files of the several departments, should be assembled together and properly arranged. He asked General Gonse to see to it. Gonse, in his turn, delegated the task to Henry. The whole thing occupied about six weeks, from the end of April to the beginning of June. Henry furnished this new *dossier* with the following documents: those which, in 1894, had been secretly divulged to the judges, without the knowledge of Dreyfus and his counsel; some thirty memoranda of Guénée's

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concerning Dreyfus's moral character; a note from the Comtesse von Munster, the German Ambassador's daughter, containing the words "There has been too much gossip going on"; a note from Panizzardi beginning "I've seen Dubois again"; a miscellaneous collection of disconnected fragments all dating from before the trial; and seventy-four papers or letters more or less incomplete, which had been picked up at the Embassies after Dreyfus had sailed for Devil's Island, and had no connection with the affair. Then there was the so-called "confessions" file; the three Panizzardi-Schwartzkoppen letters, that is to say, the three forgeries Henry had got Lemercier-Picard to execute for him; the letter from Panizzardi to Schwartzkoppen on which Henry had scratched out the letter "P" and put in a "D" instead; and lastly, the rough draft of a note from an Austrian attaché, Colonel Schneider. This draft, which bore neither signature nor date, had been picked up at the Austrian Embassy in September 1896, just when the newspapers were squabbling over Dreyfus's reported escape. Schneider, in this memorandum, related the favourable things which the German and Italian attachés had said about Dreyfus, but he remarked that he did not think they really meant them. As a matter of fact, Schneider afterwards changed his opinion. But when Mathieu Dreyfus brought his charge against Esterhazy, Henry raked out this document, changed the date of it from September 1896 to November 30, 1897, and added Schneider's signature.

The *dossier*, as now constituted, contained 373 documents. Nevertheless, Henry did not dare to put in the photographs of the famous annotated *bordereau*, one copy of which, so Reinach says, had been sent to Mercier and another to Esterhazy. But that, probable as it is, has never been definitely proved.

Gonse also made up a *dossier* on his own account. It contained (1) a memorandum from General Lèbelin de Dionne, who had had Dreyfus under him at the École de Guerre and had reported very well of him. Gonse sent

for him, and, at his request, de Dionne agreed to modify his report and to say that, even in those days, the Jew Dreyfus had to some extent come under suspicion; (2) a memorandum giving the heads of a conversation he had had with a tutor at the École Polytechnique, named Ocagne. Ocagne had told Gonse that Painlevé, the mathematician, had got it from Jacques Hadamard, a lecturer at the Sorbonne, that he, Hadamard, who was a relative of Dreyfus's, had had unsatisfactory reports regarding the prisoner on Devil's Island. Now what Hadamard had really said was that, although unfavourable reports had got about concerning Dreyfus's private life, he himself had no doubts about his cousin's innocence.

Painlevé, having got to know that his conversation with Hadamard had been misrepresented, went to see Gonse and told him the real facts. Gonse heard what he had to say, then, when he had gone, wrote up the following version of Hadamard's statement, saying that it had been confirmed by Painlevé in d'Ocagne's presence:

"I did not mean to say that I thought Dreyfus was innocent; moreover, since his arrest we, in the family, have heard some things about him that make it impossible for us to answer for him."

This statement was dated March 8, 1898, and bore the signature "*Gonse*."

There were also three other little memoranda that Gonse put into his collection. One had reference to a story d'Ocagne had told him of how, at Brussels, "some time before his arrest," Dreyfus had run into a former fellow-pupil of his at the Polytechnique, a man named Lonquety, and had pretended not to recognize him. As a matter of fact that meeting had taken place in 1893, in a restaurant.

The second note had to do with one Pomier, a servant in the employ of a secret service agent at Brussels, who had seen on his master's table various communications signed "Dreyfus" which had come from Paris and had reference

to mobilization. Gonse told Henry to find out Pomier's whereabouts and get hold of him. The police ran him to earth in Paris, but he flatly denied that he had ever made the statements attributed to him. Henry's report to Gonse was that the man had disappeared and left no trace. Yet the things he was alleged to have said were still reported as authentic.

The third note was about some piece of ancient history regarding melinite shells. Gonse had come across some charred fragments of a letter written on tracing paper and supposed to be a copy of secret instructions regarding the loading of this shell. Gonse gave these fragments to Bertillon to examine. Bertillon, however, refused to admit that they were in Dreyfus's writing. Thereupon Gonse applied to a former comrade of the condemned man, a Captain Rémusat, who agreed to write and say that Dreyfus had tried to obtain information regarding the Robin shell. There was absolutely nothing to suggest that this shell had been given away to the Germans, and Robin himself afterwards declared that Dreyfus had never tried to get any information out of him.

Meanwhile, Gonse perceived that his *dossier* lacked one important item, viz. the telegram which Panizzardi had sent the Italian Staff on November 2, 1894, as soon as he heard that Dreyfus had been arrested. As we have seen, the decoding of this communication was productive of more than one version. The reading ultimately agreed upon was as follows:

"If Captain Dreyfus has not had any dealings with you, it will be as well to get the Ambassador to publish an official denial, so as to avoid all newspaper comment."

Gonse wanted Henry to let him have this translation, but Henry had done away with it because it contradicted the letter he had forged on November 1, 1896. He replied, therefore, that he could not put his hand on it. Gonse then referred to Billot, who told him he had better send Henry

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to the Foreign Office for another copy. Henry went and saw Paléologue, but Paléologue, instead of giving him a written copy, merely told him by word of mouth what the final version had been. Henry wrote to his dictation, and then came back and said to Gonse, "These gentry would not let me have the telegram."

This was reported to Billot, who said he would get the requisite copy from Hanotaux. Hanotaux replied that the thing was over and done with, and that he could not entertain private and personal applications. After that Billot instructed Gonse to apply to the Post and Telegraph Department. This Gonse did, but instead of asking for a copy, which he would have got, he asked for the original. He was told that originals were destroyed after a certain lapse of time.

Henry, who was afraid Billot would move heaven and earth to get hold of the real version, thought of a subterfuge. He suggested to Gonse that du Paty should be asked to write down the wording from memory. Du Paty wrote out a version that reproduced one of the earlier, incorrect translations, leaving a blank space for the part about which there had been a query. But Gonse introduced his own modifications, and this was what finally emerged: "Captain Dreyfus has been arrested. The War Office possesses conclusive evidence of his relations with Germany. I have taken all precautions."

This was in direct contradiction with what Panizzardi had wired to the Italian Staff. A note was added to the effect that it had been reconstructed by du Paty from memory.


While the General Staff had been busy, all through March, April, and May, enriching the *dossier* which was supposed to contain proofs of Dreyfus's guilt, in order to be ready for the tug-of-war at Versailles, Esterhazy had definitely quarrelled with his cousin Christian. Christian had been getting anxious about his money, and told his kinsman that he wanted it back. The Major was highly

indignant, but Christian, not to be put off by bluff and bluster, arrived with his mother at Mlle Pays's flat, and there renewed the attack. Esterhazy, being cornered, told him he had never placed the money with the Rothschilds, chaffed his cousin for being a ninny, and said that, anyhow, it would be all right, as he was going to write his memoirs for a publisher who had agreed to let him have an immediate advance of five thousand francs on account, and he would pay him back out of that. This time Christian was not to be taken in. He went and saw Labori and told him, not only about his own troubles, but everything he knew about Esterhazy and his doings—about his being hand-in-glove with the General Staff, his meetings with du Paty, the faked telegrams signed *Speranza* and *Blanche* which the woman Pays had written, the story of the veiled lady, and so on. Next day he unburdened himself of the same details to Trarieux the Senator, who passed the story on to Zola, Leblois, Picquart, and Joseph Reinach.

While Christian Esterhazy was priming the defenders of Dreyfus with this information, de Pellieux took up a new line of attack against Picquart. Henry knew better than anybody that the veiled lady had never had any real existence otherwise than in the guise of du Paty and himself; but to bamboozle de Pellieux he had given him to understand that this mysterious personage was a cousin and an old flame of Picquart's, a Madame Monier, who, in order to avenge herself for having been left high and dry, had told Esterhazy everything she knew. He added that Gonse and he had disclosed the woman's identity to Bertulus. De Pellieux was credulous enough to believe this absurd story, and sent one of his officers to cross-examine the lady's concierge. The lady herself, having got a hint of what was in the wind, asked de Pellieux to stop these backstairs proceedings. The General then did an unpardonable thing. He wrote to her husband telling him that his wife had come to him as Picquart's mistress, and had asked him for an explanation. M. Monier merely replied that his wife was

UN DINER DANS LA LOGE

PAR CARAN D'ACHE



LE DERNIER SALON OU L'ON CAUSE:

CARICATURE INSPIRED BY THE DISCLOSURES OF M.I.E. PAYS

with him in the country when Esterhazy was having his interviews with the veiled lady. De Pellicux pretended to give in, but he told Esterhazy, who repeated it to Bertulus, all about the visit he had had from Madame Monier. Madame Monier, however, had been one too many for him, and had gone herself to complain to Bertulus about the annoyance to which she had been subjected by these police investigations. The result was that the Judge began to see through the manœuvres of the General Staff, and thus had proof of the collusion that had been going on between the Intelligence Department and Esterhazy. He contented himself with asking for the *Speranza* letter from the War Office, and the War Office gave it him. He then waited for Christian to come and see him again. Such were the events that took place between Zola's trial and the reassembling of the Chamber.

CHAPTER VI

CAVAIGNAC'S SPEECH.—PICQUART WRITES TO BRISSON.—BERTULUS AND FABRE INVESTIGATE.—ZOLA AT VERSAILLES.—ZOLA GOES INTO EXILE.—ONE OF HENRY'S FORGERIES EXPOSED.—CONFESSION AND SUICIDE OF THE FORGER.—A RE-TRIAL DECIDED UPON.—DEATH OF FÉLIX FAURE.—LOUBET ELECTED.—THE COURT OF APPEAL QUASHES THE 1894 SENTENCE.

THE first sitting of the new Chamber took place on June 1st. Paul Deschanel, a moderate, was elected President, by a majority of ten, over Brisson, his Radical opponent. But a fortnight later the Left took its revenge by defeating the Méline Ministry by 293 against 246. The new Cabinet was formed on June 30th, with Brisson as Prime Minister. The Minister of Justice was Sarrien, and Cavaignac was in charge at the War Office. On July 7th Castelin, the Nationalist, interpellated the Government, exhorting it to have done with the Dreyfus case and to mete out to the sedition-mongers the punishment they deserved. Cavaignac mounted the tribune, and began by explaining that if Esterhazy had been acquitted, it was because his judges had no proof of the crime imputed to him. "An attempt has been made," he added, "to put into Dreyfus's place an officer whose conduct will meet with the punishment it deserves." Then he went on to affirm that he was absolutely certain of Dreyfus's guilt, and proceeded to enumerate the proofs on which his conviction was based :

"(1) A letter in which Panizzardi informed a collaborator of Schwartzkoppen's that an individual named D—— had brought him a number of interesting things.

"(2) The letter referring to *ce canaille de D——*.

"(3) The letter from Panizzardi in which the name of Dreyfus was mentioned.

"(4) The admissions made by Dreyfus to Captain Lebrun-Renault."

Cavaignac's speech was greeted by the House with applause. A proposal that it should be printed and displayed on public hoardings was put forward by Déroulède, Marcel Habert, Cassagnac, Humbert, and Mirman, and carried by a large majority. Fifteen Socialists abstained from voting, as did Méline. The latter, on hearing mention of the letter from Panizzardi in which Dreyfus was referred to by name, realized that this was the document which the Italian Ambassador had declared on his word of honour was a forgery. Moreover, he was well aware that Dreyfus had never made any confession. In a word, not one of the proofs set out by Cavaignac had the smallest validity, for the following reasons:

"(1) As to the letter from Panizzardi to someone in the intimacy of Schwartzkoppen, it was subsequently established that the real initial was 'P,' and that Henry had scratched out the 'P' and put a 'D' in its place.

"(2) The letter with the words *ce canaille de D*—could only refer to some obscure secret service man to whom the German and Italian attachés gave the name of Dubois and who sold them plans of fortresses, for the most part valueless.

"(3) A letter from Panizzardi signed *Alexandrine* was the item which Henry had forged from beginning to end on November 1, 1896.

"(4) As for Dreyfus's confessions, they were based on the memorandum which Lebrun-Renault had written in October 1897 in response to a request from Gonse."

Cavaignac's speech was acclaimed with enthusiasm by the whole of the Nationalist Party. It was, however, remarkable that, though the rank and file of Dreyfus's supporters were filled with dismay, this was very far from being the case with the leaders, who were highly delighted. In point of fact, not only had Cavaignac left out all reference to the *bordersau*, the only legal count in the indictment, but—still more important—though he was unaware of it, he had

opened the door to revision. The day after his speech Labori got Picquart, Demange, Trarieux, and Joseph Reinach to come and see him. Demange read out a protest which he desired to send to the Minister of Justice, declaring that, in 1894, the only document of which he had legal cognizance, the only document of which the Court-Martial had legal cognizance, was the *bordereau*. It followed, therefore, that the defence had had no opportunity of contesting the validity of any other document. When he had read it through, Joseph Reinach expressed the opinion, and Labori and Trarieux concurred, that Picquart, and Picquart only, was the right man to reply to Cavaignac. Picquart agreed to do so, and drew up a letter to Henri Brisson in the following terms:

MONSIEUR LE PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL,

I have had as yet no opportunity of speaking my mind concerning the secret documents on which the supposed guilt of Dreyfus is alleged to rest.

As the Minister for War quoted three of these documents in the Chamber, I consider it my duty to let you know that I am in a position to establish, to the satisfaction of any competent authority, that the two documents dated 1894 could not possibly apply to Dreyfus, and that the document dated 1896 has upon it all the marks of a forgery.

It will therefore be apparent that the Minister of War has been unwittingly misled, and that the same is the case with all who believed in the validity of the documents in question.

When this letter became public, Cavaignac decided on two things: (1) to proceed against Picquart; (2) to verify the genuineness of the secret documents. Accordingly, as early as July 12th he informed the Cabinet that he was going to lodge a complaint against Picquart and Leblois with the Minister of Justice, in virtue of the law governing

cases of espionage. But, instead of citing the letter which Picquart had just written, Cavaignac based his case on the accusation brought against Picquart, in the course of the Zola trial, by Henry, Lauth, and Gribelin.

Cavaignac also intimated that he was going to have Esterhazy brought before a Court of Inquiry. For some days past Esterhazy's plight had been going from bad to worse. Mathieu Dreyfus had procured specimens of the woman Pays's handwriting, and had handed them to Bertulus. The latter, on comparing them with the writing on the telegram signed *Speranza*, became fully convinced that Esterhazy's mistress was the author of the telegram, as Christian had already told Labori.

Meanwhile, after a great deal of hesitation, Christian went to Bertulus and told him the whole truth. Bertulus, feeling that he had now a good case against Esterhazy, called on Feuilloley, the Public Prosecutor, and told him that he was going to issue warrants for the arrest of Esterhazy and the woman Pays. Feuilloley, who would have preferred to leave it to Cavaignac to deal with Esterhazy, displayed some hesitation, and there was a somewhat heated discussion between the two men. But Bertulus stuck to his guns. Feuilloley, however, informed Cavaignac of what had taken place. Cavaignac authorized Bertulus to carry out a search at Esterhazy's apartments.

Just when the evening papers were coming out with the news that proceedings were being taken against Picquart and Leblois, Bertulus, accompanied by some other officials and a police officer, was on his way to the rooms of Mlle Pays in order to conduct a search. Arriving there, he took an inventory of all the furniture and found a quantity of letters and papers, which he duly placed under seal. He even picked up a *képi* of Esterhazy's and turned the lining inside out. If he had only looked under the stiffening as well, he would have found (as he afterwards discovered) a photograph of what Esterhazy used to call "the Imperial Guard," which was either the document containing the

words *ce canaille de D*— or the forged *bordereau* with its alleged annotations by the German Emperor. At this moment Esterhazy himself came in. He had come to take his mistress out to dinner. The magistrate told him he was going to arrest him for making and uttering forged documents. Esterhazy went as white as a sheet and nearly collapsed. Then, recovering himself and putting on an air of bravado, he exclaimed, "I will speak; I will let them know a few things I have kept to myself till now."

"Enough of this play-acting," answered Bertulus. "We know all about you!"

The search went on until eleven o'clock at night. At midnight the police took the woman off to Saint Lazare, and Esterhazy to la Santé. Next day, July 13th, on Cavaignac's instructions, Fabre sent Picquart to keep Esterhazy company at la Santé.

It was on July 18th, shortly after these arrests, that Zola was due to come up before the Assize Court at Versailles. Clemenceau and Labori determined to apply for leave to submit proof of the charges contained in the letter "J'Accuse! . . ." and advised Zola not to appear if the Court rejected the application. The moment the proceedings began Labori put forward his demand. Bertrand, the Attorney-General, opposed, and the Court rejected the application. Labori then announced that he would appeal, but the president, Perivier, and his assessors ruled that the hearing should go on irrespective of such appeal. Zola and his supporters then left the Court amid the jeers of the crowd, who tried to rough-handle them. Déroulède kept shouting, "Chuck him out of the country! Send him to Jericho!"

The Court found against Zola, and condemned him to the maximum penalty.

On the way back from Versailles Zola, accompanied by Labori, called in at Georges Charpentier's (his publisher), in the Avenue du Bois de Boulogne. Both the Clemenceaus and Desmoulin, the engraver, were already there. Labori,

who was supported by Clemenceau, strongly urged Zola to get out of France so that his sentence might remain in abeyance and he be free to start fresh proceedings whenever the moment seemed propitious. Zola was against this, saying that he would rather go to prison than run away. At last, however, he gave in and consented to act on his counsel's advice. Desmoulin went to fetch Madame Zola, who arrived with a few articles of toilet necessary for the journey, and that same evening Zola set out alone for London. He put up at the first hotel that offered, and entered his name on the register as M. Pascal.

Next day the *Aurore* published over Zola's signature an article which Clemenceau had drawn up, and in which the author of "J'Accuse!" set himself to explain the reasons which had led him to quit France. It ended with these words: "In October I shall be face to face with my judges."

In advising Zola to leave France, Labori and Clemenceau entertained the hope that the inquiries into the conduct of Picquart and Esterhazy would elicit some new facts that would hasten on a fresh trial. This hope came very near fulfilment. In the course of her first examination the woman Pays told Bertulus that it was she who had written the *Speranza* telegram. The very next day, on Tézenas's advice, she refused to repeat her confession. However, in the course of overhauling the papers which he had impounded at Esterhazy's, Bertulus came upon some documents which threw a considerable light on things. They were the codes which Esterhazy had used when writing to Henry and du Paty; the draft of the letter he wrote to de Pellieux asking him to give evidence before the Court-Martial, which draft de Pellieux had corrected with his own hand; a draft of a letter to du Paty about bringing pressure to bear on the experts in the matter of the *bordereau*; some memoranda for Gonse; letters from Henry; copy of a plan of campaign submitted to de Boisdeffre and de Pellieux in view of the Zola trial; a memorandum with such notes as "Basle," "Cuers," etc. All these papers clearly showed that Esterhazy

had been "put wise" about the inquiries Picquart had been making concerning him. Moreover, the collusion between him and the General Staff came out as plain as daylight. Finally, Bertulus found himself in possession of a letter which Esterhazy had written to Jules Roche, the Deputy, when trying to get him to back up his application for a post in the War Office, and which contained this sentence: "Henry has been in my debt ever since 1876. I lent him money then, and it is still owing. That accounts for a great deal."

It happened that on the very day Zola set out for England Bertulus received a visit from Henry, who had been sent by the General Staff "to look up and bring away any documents which seemed to concern the external security of the country." The Judge told him that the seals could not be removed save in the presence of Esterhazy, Marguerite Pays, and their legal representatives. Nevertheless he consented to show him the documents which were not under seal, among which were the papers enumerated above, and notably the note "Basle," "Cuers," and so on. When he saw them, Henry looked worried. Bertulus noticed this, and said, "You will never make me believe that Esterhazy got to know about Cuers and the Basle interview off his own bat. Who put him up to it, then, if not you, or someone connected with you?" He then gave a rough outline of this collusion and what Esterhazy and du Paty had to answer for. Taking it that he was discovered, Henry confessed that the authors of the faked telegrams signed *Speranza* and *Blanche* were none other than Esterhazy and du Paty. Then he implored him to save the Army, and to do nothing till he had seen General Roget, Cavaignac's chief private secretary. Bertulus replied that he would willingly see Roget, and insisted that the officers implicated would have to go. "Let du Paty go and blow his brains out, and let the law take its course with Esterhazy." Then, tapping Henry on the shoulder, he said, "And that's not all, we've still got you to think about. I've seen a letter in which Esterhazy shows you up pretty badly. If that letter, which is no longer

in my possession, falls into your adversaries' hands, people will see that all your statements are lies and that for a long time past you have been mixed up with Esterhazy." Finally, it having suddenly flashed on him that Henry might have been Esterhazy's accomplice, Bertulus wound up by saying, "Some people might quite well maintain that the man who kept Esterhazy informed was none other than yourself."

At this Henry fell all of a heap into an arm-chair and burst into tears. Then he struggled to his feet and, flinging both his arms round Bertulus, cried imploringly, "Save us! save us!" Sitting down again at Bertulus's invitation, he exclaimed, "Esterhazy is a bandit," to which the Judge replied, "Esterhazy is the man who wrote the *bordereau*." Henry answered, "Don't drive it home, don't drive it home! The honour of the Army comes before everything."

Bertulus, seeing how completely unstrung he was, took pity on him and, saying that if he preferred he would continue his questions another day, allowed him to depart.

Once outside in the street, Henry, who had been afraid he was going to be arrested, began to comfort himself with the idea that Bertulus had been trying to frighten him, and that he really knew nothing. He told Gonse and Roget about the interview, but in his version the rôles were reversed. It was Bertulus who had done the weeping, protesting his love for the Army and declaring that, in arresting Esterhazy, he had simply meant to raise the alarm, expecting the Government to intervene. Consequently Henry advised Roget to go and see Bertulus and explain to him about du Paty. As soon as he began to feel that his own reputation was in jeopardy, Henry did all he could to put the suspicions on to his colleague. But Roget refused to go, saying that Cavaignac was getting tired of Esterhazy and that, if du Paty had got himself in a mess, so much the worse for him.

Next day Cavaignac received a visit from Maître Tézenas, who told him that ever since his arrest Esterhazy had been blustering and rampaging about, threatening to divulge all he knew. Cavaignac said he did not care a rap for the

blackguard. All the same he let it be understood that he intended to have nothing to do with Bertulus and that, if he gave Esterhazy a twisting, it would be without anyone else's assistance.

When, three days later, Henry went back to see Bertulus, he had quite regained his calm. He told him that Roget did not think any useful purpose would be served by his coming to see him. After which he looked on at the removal of the seals as if it were no concern of his. On the 26th there was a further interview, which he attended in company with Captain Junck, with whom he proceeded to carry out a minute examination of the papers. "What can they be after?" said Bertulus to his clerk. Esterhazy, who was in the room at the time, said, "I know; it's the 'Imperial Guard'; but they won't get it; it's in safe keeping."

Seeing that Henry was himself again, Esterhazy and his mistress took fresh heart and began whittling down the confessions they had made. The woman Pays swore that all she knew about the *Blanche* and *Speranza* telegrams was what she had got from the newspapers. As to the charges Bertulus and his cousin Christian had brought against him, giving chapter and verse for everything, Esterhazy lied till he was blue in the face and got in a hopeless tangle. After a while, when the evidence got too much for him, he let slip one or two bits of the truth, but he quickly pulled himself up, and said, "Don't stick that down in the report, I shan't sign it." But when Bertulus, at the close of his examination, read over the various counts against him, and when he learnt that Christian had really made up his mind to proceed against him for fraud, Esterhazy crumpled up, for he knew that Bertulus held him to be the author of the *bordereau*.

Unfortunately, Bertulus, after getting the upper hand, played his cards badly. Although he knew all about Henry and his manœuvres, he still thought that du Paty de Clam had played the lead in the collusion between the General Staff and Esterhazy. He accordingly advised Picquart to proceed against du Paty for forgery, as being the accomplice

of Esterhazy and Marguerite Pays. No sooner had the case started than Cavaignac declared that du Paty, being on the active list, was amenable solely to the military courts. The Minister of Justice concurred, and Bertulus was invited by Feuilloley to declare the case outside his jurisdiction. Bertulus, very loth to have the case taken out of his hands, thought it would be a good move to draw a distinction between the two forgeries. Taking it that the *Blanche* telegram had been drawn up and dispatched by du Paty without civilian complicity, he ruled that it did not fall within his competence. But the *Speranza* telegram, which had been copied out by Marguerite Pays, did, he asserted, come within his province. The Attorney-General contested this distinction and gave notice of appeal. Picquart also appealed, holding that it came within the Judge's competence to deal with both telegrams. Bertulus consequently found himself compelled to suspend operations against Esterhazy until a legal decision had been come to about du Paty. The legal authorities had merely to pronounce on form and procedure, not on fact and substance, yet they did so pronounce when they declared that Bertulus had been at fault in not putting du Paty through a fresh examination and in disregarding the conclusions of the expert as to the handwriting on the *Speranza* telegram. In face of this decision, which President Caze did not dare to publish *verbatim*, Picquart appealed, and Bertulus gave his ruling whereby Esterhazy and his mistress were committed for trial at the Assizes on a charge of making and uttering forged documents. Trollard-Riolle declared that, Pays and Henry having retracted their confessions, those confessions had no longer any significance; that the expert's report attributing the writing on the *Speranza* telegram to Pays was insufficient evidence on which to base an accusation; that the contradictions in Christian's statement rendered his evidence worthless. The Court concurred in these opinions, reversed Bertulus's ruling, and decided that there were no grounds for proceeding against Walsin-Esterhazy and the woman Pays. Esterhazy and his

mistress were accordingly released from custody the same day.

It will be remembered that in reply to the letter which Picquart had sent to Brisson regarding Cavaignac's speech of July 7th the latter had commenced proceedings against Picquart on the ground that he had divulged to his friend Leblois certain details regarding national defence. The Judge, Albert Fabre, who had been instructed by Feuilleley to go into the matter, had pursued his investigations side by side with those which Bertulus had been conducting in the matter of Esterhazy and Mlle Pays; but whereas Bertulus had promptly seen where the truth lay, Fabre still held the belief that Dreyfus was guilty. When, however, he came to question Picquart, he was impressed by the calmness of his demeanour and the precision of his replies. Picquart freely admitted that he had consulted Leblois over the Boulot affair, and also as to the law relating to carrier-pigeons, but he denied that in so doing he had committed any breach of the regulations. He further denied that he had divulged the existence of the secret *dossier* to his friend. He added, however, that when he felt he was in danger he had thought it necessary to reveal to him the miscarriage of justice that had occurred in 1894, but only on the express condition that the matter should not be mentioned save to a member of the Government and that neither Mathieu Dreyfus nor Demange was to be informed of it.

Fabre could not bring himself to believe that men so high up in the Army would ever consent to bear false witness against a comrade; still less that they were out to compass his ruin. However, he did not hurry over his inquiry, as he wanted to be quite clear in his own mind as to how the land really lay. He therefore referred to Henry for information, and Henry naturally gave his own version of Picquart's conduct. In a fatherly sort of tone, like a man who did not want to come down too heavily on a colleague, he declared that he had never seen the *petit bleu* until it had been pieced together again by Lauth. Leblois had been a nuisance with

his continual visits to the office. One evening, on going into Picquart's room, he had found Leblois there. The secret dossier was lying open between them, and he had seen the *canaille de D*—letter half sticking out of its envelope. He added that Picquart had been wrong to get so worked up about the letter he had sent him in Tunisia. Anyhow, what he ought to have done was to speak to his chiefs about it; but he had taken good care not to do that.

Fabre also heard what Gonse, Lauth, and Gribelin had to say. They merely confirmed what Henry had said, adding a little embroidery of their own. The *petit bleu* they affected to regard as a very dubious document, which Picquart had tried to foist on to Schwartzkoppen. They said it was Picquart who had written the article in the *Éclair* and sent the facsimile of the *bordereau* to the *Matin*. Bernard Lazare, they said, and Scheurer-Kestner had both got their information from him. This they backed up with the evidence of one Savignaud, who had been one of Picquart's orderlies. He said he had sent off from Susa three or four letters to Scheurer-Kestner. This turned out to be a lie, and Scheurer told the Court that he had never set eyes on Picquart until January 1898, and that he had never had any letters from him from Tunisia. Fabre disregarded Savignaud's evidence, but clung to what had been said by Henry and Gribelin, to whose absolute integrity General de Pellieux also came to testify.

Mathieu Dreyfus, in answer to a question by the Judge, stated that it was he who had given Bernard Lazare the necessary information for his pamphlet, and that he had never seen Picquart until the Esterhazy trial. For his part, Leblois declared that he had never acted as counsel for Picquart and took upon himself the sole responsibility for what he had done without his friend's knowledge.

These conflicting pieces of evidence caused the Judge a good deal of perplexity. He was greatly impressed by Picquart's firmness and self-possession. He had a feeling that his former chiefs in the Army were trying to get him out

of the hands of the civil authorities in order to bring him before a military tribunal. Feuilleley shared this impression. They may have thought Picquart was guilty, but they did not want to deliver him over gagged and bound to his adversaries. Accordingly, they concerted to bring into closer juxtaposition the charges levelled against Picquart and those which were laid at the door of Leblois. This would have the effect of bringing them both before the Civil Court. Bertrand, the Attorney-General, opposed this move. Fabre stuck to his guns, and advised Picquart to apply for his provisional release. This Picquart declined to do.

While, during this month of August 1898, Bertulus and Fabre were bringing their judicial investigations to an end, one or two things happened. The three experts, Couard, Belhomme, and Varinard, had been the means of having Zola condemned by default to one month's imprisonment and ten thousand francs payable to each of them. On the other hand, proceedings were started by Labori against the *Petit Journal* for publishing letters defaming the memory of Zola's father, and the newspaper had to pay a fine of two thousand francs. Meanwhile Cavaignac, furious at seeing that his speech, so far from putting the closure on the "Affair," had only endowed it with fresh vitality, resolved to stamp out the agitation by having the leaders of the revisionist party arrested and brought before the High Court. He gave his colleagues a list of the names of the men he had in view. It included Scheurer-Kestner, Trarieux, Leblois, Picquart, Christian, Clemenceau, Urbain Gohier, Ranc, Jaurès, Gérault-Richard, Yves Guyot, Joseph Reinach, Mathieu Dreyfus, Bernard Lazare, and others. Brisson said he would not be a party to such a proceeding. The other Ministers concurred with him, and Cavaignac let the proposal drop. But though they refused to send the leaders of the revisionist movement to prison, they agreed that action should be taken against some of its supporters. Stapfer, Dean of the Faculty of Letters at Bordeaux, was relieved of his functions by the Minister Léon Bourgeois for

having spoken the following words over Couat's grave: "Couat was seized with a veritable terror at this partisan violence, at the confusion and havoc wrought by this tempest of unreasoning fury."

But just when the legal drama seemed to be entering on a period of quiescence, there occurred an event which was destined to impart to it new life and new intensity. It will be remembered that, after delivering his speech, Cavaignac resolved to have a careful examination made of the secret documents on which his certitude of the prisoner's guilt reposed. This examination he entrusted to Captain Cuignet. Now it so happened that on the evening of the 13th, while he was examining the famous Panizzardi letter signed *Alexandrine*, which Cavaignac had read out in the Chamber, and which Picquart had roundly declared to be a forgery, Cuignet, who was working by lamplight, noticed that the squares on the paper were of two different shades. The heading of the letter and the signature were written on pieces of paper of which the ruling was of a bluish-grey tint, whereas the ruling in the body of the letter was pale mauve. The inference was that the letter had been made up from pieces of two other letters. It was a fake, a forgery. Cuignet then took the letter dated 1894, that is to say, two years before Panizzardi's. Here he noted the same anomaly, but in this case it was the other way round, the heading and the signature of the letter were on mauve-ruled paper, the body of it on grey. It followed, then, that both letters had been "faked" and put together at the same time.

Henry, who had never noticed the difference in the paper, had always told his chiefs that it was in a paper bag, which the woman Bastian had brought him in October 1896, that the pieces of Panizzardi's letters had been found, and that he had put them together himself. Assuming that the corresponding letter, stamped 1894, had been dated by Henry, it became evident that these two letters—the fragments of which had served for the concoction of both—had been manufactured at one and the same time.

The day after he made this discovery Cuignet went to see General Roget, who examined the documents and confirmed the forgery. Then they both went off to Cavaignac, who, after carefully scrutinizing the documents, came to a similar conclusion.

The first thing that occurred to Cavaignac was to send for Henry without delay and ask him for an explanation. Then he thought it might be better to go more warily to work. It was now August 14th, and Henry was at Berck-sur-Mer, where he had gone to join his wife for the Feast of the Assumption. As for Cavaignac, he had got to go to Macon, and from there on to le Mans. Moreover, before going into Henry's case he wanted to have done with Esterhazy. On August 16th Esterhazy was told by the military Governor of Paris that he was to be brought up before a Committee of Inquiry. That Committee, over which General Florentin presided, met behind closed doors on August 24th. The case, which was formulated by Colonel de Kerdrain, had to do with his letters to Madame de Boulancy, the articles that had appeared in the *Libre Parole*, his letters to Félix Faure, and his gross misconduct as an officer who openly lived with a quondam prostitute and had a business interest in a house of ill-repute. Esterhazy acknowledged all these things, but pointed out that his conduct had been condoned, seeing that when the Zola case was before the Courts generals had shown him many marks of esteem. Moreover, it was by order of his superiors that he had done the things he was now blamed for doing. He made out that the Jews had offered him 600,000 francs if he would but acknowledge that it was he who had written the *bordereau*. Next, when confronted with du Paty, all his tactics were directed towards making him confess that it was he who had dictated the letters to Félix Faure. As to the article signed *Dixi* in the *Libre Parole*, he, du Paty, had brought it with him all written out beforehand.

Du Paty was forced to admit that there was a certain amount of truth in these assertions; but, though strongly

pressed by the president, he refused to disclose the names of the persons for whom he had been acting as intermediary with Esterhazy. Esterhazy, being called on to state his defence, spoke of his connection with the General Staff, declared that du Paty had not come alone to the meetings in the Parc Montsouris, but that he had been accompanied by two officers, one of whom was Henry. Moreover, among the witnesses called, one Boissandre, on the staff of the *Libre Parole*, had sworn he had seen a document which showed that Esterhazy had constantly been receiving advice from the General Staff. Reverting to this evidence, Esterhazy declared that the document referred to was in du Paty's writing, and that the existence of a plot between him and his superiors to mislead de Pellieux was clearly manifest. The said document was in the hands of Maître Tézenas, who was at the moment absent from Paris, and he asked for a few days' grace in order to produce it. The Committee gave him three days. Tézenas, who was beginning to take the measure of his client, said he was ill and quite unable to travel. However, Esterhazy kept plaguing him with telegrams, and at last he gave way. On the morning of the Committee's resumption he went to call on General Florentin, and told him what he knew; then he gave to Esterhazy, who handed it on to General Florentin, the letter from du Paty in which the following sentence occurred, "General de Boisdeffre is not unaware that I have had some indirect communications with Major Esterhazy."

After considering the evidence the Committee declared, by three votes to two, that the officer whose conduct had been the subject of investigation deserved to be put on half-pay for habitual misconduct. But they unanimously added that his offences were not offences against discipline.

Next day General Zurlinden, Military Governor of Paris, forwarded the Committee's findings to Cavaignac. Cavaignac had just made up his mind that he would interrogate Henry himself, Henry having just got back to Paris. The examination took place on August 30th at two o'clock in Cavaignac's

room. De Boisdeffre, Gonse, and Roget were present, it falling to Roget to take the minutes.

Cavaignac began by warning Henry that "an examination of the two documents: Panizzardi's letter of October 31, 1896, and the previous letter of June 1894, had made it clear that one of these letters contained words belonging to the other, and *vice versa*, and that therefore they had been gravely tampered with." "In the face of these facts," he went on, "it would be as serious a matter to offer no explanation at all as to offer an inadequate one. When and how did you piece these documents together?"

Henry began with a lie. He said he had received the two documents on the dates respectively recorded on them, and that he had pieced them together himself.

"I am absolutely sure," he said, "that I never unstuck and stuck together again the 1894 document. Besides, I never do unstick documents."

"Do you sometimes keep the separate pieces, without gumming them together?"

"I don't remember ever keeping loose pieces for more than a week or ten days. I tried to find the 1894 paper a few days after I had given the other one to General Gonse. I did not know where it was."

"The 1894 letter has pieces in it that belong to the 1896 letter."

"I don't see how that can possibly be."

"There is definite proof that certain portions have been interchanged; how do you account for that?"

"How do I account for it? I suppose I must have done the interpolating myself. All the same, I'm not going to admit that I have forged a thing when I haven't. I should have had to forge an envelope as well."

"The interpolation is beyond all question."

"I put the several pieces together just as I received them. What more can I say?"

"You can say exactly what it was you did."

"I did not fake the papers."

"You put into one paper, pieces that belonged to the other."

"I arranged some of the sentences a little—the one, 'It must never be known.' But the first sentence is correct. . . . I assure you I did not forge anything."

"What you say is at variance with the plain facts. You forged this letter."

"I swear to you I didn't. All I did was to doctor one sentence a little, in order to give more point to the whole."

"Which are the words you put in?"

"I don't remember now. I unstuck a part of the 1894 letter, not the whole of it."

"You forged the whole thing."

"I swear to you I did not."

"You're not telling the truth. You made up the second letter so that it should seem to follow on from the first one."

"I swear that the opening of the letter is quite genuine."

"The opening was made up too. Come; out with the whole truth!"

"No; I only added the last sentence."

"Come now, confess. The papers speak for themselves."

"There are some words in the body of the letter which come from the other one; but the beginning is in Panizzardi's own writing."

"Who put it into your head to do these things?"

"My chiefs were very worried; I wanted to calm them, to put their minds at rest. I said to myself, 'Let's add a sentence; if only we had a proof, all would be well.' No one knew anything about it. I acted wholly and solely in my country's interests."

"When was it you dated the 1894 letter?"

"In 1894. I don't think I dated it afterwards; I can't remember now."

"Was the 1896 letter signed?"

"I don't think I added the signature."

"And the envelopes?"

"I swear I didn't do the envelopes."

"It is quite impossible to believe that you merely added the last sentence."

Then Cavaignac, who had been saving this up for the last, came out with:

"The ruling on the different pieces of paper is not all the same colour."

Henry, who did not know he had committed this inadvertence, visibly wilted; but pulling himself together, he asked:

"Which pieces are supposed to have been interpolated?"

"I don't want any questions from you; I want you to answer mine. You forged the whole letter."

"I cannot admit that I wrote the whole of it. The first letter I found. In the second, I only added the last sentence."

"All that you could have received was the beginning and the signature."

"I received the first part."

"Or you received nothing at all. Let us have the truth; you received the beginning and the envelope."

"Yes, I received the envelope and the beginning."

"What was the beginning? Anything more than 'Mon cher ami'?"

"This is what happened: I received the beginning and a few other words."

"What words?"

"Other things that had nothing to do with the case."

"This, then, is what happened. In 1896 you received an envelope, inside which was a letter of no importance. You suppressed that letter and forged another one?"

"Yes."

With that word the examination ended. Cavaignac gave orders that Henry should be taken into an adjoining room and kept under observation. De Boisdeffre then went over to Cavaignac's desk, took a sheet of paper, and wrote the following letter:

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MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

I have just had proof that my confidence in Colonel Henry, the head of the Intelligence Department, has been misplaced. That confidence, which was absolute, led to my being deceived, so that I certified as genuine, and presented to you as genuine, a letter which was a forgery. In these circumstances, Monsieur le Ministre, I have the honour to beg that you will relieve me of my duties.

DE BOISDEFFRE.

Cavaignac wrote to him next day, saying that anyone was liable to make mistakes, and that it was his duty to remain where he was in order to pursue the inquiry. But de Boisdeffre refused to alter his decision, and departed.

By Cavaignac's orders, Henry was removed to Mont Valérien in charge of Colonel Féry, the prison major. By him he was handed over to Major Walter, who conducted him to the officers' wing, where he was given the same room as Picquart had occupied in January 1898, when, after Esterhazy's trial, he was sentenced to sixty days' internment in a fortress.

Next day the *Agence Havas* issued the following announcement to the Press:

"To-day, in the office of the Minister of War, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry was proved, and has confessed himself to be, the writer of the letter dated October 1896, in which Dreyfus was mentioned by name. The Minister for War at once gave orders for Lieutenant-Colonel Henry's arrest, and that officer was conveyed to the fortress of Mont Valérien."

This piece of news fell like a thunderbolt on Paris. The supporters of Esterhazy and the General Staff were filled with consternation. The Dreyfusards were exultant. A fresh trial now seemed inevitable. General de Pellieux wrote a

letter to Zurlinden, which was to be handed on to Cavaignac. It read as follows :

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

Misled by dishonourable people, unable to count any longer on the confidence of my subordinates, without which confidence no command is possible, and having myself lost confidence in such of my superiors as caused me to work on forged documents, I beg you to be so kind as to arrange for my retirement.

Zurlinden asked de Pellieux to withdraw this letter. De Pellieux refused. Zurlinden then declared he would keep it back for three days to give him time to think it over. De Pellieux acquiesced, but the same evening dictated an account of the incident to a journalist, who printed it in the *Gaulois*. Cavaignac afterwards declared that he had never had the letter.

Esterhazy, the order for whose compulsory retirement was to be signed by Félix Faure next day, displayed the greatest sang-froid when the journalists came to him with the paragraph from the *Agence Havas*. All his mistress remarked was, "What a fool Henry must have been to go and confess ! We knew he had concocted the thing right enough."

The day following his incarceration at Mont Valérien, Henry sent Gonse this laconic communication :

MON GÉNÉRAL,

I have the honour to beg that you will come and see me. I absolutely must speak to you.

Then he wrote the following letter to his wife :

MY ADORED BERTHE,

I see that, except for you, everyone is going to leave me in the lurch, and yet you know for whose sake I did these things. My letter was a copy, and there was absolutely nothing in it that was spurious. All it did

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was to confirm the verbal information that had been given me a few days before. I am absolutely innocent. That is known, and everyone will know it before very long, but for the moment I can say nothing. Always take care of our darling little Joseph and love him always, as I love him, and as I love you.

Au revoir, my darling; I hope you will soon be able to come and see me. I embrace you both with all my heart.

When he had finished this letter, Henry started another:

MA BERTHE BIEN-AIMÉE,

I am like a man distraught. A terrible anguish grips my brain. I am going for a dip in the Seine. . . .

He got no farther, but went and stretched himself on his bed and, with two strokes of a razor, cut his throat. The blood gushed out all over his hands, soaking his sleeves and the bed-clothes. About six o'clock the orderly whose duty it was to take him his meals knocked at the door. Getting no answer, he went and summoned the lieutenant on duty. Not being able to open the door, the lieutenant forced the lock, and saw the dead man lying on the bed. Major Walter, on being told what had happened, hurried to the scene and found the body cold. Henry must have been dead some three hours. The fact that large inroads had been made on a bottle of rum seemed to indicate that Henry had drained several glasses in order to nerve himself for the deed.

The body was prepared for burial on September 7th. The Curé of Suresnes came and pronounced the absolution, and the remains were driven away to Pogny, Henry's birthplace, where the interment took place.

So great was the impression created by the forger's suicide that those members of the Republican Party who had been sitting on the fence now definitely pronounced for a new trial. The Nationalist organs toned down the violence of their opposition. Only Drumont in the *Libre Parole* and

Rochefort in *l'Intransigeant* endeavoured to show that, though Henry was a forger, Dreyfus was none the less guilty.

Esterhazy did not share this view. As soon as he heard of his friend's suicide, he quietly slipped off to Brussels, whence he crossed over to London. The very day of his flight the appeal lodged by Picquart against the ruling, which had non-suited him as well as du Paty, was allowed.

Brisson, who since Henry's confession had gone over to the revisionists, made the mistake of not acting with sufficient promptitude. It was not till September 3rd that he made known to Madame Lucie Dreyfus that he expected her to apply to the Courts for a new trial. The application was drawn up that same evening by Maître Demange, who immediately lodged it with Sarrien, the Minister of Justice.

But Brisson had counted without Cavaignac. For two days Cavaignac had been dinning it into everybody's ears that Henry's confession and Henry's suicide had in no way altered his views about Dreyfus. He was more opposed to a re-trial than ever. Accordingly, he told Brisson that he had determined to resign his office. Next day the newspapers came out with his letter of resignation, in the course of which he had written, "I am just as convinced as ever that Dreyfus is guilty."

Brisson was in two minds about taking over the War Office himself. However, he offered it to General Saussier, but Saussier declined, and it was Zurlinden, the Military Governor of Paris, who stepped into Cavaignac's shoes. The new Minister made it clear on accepting office that he intended to have a thorough examination made of the documents before any steps were taken for a new trial. To this Brisson agreed, and Zurlinden set to work. Not knowing anything whatever about the case, he got himself posted by Roget and Cuignet. They persuaded him to believe that the *petit bleu* was a forgery concocted by Picquart for the purpose of clearing Dreyfus, and that the scratching out which was visible in the address had been done so that the name Esterhazy might be substituted for whatever name

had been there before. Henry, being the staunch soldier that he was, had seen through the trick and, as he realized that General Billot was uneasy in his mind, he had answered this *petit bleu*, which incriminated Esterhazy, with a document that was altogether conclusive against Dreyfus. So it was merely a case of one forgery against another. Cuignet added that it was really du Paty who was at the bottom of this manoeuvre.

It never for a moment entered Zurlinden's head that the scratching out might have been done by someone else, and not by Picquart at all. He liked Roget's and Cuignet's explanation. It appealed to him, and he adopted it. Their account of the matter seemed to him the more plausible in that it was beginning to be hinted at in some of the newspapers. The first few moments of stupefaction over, the anti-Dreyfusites had begun to hold up their heads again. Ernest Judet, in *Le Petit Journal*, likened Henry's falsification to "a bank-note of a nominal face value representing securities of absolute authenticity."

Charles Maurras went much farther. In a series of articles published in the old Royalist *Gazette de France* he depicted the forger Henry as a great patriot. That officer, according to him, had perpetrated his forgery for his country's good. He knew that his superior officers could not produce certain all-convincing proofs which they held, without risk of bringing about a war with Germany. That being so, and in order to give them peace of mind and to save the country, he had himself concocted a document with the object of satisfying the incredulous. Such was the origin of the "patriotic forgery" legend. Astounded at this audacious effrontery, the revisionists left no stone unturned to expose its absurdity. If the General Staff had had incontrovertible proof that Dreyfus was a traitor, surely de Boisdeffre, Gonse and Billot, and Henry himself would have been the first to make it known to Colonel Picquart when Picquart, with his suspicions against Esterhazy aroused, told them of the doubts and misgivings to which he was a prey. Further,

Henry had produced his forgery at the very time when Picquart was sent away on special service, and he had done so for the purpose of stiffening the conviction of his chief, which it was not his business to do. Lastly, if there had been any truth in the Maurras theory, Henry would have put it before Cavaignac when the latter began asking his awkward questions and would never have dreamt of killing himself. The whole thing was as plain as daylight, but the public had been so perverted by the Press that the most transparent truths looked to it like lies, while the most astounding sophisms were freely accepted as true.

Zurlinden had asked for a few days to study the case. Having made up his mind on the matter, he sent Sarrien the documents in the case together with his own conclusions, which were opposed to a new trial. He added that, having looked into the matter, he was entirely convinced that Dreyfus was guilty. The Minister of Justice also asked Zurlinden to let him have the secret *dossier* which had been sent by Mercier to the judges when they had retired to consider their verdict. As Mercier had taken good care that the biographical memorandum which accompanied the *dossier* should be destroyed, and as the several secret documents composing it had been dispersed among various other files, Zurlinden replied "that there was no trace of any such secret *dossier*."

When he learned the decision of his new Minister for War, Brisson was completely taken aback. A Cabinet Council, at which Félix Faure was present, took place on September 12th. Before the question of revision came up for discussion, Zurlinden produced an order relieving du Paty de Clam of his duties. Zurlinden had taken this step at the instance of Roget, who had told him of the part du Paty had played in the Esterhazy inquiry. But Brisson, before the order was signed, demanded that the wording of the order should be read out *in extenso*. Zurlinden complied with an ill-grace. From this recital, the members of the Cabinet learned for the first time of the collusion between the

General Staff and Esterhazy. After this, Zurlinden explained his reasons for opposing a new trial. They were, (1) the author of the *bordereau* was undoubtedly Dreyfus; (2) in 1894 Henry had given evidence, not in his own name, but in the name of the Service. It followed, therefore, that the forgery committed in 1896 did not affect the credibility of his evidence, or vitiate the justice of the verdict.

Brisson replied that he did not share that view. A discussion followed, and the upshot was that Brisson declared himself for, and Zurlinden against, a new trial. Each alike made it clear that if his colleagues did not concur with him, he would resign. Félix Faure was all for gaining time, and, as he had to attend the manœuvres, he managed to get the division postponed until he returned on the 17th.

In the interval Sarrien asked Picquart to send him a memorandum of what he knew about the case. Picquart, whose second month of imprisonment was drawing to a close, had just made up his mind, since Cavaignac was no longer in office, to petition for his provisional release. The case in which he was co-defendant with Leblois was about to come on, and he felt certain that in view of Henry's admissions the Court would dismiss the charges. He did not know then that Zurlinden intended to have him up before a Court-Martial. Zurlinden, when he heard that Sarrien had asked Picquart for his account of the case, flew into a great rage and decided to instruct the Governor of Paris to hold an inquiry into the origin of the *petit bleu* and the way in which it had been tampered with. He also sent the Minister of Justice his own account of the case, which of course differed *in toto* from the account drawn up by Picquart. At the Cabinet meeting held on the 17th Zurlinden made reference to the *petit bleu*, and asked leave to institute proceedings against Picquart. Brisson replied that the question was not down on the agenda; what *was* on the agenda was whether Madame Dreyfus's application should be brought before the Consultative Committee. Zurlinden then rose and quitted the room without a word.

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As soon as he got back to the War Office, Zurlinden sent in his resignation. His letter contained the following notable sentence: "A careful study of all the evidence regarding Dreyfus has too completely convinced me of his guilt for me to accept, as Head of the Army, any other solution of the matter than the maintenance, in its full rigour, of the sentence passed upon him." That same evening he was succeeded by General Chanoine, who had been recommended to Brisson by Bourgeois and Vallé.

The first thing Chanoine did was to suggest to Brisson that he should reappoint Zurlinden as Military Governor of Paris, and Brisson, not daring to refuse, fell in with the proposal.

On leaving the War Office, Zurlinden drew Chanoine's attention to the evidence he had just collected against Picquart. Chanoine, without so much as giving it a glance, put his signature to the covering letter which had been written to go with it to the Military Governor of Paris, together with instructions to open an inquiry. As Zurlinden had just been appointed Military Governor, it was he who received the papers and signed the order instituting proceedings against Picquart. As soon as Brisson heard of this he saw how he had been duped, and was dumbfounded. His mortification was increased by the fact that he had been counting on Picquart's provisional release, for he knew that *pourparlers* had been entered into between the Court and Labori with a view to securing a postponement of the case against Picquart until after a decision had been reached in the matter of Madame Dreyfus's application. And now here were the military people determined to get Picquart into their clutches, no matter what the result of the civil proceedings might be!

When, on September 22nd, the case came up for hearing, Siben, the deputy magistrate, proposed an adjournment. Labori urged that the case should be dealt with there and then. To adjourn would simply be to hand over Picquart to the military tribunal. Jules Fabre, Leblois's counsel,

LA REVISION ...?



LA VOILA !...

Le casque prussien ira bien a son genre de beauté.
HENRI ROCHEFORT

TYPICAL ANTI-DRYFUS CARTOON
(October 9, 1898)

associated himself with this view. Picquart asked leave to speak, and fixing his eyes intently on Gonse and de Pellieux, who were seated on the witnesses' bench, he delivered himself as follows:

"I shall go perhaps to-night to the Cherche-Midi, and this will probably be the last time I shall have a chance of saying anything in public. I want it to be understood that if Lemer cier-Picard's noose or Henry's razor is found in my cell, then it will be a case of murder, for I am not the man to think for an instant of committing suicide. I shall go with my head erect, and face this trial with the same serenity that I have always displayed in the face of my accusers. That is all I have to say."

The Court, after considering the matter, adjourned the case. Next day Picquart was transferred to the Cherche-Midi and, by Zurlinden's orders, placed in solitary confinement. It was to Captain Tavernier, who had been specially summoned from Marseilles, that the preliminary investigations in this new case were entrusted, and Captain Cuignet was his assessor.

The committee appointed to inquire into the case for a new trial consisted of six members, and it met on September 21st, 22nd, and 23rd. The voting was equally divided, but in the end they decided that there was no justification for a new trial. Sarrien told the Cabinet that this was tantamount to a definite refusal, and that there was no alternative but to accept the decision. Brisson replied that the committee was a purely consultative body and that the question whether or not there should be a new trial was one for the Government to decide, and again he pronounced himself in favour of a rehearing. But as some of the Cabinet were absent, the question was not put till the next day, September 20th, when Brisson carried his motion by a margin of two. Sarrien, who had voted against it, transmitted Madame Lucie Dreyfus's application to the highest Court of Appeal. The President of the Criminal Court, under whose jurisdiction the case fell, was M. Loew; the Attorney-

THE DREYFUS CASE

General of the Court was M. Manau. The latter, assuming that the judges who heard the case in 1894 did not condemn Dreyfus on the strength of the *bordereau* alone, put through a request to the Minister of War for a sight of the secret *dossier*, but Chanoine refused to let him have it. Manau therefore based his case solely on the two new facts adduced by Madame Dreyfus, namely, the conflicting views of the handwriting experts on the *bordereau* and the forgery by Henry. The task of making a report on the case was entrusted by Loew to M. Bard, one of the youngest judges of the Criminal Court.

Now that the case had been relegated to the Courts of Justice, and had become a matter for the lawyers to thrash out, there were some grounds for hoping that political passions would tend to die down. Nothing of the sort. The Nationalists grew more violent than ever. Rochefort, in *l'Intransigeant* of October 18th, declared that every member of the Court of Appeal ought to have his eyes put out, and Cavaignac said that the *Chambre Criminelle* should be deprived of its jurisdiction.

On October 25th Parliament reassembled. Several interpellations had been put down in regard to the proposal for a new trial. Déroulède launched the first attack. He laid on fiercely, declaring that the Government would have to go, and that great as was Parliament's respect for the Army, General Chanoine ought to be supported by a real bumper vote. Thereupon the Minister for War, who was in league with Déroulède, rose to address the House. Declaring that he had accepted his post as a matter of duty, and out of devotion to the Army and the Republic, he went on:

"Mention was made just now of that unholy case which my predecessors in office refused to have anything to do with. I have a right to my own opinion, and mine is the same as theirs. Here, then, and now, I resign my post as Minister for War."

This was a stab in the back for Brisson, who had pinned his faith to Chanoine, and had not even been told of this decision. The Right Wing and the Nationalists broke out into a tempest of applause. Brisson appealed to the Chamber to support him in the endeavour he was making to secure the supremacy of the Civil Power. The Republicans cheered this utterance and, during a suspension of the sitting, drew up a resolution embodying that principle, requesting that the discussion should be adjourned for two days. That request was an error on their part, for it gave their adversaries time to reform their ranks. Albert de Mun, Cavaignac, Baudry d'Asson, and de Mahy addressed the Chamber. Finally, Barthou gave the Government its death-blow by declaring his refusal to support it. Brisson again intervened, but the Government was defeated by a majority of 296 to 243. Félix Faure entrusted the task of forming a new Cabinet to Charles Dupuy. Dupuy agreed to undertake it. He himself took the portfolio of the Interior, Freycinet went to the War Office, and Lebret became Minister of Justice.

During the Ministerial crisis the criminal section of the Court of Appeal met to hear the report of M. Bard. The document was restrained in tone and gave a *résumé* of the facts. "Dreyfus," he said, "was, according to Billot, condemned on the evidence of twenty-seven officers. But to d'Ormescheville, who had drawn up the charge, not one of those officers had cited a single fact, or said a single word, that should have convicted the prisoner of treason. Were certain documents communicated to the judges in 1894—secret documents? Zurlinden declared that there was no trace of such a thing. Picquart, on the other hand, gave a list of the documents and believed that it was he himself who had been the bearer of them. As for the confessions, the only thing extant was the note made by Lebrun-Renault in his memorandum book; but the original was not among the official papers. All the rest of the evidence was dated three or four years after the event. The idea that Dreyfus traced the *bordereau* from a manuscript was suggested by

Esterhazy to the handwriting experts. Henry's evidence had carried the most weight all through. But Henry lied eight times when he swore to Cavaignac that he had not committed the forgery. After that, how could one trust anything he said? In conclusion, M. Bard observed that he could not say whether Dreyfus was innocent or not until he had seen the secret *dossier*, and he deemed that an inquiry was certainly called for.

M. Manau then delivered his plea. He protested against the violation of the law, demanded that Dreyfus's penalty should be suspended, and declared that the Court called for light for all men of good faith.

Finally, Maître Mornard, speaking for Madame Dreyfus, associated himself with the application for a supplementary inquiry. Three days later, on October 29th, the Court gave its decision by a majority of ten votes to four.

It decided that a *prima facie* case had been made out, and that a supplementary inquiry would be undertaken, but that it was not yet the time to come to a decision regarding the Attorney-General's request for suspension of the penalty.

Upon this the Criminal Court set to work. Instead of appointing a committee, as was usual, it decided to function collectively.

Early in October Loew had received an anonymous communication informing him that a lawyer named Callé had in his possession "a letter of Esterhazy's on square-ruled paper exactly like that of the *bordereau*." The man was sent for by the Court, and handed over the letter. It was dated Rouen, August 17, 1894, and began: "I received, on my return from camp at Châlons, where I have been for a fortnight . . ." Another letter, dated the 11th, was headed "Firing school of the 3rd Artillery Brigade. Camp de Châlons." In it Esterhazy said, "I am leaving camp in five days." Furthermore, a man of business added to the *dossier* yet another letter of Esterhazy's, dated 1892, written on the same sort of thin paper and addressed to a tailor. Experts in paper, after a technical examination, pronounced

the paper of these letters and that of the *bordereau* to be identical.

The Criminal Court began by hearing the evidence of the former Ministers for War: Mercier, Billot, Cavaignac, Zurlinden, and Chanoine. They only repeated what they had said before. As Mercier made no allusion to the secret documents, Loew questioned him about them. Mercier refused to reply because, he said, the grounds for appeal were limited to the contradictions among the experts and to Henry's forgery. Then he went on to declare that Esterhazy could not possibly have been the author of the *bordereau*. Even if he had written it, he could not have understood the documents it enumerated. Cavaignac adopted a similar line. Zurlinden said he had been quite unable to find out anything about any secret *dossier*. Chanoine said his conviction was based on documents which could not be divulged without grave inconvenience.

While all this was going on the Appeal Court gave instructions that Dreyfus was to be informed with all possible despatch of the decision that had been come to, and invited to prepare his defence. Not knowing anything about what was going on in France, Dreyfus, in a fit of profound discouragement, had, in September 1898, written a despairing letter to the Governor of Guiana. Early in November he received a letter from his wife telling him about the important events that had been happening, and how the Government had granted the application for a new trial. When the official dispatch was handed to him his countenance lighted up with joy. Trarieux had asked that he should be allowed to go where he liked about the island. Deniel, his gaoler, restricted this permission to the area of the entrenched camp, but now Dreyfus was again able to look on the sea and the vegetation of the island, which he had not beheld for two whole years.


While the Criminal Court was beginning its inquiries, Captain Tavernier was nearing the end of the investigations he had been ordered to make about Picquart. Cuignet had

suggested to him that the erasure on the address of the *petit bleu* was Picquart's doing. This Picquart easily rebutted. When he scratched out the address, Henry, as we have already pointed out, had forgotten to destroy the photographs, which showed no trace of erasure. Picquart called for the production of these photographs, which were submitted to the experts, together with specimens of handwriting—his own, Schwartzkoppen's, and a female friend of Schwartzkoppen's. The result was conclusive. The name Esterhazy had been rewritten in a different ink over another Esterhazy, which was obviously the original name on the envelope. In spite of this convincing result, Zurlinden signed the order for Picquart to be brought before a Court-Martial on a charge of forging and uttering a false document.

This decision excited a tremendous outbreak of indignation among the Dreyfusards. Forms of protest were distributed broadcast and covered with signatures. Among those who signed were some of the most illustrious and distinguished men and women in France.

In the Chamber some deputies demanded that Picquart's case should be postponed till the Criminal Court had completed its investigations. Poincaré, who had been a colleague in the Cabinet with Mercier when the Dreyfus case was on, took advantage of the occasion to ease his conscience. He declared that neither he nor his colleagues had ever heard of any other charge than that connected with the *bordereau*. And as to the confessions, Mercier had never said a word to him about them. Notwithstanding this intervention, Dupuy refused to ask for a remand. Picquart's counsel then bethought him of a legal way out, and recommended his client to lodge an appeal, the result of which was to force the Court-Martial to acquiesce in an adjournment of their proceedings *sine die*.

After the five Ministers had given their evidence, General Roget was called. He merely repeated what they had said. According to him, Dreyfus might quite well have committed the treasonable acts reported to the Intelligence Depart-



• Ceci couvra cela

THE WAR MINISTERS AND "L'AFFAIRE"

ment between 1891 and 1894, the date of his arrest; Esterhazy, however, could only have played the traitor if he had had Henry to prompt him; Esterhazy had been offered half a million to acknowledge himself the author of the *bordereau*, etc.

After Roget came Picquart. His evidence was heard on November 25th, 28th, and 29th. This time he cleared his conscience by giving the Judges the full story of the case from the very start down to the time of speaking. Taking the generals' arguments one by one, he showed how flimsy they were. A great point was his demonstration of the collusion of which the General Staff had been guilty in their desire to shield Esterhazy.

Then, during the next few days, the evidence of numerous witnesses cited by the Court was taken. Bertulus went through the history of his investigations into the character and behaviour of Esterhazy. General de Gallifet related that General Talbot, a former British military attaché, had frankly told him that for a thousand-franc note or two his colleagues at the various Embassies were obtaining from Esterhazy all the secret information he could get. Gobert, the handwriting expert, said there could no longer be the slightest doubt about the absolute similitude between Esterhazy's writing and the writing on the *bordereau*, since the discovery of letters written by Esterhazy on paper identical with that of the *bordereau*. Lebrun-Renault admitted that, in the statement prepared by him after the degradation of Dreyfus, he had entered, in the remarks column, the words "nothing to report." When asked to show the page in his note-book on which, according to his story, he had made a memorandum of his conversation with Dreyfus, he said that after showing it to Cavaignac he had thrown it away.

A corporal, who was called at Mercier's request, swore that Dreyfus, on his arrival at the *dépôt* after his degradation, was heard to say, "I am guilty, but I am not the only one." The chief of the *dépôt*, M. Darlin, rebutted this evidence,

and stated that Dreyfus consistently protested his innocence. Then came the politicians: Poincaré, Barthou, Dupuy, Casimir-Perier. All of them deposed that they had never heard any mention of a confession in 1894. Casimir-Perier added that when he was President of the Republic, he knew nothing against Dreyfus but the *bordereau* and the document *ce canaille de D*— which Mercier told him had been made known to the Court-Martial. He had never had knowledge of any other secret paper, nor of the alleged letter from the German Emperor.

Illuminating as all this evidence was, the Judges nevertheless thought it their duty to acquaint themselves with the secret *dossiers*. They accordingly applied for them to Freycinet. In view of the Nationalist opposition, the Government thought twice about acceding to this request. At length it was agreed that the demand should be complied with, on condition that the Court published nothing without the consent of the War Minister, that the file should be brought to the Court by Captain Cuignet and that the same officer should take it back every night to the War Office.

Freycinet had selected Cuignet on the suggestion of the General Staff. The selection seemed all the more natural in that Cuignet was the man who had discovered Henry's forgery. Furthermore, he had sent Freycinet a voluminous report in which he accused du Paty of having suborned Henry of divulging the news of Dreyfus's arrest to the *Libre Parole* in 1894, of writing the articles published by the *Éclair* in 1896, of being the author of the Weyler forgery and the faked telegrams *Speranza* and *Blanche* that were sent to Picquart, and, finally, of having organized the meetings with Esterhazy in the Parc Montsouris, etc.

The Cabinet, who knew nothing about these stories and could not make head or tale of them, resolved, on December 27th, that proceedings should be taken against du Paty as soon as the Criminal Court had completed its inquiry.

When these papers had been duly unpacked and examined, Cuignet explained that Dreyfus's guilt was founded

on three different orders of proof: (1) the confessions; (2) the technical nature of the *bordereau*; (3) the secret documents, which again were divisible into three classes, viz. those which had a direct bearing on the case; those which were connected with it; and, finally, those which were forgeries or suspected to be such.

After repeating Cavaignac's argument regarding "the confessions," and discussing the text of the *bordereau*, Cuignet applied himself to the secret documents. He admitted that the letter in which Panizzardi wrote to a collaborator of Schwartzkoppen's, "D—— has brought me a number of interesting things," had been tampered with. He also ruled out the letter *ce canaille de D——*, which he regarded as inapplicable to Dreyfus. On the other hand, he maintained the authenticity of the note known as "Schwartzkoppen's Memorandum," containing the words "doubts, proofs," etc.*

Then he brought forward other documents which had hitherto remained undisclosed, notably the following:

(1) A letter from Panizzardi to Schwartzkoppen, signed *Alexandrine*, and reading as follows:

"Safely to hand; many thanks. Please be good enough to send me at once what you have copied; it is necessary that I should finish up because, by the 31st, I have to send to Rome, and, before then, you will have to copy the part copied by me. I have to tell you that I shall have particulars of the railway organization."

Although the person who was to deliver the document was not named, Cuignet drew the inference that Dreyfus was meant because he had done part of his training in the department that had charge of the railway organization. On its being pointed out to him that the document was not dated, Cuignet admitted that it merely bore, in the bottom left-hand corner, the date April 1894, which

* See page 20.

had been added in red ink by Henry. We shall see later on what the date really was.

(2) A copy of a confidential course of instruction from the École de la Guerre written by Count d'Arco, first secretary at the German Embassy. In a note dated November 20, 1898, annexed to this document, Lieutenant-Colonel Rollin, chief of the Intelligence Department, and Cuignet both certified that this copy corresponded to a sequence of pages that were missing from the copy of the course which had been seized in Dreyfus's apartments in October 1894.

But about the middle of March 1899 Rollin and Cuignet noticed that the original of the copy made by d'Arco belonged to the period 1893-4, when Dreyfus had left the École de Guerre. The copy impounded at his rooms belonged to the year 1891-2 and was intact. On this error being brought to his notice, M. de Freycinet ordered them to attach a note rectifying it, and to point it out to the Court. We shall see later on what happened.

(3) Commenting on the dispatch sent on November 2, 1894, by Panizzardi to his chiefs, Cuignet quoted as correct the first erroneous version, and impugned the bona fides of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. On the other hand, he omitted to produce a document of singular significance. This was a note written on November 6, 1897, by Commandant Fontenillat, stating that, on the occasion of a visit paid by him to Colonel Panizzardi, the latter had told him that he was convinced that Dreyfus was innocent. Seeing that Fontenillat was incredulous, Panizzardi had added, "I tell you Schwartzkoppen gave me his word of honour."

As we shall see in due course, there were other documents besides this one missing from the file produced by Cuignet.

While these events were being unfolded before the Criminal Court, the rumour spread abroad that that body was in favour of revision. Forthwith Nationalists and anti-Semites commenced a campaign of vilification against the Court, alleging that the Judges had sold themselves to the syndicate formed to secure a declaration of the prisoner's innocence.

The disseminators of this slander found an ally in the President of the Civil Court, Quesnay de Beaurepaire, the very person who ten years before had drawn up the indictment against General Boulanger. (Incidentally, he was the author of a number of novels published under the pseudonym of Jules de Glouvet.) He was a rooted opponent of revision. A colleague of his, M. Grosjean, had told him that he had come across something that looked very like evidence of collusion between one of the Judges, namely Bard, and Colonel Picquart. On the strength of this vague insinuation, Quesnay wrote to Mazeau, President of the Court of Cassation, accusing Loew and Bard of conspiring to defeat the ends of justice. The matter was investigated, with the result that all this tittle-tattle was proved to be utterly without foundation. Quesnay, however, would not accept defeat. He handed in his resignation, and then proceeded to pour forth a series of articles in the *Echo de Paris* woven out of the following incidents:

When Picquart had been summoned to give his evidence, he had been driven to Court in a cab accompanied by a Captain of Gendarmes named Herqué. Both men were wearing civilian clothes. On being informed of their arrival, the President of the Court, Loew, gave orders that they were to be shown into Quesnay de Beaurepaire's room, where they were to wait until General Roget had concluded his evidence. As, however, it subsequently appeared that that was going to last the rest of the day, Loew took advantage of a break in the proceedings to go himself and tell Picquart that his evidence would not be taken till the next day. Never having seen either Picquart or Herqué before, Loew, on greeting them, raised his Judge's toque. Herqué, as well as an inspector who was stationed at the door, one Ménard by name, told the registrar they were rather surprised that Loew should have gone out of his way to show such consideration to a prisoner from the Cherche-Midi. Next day Loew told Ménard to let Picquart know he would not be called till four o'clock. Ménard subsequently

gave out that the President had added, "And tell him the Court expresses its regret."

Next day Quesnay de Beaurepaire resumed possession of his room, and Picquart had to wait in the office of M. Tanon, the President of another Court, until Roget, who was still under examination, had brought his evidence to a close. At Loew's request, Bard went to inform him of the additional delay. Not knowing exactly where to find Picquart, he tried Quesnay's room, and then, perceiving his mistake, apologized and went on to Tanon's, where he told Picquart that his evidence was to be again postponed.

A day or two later Picquart, who had now begun his evidence, happened to be in a waiting-room during a temporary suspension of the hearing. A decanter of cold water, some sugar and rum had been put there for the refreshment of the witnesses. Being very tired and suffering from the effects of a chill, Picquart helped himself to some of the rum and water. Bard, who happened to be passing through the room at the time, remarked that some hot rum and water would have suited him a good deal better. When the hearing was over a glass of hot rum was handed to Picquart, who expressed his thanks to the attendant who brought it. Captain Herqué, who had observed the incident, remarked, "It's M. Bard you've got to thank for that."

These absurd trivialities were seized upon by Quesnay for the purposes of his campaign in the *Echo de Paris*. His articles, which were reproduced by all the anti-Semite Press, appeared just in the nick of time to swell the tide against revision, which, though undiscernible immediately after Henry's suicide, had towards the middle of December begun to assume considerable amplitude.

On November 26th, and again on December 6th, Joseph Reinach published two articles in the *Siècle* in which he stated that in his view Henry had been Esterhazy's accomplice. He based his statement on a piece of information he had got from Count Tornielli, the Italian Ambassador in Paris. The latter had told him that, in the year following

Dreyfus's condemnation, Esterhazy and Henry had received something like 100,000 francs from Schwartzkoppen.

Greatly upset at this charge against her husband, Henry's widow brought an action against Reinach. In order to help her pay the expenses of the trial, the *Libre Parole* started a subscription on December 14, 1898, and kept it open till January 15, 1899. Mercier headed the list, and twenty-eight retired generals, a number of priests, titled people, and literary men followed suit.

In view of the accusations brought forward by Quesnay de Beaurepaire, Lebret instructed President Mazeau to institute an inquiry into the facts alleged. The incriminated Judges had no difficulty in exonerating themselves, and on January 27th Mazeau sent in a report of the proceedings to the Minister of Justice accompanied by a note setting forth that, though neither the good faith nor the integrity of the Judges of the Criminal Court could be called in question, yet in view of the exceptional gravity of the crisis through which the country was passing it would be prudent not to suffer the responsibility for the final verdict to rest upon the Criminal Court alone.

Deriving great encouragement from this recommendation, Dupuy and Lebret brought in a Bill providing that whenever the Criminal Court was called upon to consider an application for a new trial, the question should be submitted to the three Chambers in joint session. The Bill, if it became law, was to take effect immediately.

The Commission appointed by the Chamber of Deputies to consider the provisions of the Bill pronounced against it by eight votes to two, and the secretary, Renault-Morlière, as well as Millerand and Camille Pelletan, opposed it in the Chamber. Lebret gave it his support, and exerted a decisive influence on the deputies by advising them significantly to "keep an eye on their constituencies." This appeal to their apprehensions had its effect, and the Bill was passed on February 10, 1899, by 324 votes to 207. The Senate, despite the energetic opposition of René Béranger and


Waldeck-Rousseau, endorsed the decision of the Chamber on February 28th by 155 votes to 125. Fifteen members abstained from voting.

While these political debates were taking place in Parliament, the Criminal Court went on with its investigations. Towards the end of January it had heard the evidence of Paléologue, who had been ordered by Delcassé to lay before him the diplomatic records at the Foreign Office. Paléologue laid particular stress on the story of the telegram which Panizzardi had sent to his Government on November 2, 1894. He explained that Henry had twice made away with the authentic translation of the telegram, the purport of which told in favour of Dreyfus. He produced declarations from Munster and Tornielli as well as a telegram from the French Ambassador in Rome, dated April 1898, concerning the sums received by Esterhazy. In conclusion, he quoted a statement emanating from a foreigner of note affirming that, at the War Office in Berlin, there were some 225 documents that had all been sold to them by Esterhazy.

With regard to the letters from the German Emperor, Paléologue declared that he had only heard them spoken of on one occasion, and that was by Henry. The same day, speaking of these alleged letters, to which Rochefort and Drumont continued to make veiled allusions in their articles, Delcassé had told the Chamber that if there had been any forgeries in existence, the forger would have taken especial care not to bring them to the Quai d'Orsay.

The handwriting experts, Teyssonnières, Bertillon, Couard, Belhomme, Varinard, still persisted in attributing the *bordereau* to Dreyfus. Pelletier and Gobert adhered to the evidence they had given in 1894, which was favourable to Dreyfus.

Two ex-officers, General Sébert of the Académie des Sciences, and Captain Moch, together with two majors of artillery still on the active list named Ducros and Hartmann, showed clearly that, by reason of the technical inaccuracy of the terms employed, the *bordereau* could not have been



Le youpinard Drumont. — Je regrette, ma bonne dame, je ne puis rien faire pour vous : votre mari n'était pas un faussaire...

22 décembre 1898.)

CARTOON INSPIRED BY DRUMONT'S FUND FOR THE WIDOW OF COLONEL HENRY

the work of an artillery officer. There was nothing of a secret nature about the matters referred to in the memoranda mentioned in the *bordereau*, and any officer could have written them up from material taken from the military journals. Ducros stated that when he was in charge of the arms factory at Puteaux, where the secret parts of arms were manufactured, he invited Captain Dreyfus to come and see over the workshops. Dreyfus never came. A spy would have jumped at the chance.

Painlevé and Hadamard showed how, from something they had said in the course of conversation that was favourable to Dreyfus, the officials of the General Staff had built up a falsehood. D'Ocagne, being called on to explain matters, was driven to admit that Hadamard had, as a matter of fact, told Painlevé that "Dreyfus's guilt was not established," and that Lonquety had attached no significance to his meeting with Dreyfus in Brussels.

Du Paty declared that at the time he was conducting his inquiries about Dreyfus in 1894, as well as in his relations with Esterhazy in 1898, he had but fallen in with the orders and wishes of his superiors. He admitted that Sandherr had instructed him to report on the secret documents; but as to what Sandherr had done with the report he had not an idea.

Esterhazy, who was at this time in Brussels, had long been hesitating whether to come and give evidence or not. At last he made up his mind that he would come. Putting on his customary boastful style, he spoke solely of the events in which he had been involved during the past fourteen months. He asserted that when he was brought up for trial the entire General Staff had rallied to his support. It was only when Cavaignac had sworn to have his blood that they had left him in the lurch. But he would be quite able to take care of himself when the time came. For the moment he was content to treat the people who had given evidence against him with the contempt they deserved.

The Judges questioned him about his relations with Sandherr. But he refused to say a word, merely stating that

he would produce his documents when it suited him, and when he had consulted his legal advisers. When, however, his letters written on the thin paper were put before him, *as well as the bordereau*, he recognized their affinity to the latter. Loew reminded him that he had said that the *bordereau* had been traced by Dreyfus from his (Esterhazy's) writing. Esterhazy retorted that the first Court-Martial had attributed the document to Dreyfus, and that the second Court-Martial had not attributed it to him (Esterhazy). He was therefore under no obligation to reopen a matter on which judgment had already been pronounced. Then Loew went on to remind him that he had already made some more or less half-hearted confessions to a number of journalists, notably to Chincholle of the *Figaro* and to an Englishman named Strong, who was on the staff of the *Observer*. He added that he had refused their offers of money.

His evidence over, he proceeded to lodge a formal objection against Bertulus, the Judge entrusted with the hearing of Christian Esterhazy's suit, impugning his fairness and maintaining that he was inveterately hostile to himself. This done, he departed for Holland.

The investigations of the Criminal Court had been brought to a conclusion. In view of the new regulations regarding appeals in criminal cases which had just been passed, Mazeau decided to appoint another *rapporteur*. His choice fell upon M. Ballot-Beaupré, whom he knew to be opposed to revision. The three Chambers, in united session, addressed themselves to a supplementary inquiry in the course of which the evidence of some ten witnesses was taken, among them being Commandant Fraystaetter, who, as Captain, had sat on the original Court-Martial. Ever since the confession and suicide of Henry, he had harboured grave doubts as to the culpability of Dreyfus and was anxious to ease his conscience. He declared that the *bordereau* was the only thing that had come under review at the sitting, and that the document about *ce canaille de D*—— had only been submitted to the Judges in their private room. He

added that what decided him to vote as he did was Henry's solemn declaration that he had it from an unimpeachable source, i.e. from Val Carlos, that the name of the man implicated was Dreyfus.

Lépine, who, as Prefect of Police, had been present *ex officio* at the 1894 trial, said that he had forwarded Henry two memoranda which showed that Dreyfus was unknown in gambling circles and that he was in no way mixed up with women. These two reports, of which copies were extant at the Prefecture, had been replaced by the mendacious reports of the detective Guénée.

Du Paty put in a denial of the charges in which Cuignet had endeavoured to involve him. Charavay, the handwriting expert, who in 1894 had ascribed the *bordereau* to Dreyfus, acknowledged, now that he had seen Esterhazy's writing, that he had made a mistake.

But the main discussion centred round Panizzardi's dispatch. Cuignet, who had just been promoted Major, had, in his evidence before the Criminal Court, cast a doubt on the bona fides of the Foreign Office. When Delcassé heard what he had said he was seriously annoyed, and asked the postal authorities for the copy of the dispatch. Paléologue produced it in Court. An argument arose between the representative of the Foreign Office and those of the War Office, Cuignet and Chamoin. The translation was made and a report, signed by the representatives of the two departments, put on record, once for all, the true interpretation of Panizzardi's telegram, viz.: "If Captain Dreyfus has not had any dealings with you, it would be well to ask the Ambassador to publish an official denial, in order to avoid Press comment."

De Freycinet, whose nerves had been upset by the whole affair, resigned a few days later in the following circumstances. One of the professors at the École Polytechnique, Georges Duruy, had published some articles in the *Figaro* in which he had implored the Army not to espouse the cause of Esterhazy. Drumont incited the professor's pupils to hiss

him and to demand his resignation. His class was disturbed by a few rowdies, and General Toulza, the principal, with de Freycinet's concurrence, suspended him from his duties. Called to account by Gouzy, a deputy, de Freycinet, feeling that the Left were unfavourably disposed towards him, handed in his resignation. Dupuy handed over his office to Krantz, who was already Minister for Public Works. The *Petit Journal* in due course published the politely acrimonious correspondence which had been exchanged between Delcassé and de Freycinet in regard to Panizzardi's telegram. Cuignet, who was accused of being responsible for this indiscretion, was relieved of his functions.

And now, as if France had not already enough to bear, there occurred another event which scarcely contributed to advance her prestige in the eyes of the world, and that was the scandal which surrounded the death of the President, Félix Faure.

After luncheon on February 16, 1899, the President had successively given audience to the Cardinal Archbishop of Paris, Monseigneur Richard, and the Prince of Monaco. The latter, on his way from Berlin, brought with him the formal declaration of the Emperor in which he explicitly stated that never at any time had he or his Government had relations, direct or indirect, with ex-Captain Dreyfus.

As soon as these audiences were over, Félix Faure had withdrawn to a private apartment adjoining his office, having given orders that he was not to be disturbed. It was in this room that he was in the habit of receiving the wife of Steinheil, the artist, who had been his mistress for some time past. About five o'clock Le Gall, his secretary, and the other officials on duty were startled to hear panic-stricken shrieks coming from this room. Hastening to the scene, they found the President lying on the floor breathing stertorously, and the lady in a state bordering on hysteria. Doctors were hurriedly sent for, and on their arrival pronounced it a case of cerebral haemorrhage. The patient went off into a coma about seven o'clock, and never regained consciousness.

On February 19th the Chambers met in combined session at Versailles, and Loubet was elected President by 483 votes to 279 cast for Méline. Some fifty votes were frittered away among Cavaignac, Deschanel, and Dupuy. On his way back to the capital Loubet was greeted with hoots and jeers by the Nationalist mob.

The Appeal Court's investigations had been completed for some days, and a certain number of copies had been taken of the evidence. Cuignet had shown his copy to Roget. Mornard, who represented Madame Dreyfus, had shown his to Demange, Labori, and Mathieu Dreyfus. Mathieu Dreyfus, in turn, made it known to Clemenceau and Reinach, who, seeing that the anti-Semite Press were publishing the passages in it that were unfavourable to Dreyfus, resolved to publish the whole thing *in extenso*.

Reinach gave copies to Victorien Sardou, an ardent Dreyfusard. Sardou took them to the *Figaro*, in whose columns they appeared in successive issues from March 31st to the end of April. The offices of the paper were searched, but nothing was found, because every night Sardou came with the instalment that was to be published next day. Hitherto, the public had only had snippets of the case, and those from the General Staff's point of view. Now they were able to read the case as a whole, and the reading brought in numerous converts.

The three Chambers of the Court of Appeal met in solemn session on May 29, 1899, and Ballot-Beaupré read out his report, which he had endeavoured to make as matter of fact and impartial as he could. One after the other he presented the two versions of the case, bringing in the long series of events that had occurred since 1894. He made a point of enunciating the principal arguments to which either side might have recourse. And then, declaring that from the strictly legal point of view the handwriting of the *bordereau* and the square-ruled tracing paper were the only elements left in the case, he asked this question: "The

bordereau, the chief item in the indictment and condemnation, was it or was it not written by Dreyfus?"

In grave and measured tones, amid the tense silence of the Court, he gave his answer. "Gentlemen," he said, "after the most careful examination I, for my part, have arrived at the conviction that the *bordereau* was written, not by Dreyfus, but by Esterhazy." Then he impaled Esterhazy on one of his own lies, since in December 1897, in reply to Ravary, who was holding an official inquiry, Esterhazy had said, "I have never in my life written anything on tracing paper." Well, then, here was a letter from him, dated August 17, 1894, that is, the same month as the *bordereau*, on that very tracing paper which he had sworn he had never used. "On my soul and conscience," concluded Ballot-Beaupré, "it is impossible for me to contest this fact, which the members of the Court-Martial did not have before them when, on December 22, 1894, they brought in a verdict of guilty against Dreyfus."

Manau then produced cogent arguments in favour of a new trial, and Maître Mornard spoke on behalf of Madame Lucie Dreyfus. The Court adjourned till June 3rd, the date fixed for the reading of the verdict.

During the intervening three days two things happened. Krantz gave orders for du Paty de Clam's arrest, and he was taken off to the Cherche-Midi. Secondly, a journalist on the staff of the *Matin*, Serge Basset, set out for London, where Esterhazy was then staying, hoping to obtain a thumping denial of the things Ballot-Beaupré had been saying. He found the ex-major in a state of utter demoralization. His wife had begun proceedings for divorce, and he felt that the General Staff were abandoning him to his fate. He cursed the generals up hill and down dale. When Serge Basset besought him to let him know the truth he shouted, "All right, then; yes, I wrote the *bordereau*, because Colonel Sandherr asked me to. . . . Billot, de Boisdeffre, and Gonse knew that I wrote it."

And that was true enough. He wrote the *bordereau*, and

the generals knew he had written it. But he could not have written it at Sandherr's instigation. The mere fact that a search was made in October 1894 at Headquarters to find out who wrote the *bordereau* sufficiently disposed of that lie. Moreover, if Esterhazy had been either the author or the mere writer of the *bordereau*, Sandherr would certainly never have omitted to inform Colonel Picquart when the latter took over from him in June 1895.

On June 3rd the Court, in full and solemn session, unanimously declared null and void the verdict pronounced on December 22, 1894, against Alfred Dreyfus, and ordered that he should be brought up for re-trial before the Court-Martial at Rennes.

The day after this decision Zola put an end to his voluntary exile and came back to Paris. On June 5th, at the hour of noon, Dreyfus was officially notified that his case was to be reheard. On June 9th he embarked on the *Sfax*, the cruiser that was to bring him back to France. That same day Picquart, who had been at liberty for forty-eight hours, after spending 324 days in captivity, betook himself to his cousin Gast at Ville d'Avray to enjoy a little peace.

CHAPTER VII

DREYFUS RETURNS TO FRANCE.—THE RENNES COURT-MARTIAL.—MERCIER TALKS ABOUT THE "HISTORIC" NIGHT.—CASIMIR-PERIER GIVES HIM THE LIE DIRECT.—ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE LABORI.—FREYSTAETTER AND THE SECRET DOCUMENTS IN 1894.—THE LEGEND OF THE ANNOTATED *BORDEREAU*.—PERJURY OF CERNUSKI.—FRESH GERMAN OFFICIAL STATEMENT.—DEMANGE'S SPEECH FOR THE DEFENCE.—VERDICT AND STATE PARDON.

ON the morning of June 30th the *Sfax*, with Dreyfus on board, arrived off Quiberon. In order to avoid any hostile demonstration, another vessel, the *Caudan*, was to tranship the prisoner and put him ashore. At nine o'clock a whaler proceeded alongside the *Sfax*. A stiff gale was blowing at the time, and the transference from one ship to another was effected with considerable difficulty. On July 1st, about two o'clock in the morning, the *Caudan* arrived at Port Haliguen, where Dreyfus disembarked. M. Viguié, superintendent of police, conducted him to a conveyance in which he was driven to Quiberon. There he entered a special train for Rennes.

At six o'clock he passed into the military prison, where a cell had been made ready for him. It was getting on for nine when an officer came to take him along to his wife, who was waiting for him in the visitors' room. It was four years and five months since husband and wife had seen one another, and they fell sobbing into each other's arms.

During the day Dreyfus was visited by his brother and some of his relations. On July 3rd Maître Demange came to see him, together with Maître Labori, who had begged Mathieu Dreyfus to let him have the honour of pleading his brother's cause. The two advocates told him all that had happened since his condemnation, events of which he was completely ignorant. For fifty-two months Dreyfus may be said not to have spoken to a soul, and speech did not

come readily to him. On the following day his counsel gave him the shorthand notes of the Zola trial and of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal. Dreyfus spent the night reading what was to him like a thrilling novel, his own heartbreaking story. Then he began making notes; little by little his memory came back; and he struggled to stave off the feverishness produced by the sudden change of climate.

The Court-Martial sat in the Great Hall of the Lycée de Rennes, which had been fitted up for the occasion. The proceedings lasted five weeks. The seven Judges were as follows: Colonel Jouaust, Lieutenant-Colonel Brogniart, Commandants de Bréon, Merle, and Proulet, Captains Parfait and Beauvais. Commandant Carrière, a retired ex-officer of gendarmerie, who had gone in for studying the law at the age of sixty-four, represented the Government. Lastly, General Chamoin and Paléologue, representing de Gallifet and Delcassé respectively, were there to explain the secret *dossiers*. On the eve of the trial Esterhazy wrote a letter to Carrière telling him he would not go to Rennes, because he knew "the Court had already made up its mind to acquit Dreyfus." Then, being resolved to defend himself to the very end, he added, "Before God and by the sacred memory of my father, I swear I only entered into relations with Schwartzkoppen on Sandherr's instructions."

The first sitting began on August 8th at 7 a.m. The hall was packed. Jouaust gave orders for the accused man to be brought in. Three minutes later Dreyfus appeared through a door that opened on to the platform. Wearing the uniform of a captain of artillery, bracing himself up by an immense effort of will, he came in walking like an automaton, saluted the Court, and took his seat at the place allotted to him. He was thirty-nine years of age, but looked like an old man, with his face worn and thin and the crown of his head bald and surrounded by a fringe of grey hair. The usher recited the various documents, beginning with the charge drawn up by d'Ormescheville in 1894, and ending with the decisions of the Court of Appeal. Then the names of the

witnesses were called over, after which Jouaust began the interrogatory. He ordered the *bordereau* to be shown to Dreyfus, and asked him if he recognized it. Dreyfus replied that he had already seen it in 1894, but that he did not recognize it. Then, struggling to master his emotion, he added :

"I swear once more that I am innocent, as I swore in 1894. For five years I have borne it all, *mon Colonel*; but once more for my own good name and the good name of my children, I repeat I am innocent."

Then ensued a long string of questions which Jouaust had set down in writing, and which he put one after another. They were all a repetition of the questions put by d'Ormescheville in 1894; such, for example, as "Didn't you go to Brussels in 1894?" "Didn't you go to Alsace?" "Didn't you go in for backing horses?" "Were you not a gambler?" "Didn't you write to Captain Rémusat asking him for certain confidential information?" "Didn't you ask Captain Boullenger some very indiscreet questions?"

Many a man, after fifty-two months on Devil's Island, might have been excused for not remembering things so trivial and so remote. At least, he might have forgotten the dates. But, very fortunately for him, Dreyfus remembered all these things and gave his answers clearly and sharply. He told how du Paty de Clam had come to see him in the prison the night before his degradation, to try to get him to confess, in view of a mitigation of sentence. He also recalled his conversation with Lebrun-Renault before his degradation, in the course of which he had again and again affirmed his innocence.

At length this interrogatory was brought to an end, and the Court decided to proceed to an examination of the secret *dossiers*. It took place behind closed doors, from August 8th to the 11th, in the presence of the accused and counsel for the defence. On the morning of the day on which the arguments began Mercier sent Chamoin a note, which he had got from du Paty, about the translation of

the Panizzardi telegram. He did not say who had written the note and asked him merely to look at it. Chamoin assented, not realizing at the moment the irregularity involved in such a proceeding.

When the Panizzardi telegram came up for discussion, he gave an account of the various translations which had been given, and wound up by saying that the final version was the correct one and that the War Office and the Foreign Office were in complete agreement. However, he read the first page of the note which Mercier had sent him, which was an attempt to show that the partisans of the erroneous version had acted in good faith. Whereupon he declared that, in his view, it was futile to read what followed because the assertions contained in it were entirely false. Labori asked leave to see the note, and Chamoin, after some hesitation, agreed to let him have it, with the proviso that neither the Judges nor the defending counsel should read the second and third pages. Afterwards, on the morning of the last day of the secret hearing, he told Labori he had got the note from Mercier and wound up by reading out the whole of it. The two pages which had not been read out contained observations designed to influence the Judges by leading them to believe that the official deciphering of the telegram was incorrect.

In the course of these hearings Chamoin produced the exhibits he had in his possession, and commented upon them; but instead of setting forth their futility, he gave the vague notion that they might or might not be significant, and thus upheld the attitude of the ex-General Staff. He also read out the letters which Dreyfus had written to de Boisdeffre from Devil's Island, whereat the Judges were greatly affected. In short, he produced all the papers in the secret *dossier* except a series of express letters which had passed between Schwartzkoppen and his woman friend, and which showed that the *petit bleu* had indeed been sent to Esterhazy by Schwartzkoppen.

The secret *dossier* also contained the species of "memo-

randum" which had been written by Schwartzkoppen and which reached the Intelligence Department on December 25, 1895. As we have said, this memorandum alluded to an official letter regarding the 120 gun allotted to the artillery of the 9th Army. This was accompanied by an explanation dated October 2, 1897, showing that inquiries made, after receipt of the memorandum, had proved that the information furnished to Schwartzkoppen must have been taken from a note, of which a copy was still in existence, though the original was no longer to be found. Now this original could only have been the work of Commandant Bayle or of his probationer, Captain Dreyfus. Bayle, who, moreover, had died in November 1895, being above suspicion, the disappearance of the original was ascribed to Dreyfus. In giving their testimony, Mercier, de Boisdeffre, Gonse, and Cuignet referred to the disappearance of this document as a count in the indictment against Dreyfus, although he had been arrested fourteen months prior to the receipt of the memorandum.

On Saturday, August 12th, the Court was again thrown open to the public. Casimir-Perier was called. He declared he would keep nothing back, and tell all he knew. This undertaking to speak frankly was all the more valuable since rumours about the famous *bordereau* annotated by the German Emperor were going the round behind the scenes adroitly spread abroad by Mercier and his friends. Casimir-Perier referred to the interview he had had with von Munster on January 6, 1895, and divulged the contents of the telegram—of which the public had hitherto heard nothing—from the Chancellor, von Hohenlohe. The interview and the telegram made up the official declaration whereby the Ambassador and Prince von Hohenlohe had formally assured the French Government that Germany had never had any communication, direct or indirect, with Dreyfus. Casimir-Perier also stressed the fact that Mercier had made light of the documents enumerated on the *bordereau*, and further added that he had been kept completely in the dark as to

the secret documents which had been divulged to the Judges alone. Finally, he spoke of his talk with Lebrun-Renault, when nothing was said to him about any confession.

After Casimir-Perier came Mercier. The Nationalist papers had all given out that his evidence would be crushing for the defence. As a matter of fact, everyone was highly disappointed. Whereas the ex-President had delivered himself in a clear, convincing manner, the ex-War Minister spoke in an undertone, wrapping up his sentences in all manner of innuendoes and veiled hints, giving his Judges to understand that he was keeping something back because it was too dangerous to divulge.

His whole object was to bring the Judges' minds to bear on the hypothesis of an annotated *bordereau*, and thereafter to convert the hypothesis into a reality. He hinted that the German Emperor was personally mixed up with spies and their activities; that official denials, which might be called for by reasons of state, were not to be taken seriously. He said that Casimir-Perier, in speaking of von Munster's action, had not said all that he should have said. He had not told them that on that fateful night he had remained in his office till midnight, wondering whether war would be the outcome of the Ambassador's protest. But in referring to von Munster's *démarche*, Mercier had spoken of it as prior to Dreyfus's condemnation (December 22, 1894), whereas it was not made until January 6, 1895; that is to say, a fortnight after it. By thus manipulating the dates, Mercier thought to justify the motives that had led him to divulge the secret documents to the Judges and to the Judges alone.

Although it had long been recognized that the document *ce canaille de D*— could not possibly apply to Dreyfus, Mercier would still have it that it did. It had also been made clear that as far back as May 1894 Dreyfus as well as his friends knew from a circular letter, signed by de Bois-deffre, that they would not be going to the September manœuvres. Nevertheless, Mercier insisted that in May Dreyfus might have thought that he would be going to

these manœuvres. He also cited against him the letter which Panizzardi had written to an accomplice of Schwartzkoppen's, stating that he was about to receive details of the troop-train arrangements.

With regard to the similarity between the paper of the *bordereau* and that used by Esterhazy for his correspondence at that period, Mercier insisted that no importance was to be attached to this coincidence, inasmuch as thin paper of that sort was always being manufactured. In 1894, however, Cochefort had tried to get hold of the same paper at all the principal stationers in Paris, but without success. Further, although Esterhazy himself had been compelled to acknowledge the authenticity of these letters, Mercier declared that they were most likely forgeries. From that he deduced that the *bordereau* was unquestionably the work of Captain Dreyfus. Even if someone else had done the actual writing, there was no doubt he had done it from Dreyfus's dictation. In proof, Mercier appealed to Bertillon's demonstration. He then went on to say that all this agitation for a fresh trial was being financed by a cosmopolitan syndicate into which millions were being poured, and he concluded by stating that, if he entertained a single doubt about Dreyfus's guilt, he would say to him without a moment's hesitation, "I made a mistake, but I made it in good faith."

At these words, Dreyfus, who had remained unmoved all the four long hours during which Mercier had been giving his evidence, sprang to his feet and with arms outstretched exclaimed, "That's what you should do. It is your duty." But his words were lost in a storm of shouts and jeers.

Casimir-Perier demanded to be confronted with Mercier. But it was now midday, and the Court had risen. The hearing was adjourned till the next day but one. As the hall was emptying, Georges Bourdon, of the *Figaro*, ran up to Mercier as he was going out, and shouted at him that he was an assassin.

At six o'clock in the morning, on Monday, August 14th, Picquart and his cousin Gast, who were making their way

along the canal tow-path from la Vilaine on their way to the Court, were joined by Labori, who walked along between them. They had not gone many yards when a shot rang out, and Labori fell with a loud cry to the ground. Picquart and Gast dashed off in pursuit of the assassin. A boatman scrambled out of his boat and tried to bar the way, but recoiled before the assassin, who threatened him with his revolver, shouting, "Out of the way, will you! I've just killed a 'Dreyfus'!" Picquart and his cousin, who were now joined by Labori's servant, continued the pursuit, but the assassin, a young fellow between twenty-five and thirty and more active than they, dashed across the Laennec bridge, and across the boulevard of the same name, and disappeared in a maze of lanes and alleys. Picquart and Gast, having lost sight of him, went back to Labori, who by this time had been joined by his wife. Drs. Reclus and Brissaud, who were attending the trial, came on the scene almost at once. They examined the victim, and decided that no vital organ had been touched. Labori was placed on a mattress and carried back to the house. There the two doctors, who had now been joined by Professor Weidal, were able to make a more thorough examination. They found that the bullet had penetrated the posterior region of the thorax and lodged in the muscles. The same evening the patient's temperature went down to nearly normal, and a rapid recovery was anticipated. The question was whether it would be better to extract the bullet or to leave it where it was. Doyen, the surgeon, who had been Labori's friend since their childhood days, had rushed off to Rennes as soon as he heard of the outrage. Labori would only see him as a friend. Reclus and his confrère declined to meet him in consultation, and definitely set their faces against any surgical interference.

The news of the outrage reached the Court just when Jouaust was about to resume the hearing. The proceedings were at once suspended. The atmosphere was charged with electricity. The idea of an attempt to kill the defender of an accused man aroused the horrified indignation of every

Dreyfusard. The Nationalists were dumbfounded and didn't know what to say. The hall emptied, everyone rushing off to get some fresh news. The general view that day was that the would-be murderer's bullet had done far more good than harm to the accused man's cause. Then slowly but surely the Nationalists began to take fresh heart. Calumny and falsehood began their subterranean work. Some expressed astonishment that the assassin had not been found. Others could not make out why Labori had not died of his wound. The difference of opinion between Reclus and Doyen aggravated their suspicions. At last, on the third day, it was openly given out that the assassination was a put-up affair, and that Labori's wound was a self-inflicted one and quite harmless. So unbounded was the credulity of the anti-Dreyfusards that this calumny, fostered as it was by the anti-Jewish Press, spread like wildfire among the populace. The Assumptionist Fathers, who edited *La Croix*, composed an indecent lampoon about it, the refrain of which ran as follows:

As tu vu
Le trou d'balle, le trou d'balle,
As tu vu
Le trou d'balle à Labori?

When, on August 14th, the Court resumed, Mercier was recalled and re-examined by two of the Judges; Jouaust asked him whether Esterhazy had been employed by Sandherr. Mercier replied, "Never, to my knowledge." Jouaust then said, "Esterhazy at first said he was not the author of the *bordereau*; a little later on he said that he was." Mercier replied, "I think he was lying." Then he went on to repeat what he had previously said, and that was, "Even if the writing was not Dreyfus's, inquiry had made it clear that it had been inspired by Dreyfus."

It was at this point that one of the Judges, Lieutenant-Colonel Brogniart, inquired, "Has no one ever put forward the theory that the *bordereau* on thin paper might have been a tracing from an original?" Mercier replied, "I have seen

such an hypothesis referred to in the papers, but it was never suggested at the time to the War Office."

Mercier's answers were adroitly deceptive. He it was who had put about among his personal friends the story of that *bordereau* which the German Emperor was supposed to have annotated. But now, when he came to be questioned about the existence of that document, he made out he had only heard about it in the newspapers. He managed to invest his replies with such an equivocal air that, while he appeared to be throwing cold water on the story, he was really giving it a renewed currency, for to dignify it by the name of an hypothesis was to admit its possibility. Nor was Mercier's attitude any less treacherous in the passage of arms which he had the same day with Casimir-Perier. In the course of his protracted examination on Saturday, the 12th, Mercier had alluded to a so-called "historic night" when, under the apprehension of an ultimatum from Germany, which might well have meant war, he (so he gave out) had spent the whole night in Casimir-Perier's private room, studying the situation. The impression he wanted to create was that Germany, in spite of her declarations to the contrary, had really had a finger in the Dreyfus affair. Recalled, in accordance with his own request, at the conclusion of Mercier's evidence, Casimir-Perier met Mercier's assertions with a series of point-blank denials. He declared, yet once again, that it was *after* the trial, on January 6, 1895, that Count von Munster had approached him; that von Munster's action was purely diplomatic and had had no sensational effect, and that that same night, so far from having been closeted with Mercier, he had gone off to dine at his mother's.

Mercier, quite unmoved, said he might have been at fault as to the exact date of this "historic night," but he remembered perfectly well that next day he had given de Boisdeffre instructions in view of a possible outbreak of war.

Seeing that, in his evidence two days previously, Mercier had endeavoured to justify the communication to the Judges

of the secret *dossier* on the grounds that von Munster's action had put everyone in a panic, Maître Demange asked how he now proposed to justify that proceeding, when he himself acknowledged that von Munster had not moved in the matter until a fortnight after Dreyfus had been convicted. Without turning a hair, Mercier replied that the incident of January 6th was but an episode in a crisis that had long been brewing.

The next few days were taken up with the evidence of the other Ministers for War, which, however, was merely a repetition of what they had said at the Court of Appeal. Billot and Chanoine were particularly flat. Cavaignac again harked back to the alleged confessions of Dreyfus, and then, though he had not mentioned the *bordereau* in his speech of July 7, 1898, he dwelt on it on this occasion, bringing in Bertillon and his system. Zurlinden also availed himself of this weapon, expounding the system in the light of some explanations furnished by a major of Engineers, called Corps, who had embodied the result of his lucubrations in a memorandum which was presented to the Judges. Unfortunately, the Major's explanations, so far from throwing any light on the matter, only served to involve it in still greater obscurity.

After the War Ministers came two other members of the Government. Hanotaux explained the part he had played in 1894, when he was in charge of foreign affairs. He handed the Court a copy of the memorandum he had prepared on December 7, 1894, when he had signified his opposition to the proceedings against Dreyfus. Next, when it was pointed out to him that he had not said a word to Casimir-Perier about the conversations he had had with von Munster, he replied that he had mentioned them to Dupuy. But he was completely silent about the further representations which von Munster and Tornielli had both made to him when Scheurer-Kestner began his campaign for a new trial, and which told wholly in favour of Dreyfus. Similarly, when he was asked about Panizzardi's telegram, all he said was that

it had not struck him as being very important, and that he had no recollection of mentioning it to Mercier.

Lebon attempted to justify the inhuman measures he had taken against Dreyfus by alleging that all the talk that was going on about the Dreyfus case in the autumn of 1896 had made him afraid there was going to be an attempt to rescue him. Demange asked—and his request was granted—for a recital to the Court of an official account of Dreyfus's treatment on Devil's Island. Whereupon Dreyfus, looking Lebon straight in the face, exclaimed, "I am not here to talk about the horrible tortures which for five years an innocent man was forced to undergo. I am here to defend my good name."

Next came Generals Roget and de Boisdeffre, and all the officers who had had to do with the Affair in one way or another. Roget delivered himself of the theory that Esterhazy was in all likelihood in the pay of the Jews; that he could never have got hold of the documents enumerated on the *bordereau*, and that he had not written the *bordereau*, because that was in Dreyfus's handwriting somewhat disguised. Nevertheless, as he was no believer in the *bordereau* alleged to have been annotated by the German Emperor, he scouted the idea that Esterhazy had been instructed to trace any such document. On the other hand, he referred to the letter of November 30, 1897, in which Schneider, the Austrian attaché, recorded his belief that Dreyfus was guilty. As soon as this item of evidence came to his ears, Schneider, who was then at Ems, wrote off post-haste to the Court to say that the letter quoted was a forgery, for at that time his opinion about Dreyfus was the exact contrary of the views he had expressed in 1896, when a false report of the prisoner's escape had got abroad.

De Boisdeffre repeated his conviction of Dreyfus's guilt, saying that Picquart had most likely been in collusion with Dreyfus and that Esterhazy was their paid scapegoat who, when the time came, was to confess himself the author of the *bordereau*.

Next came the turn of all those officers who in 1894 had appeared for the prosecution. Not only did they maintain all their former accusations, they augmented them with fresh charges raked up five years after the event.

Colonel Picquart, who was the next witness to be called, once more gave an account of the part he had played. His narrative was a model of clarity and precision.

Mercier had insisted that Henry's widow should be called. She recounted how her husband had pieced the *bordereau* together at home and how he had declared that, for the sake of the Army's good name, he had perpetrated a forgery "with a little verbal material."

On the following day Bertulus gave a full account of the scene in his office when Henry, thinking the game was up, had burst into tears and implored him not to give him away.

He concluded by affirming his belief in Dreyfus's innocence. Throughout the examination of these witnesses the whole brunt of the defence had fallen on Demange. Addressing himself with the utmost conscientiousness to his task, he disputed every inch of the ground with the witnesses, but always in so gentle and fatherly a tone that he had won the goodwill of all his opponents. When Labori was well enough to get about again and returned to the Court, he adopted a very different attitude. Resuming his cross-examination where he had left off, he put a fresh series of questions to Mercier, Gonse, de Pellieux, and Roget, and the three latter were often made to look foolish. But Mercier was a harder nut to crack; he was more slippery, more cunning, and seemed to elude the grasp of this fiery advocate. When a question was put to him point-blank, he would go off on some lengthy argument, bringing in a number of statements which, so far from shedding any light on the subject, only left it more involved.

The argument waxed particularly hot over the alleged falsification of Panizzardi's telegram. Labori insisted on knowing whether it was included in the *petit dossier* which had been secretly communicated to the Judges in 1894.

One of the Judges, Captain (now Major) Freystaetter, asserted that it *had* been submitted to him. Colonel Maurel, who had presided at the former trial, said he had not the faintest recollection of it. Mercier maintained that he had given orders that the telegram was not to be admitted as evidence, since its interpretation was conjectural, and he gave it as his opinion that Freystaetter was the victim of what he called a "superimposed memory." This was an ingenious answer, and it settled nothing, for, supposing Mercier genuinely meant what he said, the paper might have been slipped in with the others, unknown to Sandherr or Henry. There was something very suspicious about Maurel's answer, for he said he had only read one thing in the secret *dossier* and had passed on all the rest to the Judges. But Freystaetter reminded him that, as a matter of fact, he had read and commented upon each separate document before handing it on to the Judges. Maurel did not contest this very categorical statement, but merely cavilled a little at the words "commented upon."

Maurel having said that it was du Paty who had handed him the secret *dossier*, whereas Picquart had said he was under the impression that *he* had done so, Labori was anxious to settle this question once for all. But du Paty was indisposed and unable to come to Rennes. Labori thereupon got permission for an officer to visit him and take down his evidence. Captain Tavernier was selected for this task, and returned with a written statement, in which du Paty declared that, from certain secret documents which he had scrutinized and reported upon under Sandherr's instructions, he had come to the conclusion there was a traitor on the General Staff, that the said traitor then belonged, or had previously belonged, to the Intelligence Department and that he might be Dreyfus. As to the secret *dossier*, he confirmed that it was he who, under instructions from Sandherr, had handed it to the President, Maurel; but he did not know what was in it. With regard to Panizzardi's telegram, he had not been in a position to check whether

the code version which had been pronounced authentic exhibited the same disquieting characteristics as the text he had seen. He said nothing about the *bordereau*, and nothing about the words he had made Dreyfus take down at his dictation. On the contrary, forgetting what he had made the accused man undergo, he altogether denied that he had put him on the rack.

When his turn came to give evidence, Lieutenant-Colonel Rollin was questioned by Brogniart, one of the Judges, concerning the instruction-course at the École de Guerre.

Rollin's answer was as follows: "Major Cuignet and I examined the manuals and found that a certain number of pages were lacking from the fortification section."

Brogniart then asked him if he had not something fresh to impart on this point. Rollin replied in the negative, thus passing over in silence the note, dated March 1899, in which Cuignet and he had acknowledged that they had made a mistake.

Major Cordier's evidence was eagerly awaited, the more so as he was known to have altered his views. He had collaborated with Sandherr in 1894, and knew all about the early stages of the case. He declared that Henry had been forced on Sandherr, that he had more than once been found out playing a double game, and that he and Lauth used to plot against their superiors. He had fabricated the forgery in order to ruin Picquart in the eyes of his chiefs and so to take his place. It was when he (Cordier) realized the sort of things that were going on that he began to have his doubts as to whether Dreyfus was really guilty after all. At the present moment he was convinced of his innocence, and did not hesitate to say so.

Then came the civilians. Tomps described Henry's behaviour at Basle when he went there to interview Cuers. He also told how Henry had tried to get him to accuse Picquart of having sent the facsimile of the *bordereau* to the *Matin*. Hennion revealed a few more of Henry's underhand tricks. Painlevé proved that, in regard to the conversation

he had had with Jacques Hadamard, Gonse and Roget had reported him as saying the exact opposite of what he actually told them. The two generals, thus caught in a deliberate falsehood, had not a word to say for themselves.

It was next the turn of the handwriting experts. They all adhered to their previous conclusions with the exception of Charavay, who, although he was seriously ill—he died a few weeks later—had made it his duty to come to them. He declared that in 1894 he had been led astray by a similarity in the writing; but that since Esterhazy's writing had become known it was enough to compare it with the writing on the *bordereau* to see that the two were absolutely identical. It was, he added, a source of great comfort to him thus to relieve his conscience by acknowledging his mistake.

It was very different with Bertillon, who again expounded the system he had invented to prove that Dreyfus had traced the *bordereau* from his own handwriting, introducing some variations derived from letters from other members of his family. Paraf-Javal, a draughtsman, a mining engineer named Bernard, two members of the *Institut-Général*, Sébert and Henri Poincaré, the celebrated mathematician, exposed the incoherence and stupidity of Bertillon's system.

Despite the refutations of these eminent men, an Army officer, Captain Valério, appeared, at Mercier's request, to shoulder the task of proving the auto-forgery idea and demonstrating "peremptorily and geometrically" that the *bordereau* was a forged document. Esterhazy's confessions he entirely ignored; at the most, he might have made a tracing. In this way, Valério insinuated that there might be two *bordereaux* in existence, one on thick paper, written by Dreyfus, the other a copy on tracing paper, made by Esterhazy. These insinuations bolstered up in the Judges' minds the legend secretly put about by Mercier. The Press rose to the bait. In an article, which was widely reproduced, the *Nouvelliste de Bordeaux* announced that the ex-War Minister had in his pocket a photograph of the *bordereau* annotated by the German Emperor.

In order to lower the champions of Dreyfus in the public esteem, the supporters of the General Staff had given out that the syndicate formed for the purpose of securing Dreyfus's release was trying to bribe them. Furthermore, it was alleged that the Senator, de Freycinet, had told General Jamont that thirty-five millions had come in from abroad. On being asked about this statement, de Freycinet, with an eye to the coming senatorial elections, gave an answer that was calculated to satisfy both Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards alike. He declared that so far as he personally was concerned, he knew nothing very definite, and that he had only repeated to Jamont what other people, who claimed to be well-informed, had told him without, however, accepting any responsibility for their statements. He then went on to add that, in France, the revisionist campaign had been quite above-board, and that money had played no part in it.

The question as to whether Dreyfus had ever made a confession took up the whole of one day's hearing. Lebrun-Renault again repeated the story he had told many times before. Jouaust, pressing for a definite reply, asked him whether the impression left on his mind after his conversation with Dreyfus on the day of the degradation ceremony had been that the prisoner had made a confession. Lebrun-Renault replied that he had not any impression and that he was unwilling to offer an opinion. Demange then asked him this question: "How do you reconcile these two phrases: 'I am innocent,' and 'If I have handed over any documents. . . .'" "It is not for me to reconcile them," was the officer's reply. Then, in order to explain why he had said nothing about the matter when he had his interview with Casimir-Perier, he stated that he hadn't had time to speak to him about the confessions. As a matter of fact, however, it was on this very matter that the President of the Republic had sent for him. On the other hand, he was obliged to agree that he had told Forzinetti that Dreyfus had made no confession. The legend of the confessions was crumbling

to pieces to such an extent that Mercier and Gonse began to hedge a little. The former explained that he had quite forgotten to put Dreyfus's confessions on record in 1895. The latter acknowledged that he had omitted to mention them to Picquart when, in 1896, the latter had spoken to him about the possibility of Dreyfus's innocence.

Although he had been sent for, Esterhazy thought it as well not to put in an appearance at Rennes. In his absence, the evidence he had given before the Criminal Court was read out on Jouaust's instruction. Gonse declared that there was no truth in Esterhazy's assertion, and stated definitely that he had never served under Sandherr or on the General Staff. Some witnesses testified to his being an adventurer and a swindler. The detective Desvernine told how he had dogged him one day, and found that he was bound for the German Embassy. Emile Picot, the mathematician, said that he had had it from Colonel Schneider, the Austrian military attaché, that Esterhazy, whose pay had been cut off by Schwartzkoppen, had endeavoured to get him to take him on again; and that accounted for the *petit bleu*. Lieutenant Bernheim deposed that he had lent him a little book on firing, and had never had it back. Mercier here intervened to explain that this little book had no connection with the manual previously referred to in the case.

Esterhazy, who was carefully following the proceedings from London, replied in letter upon letter to the aspersions and charges of which he was the object. Some of these letters were read out in Court. They were nothing but a tissue of lies and contradictory assertions: "Bertillon was demented; Paraf-Javal an idiot; and all the generals, with the single exception of Mercier, were skunks; Dreyfus was a scoundrel."

Insults were followed by threats. He was going to send Demange some documents that would make the General Staff laugh on the wrong side of their faces. Finally, Jouaust received a letter in which Esterhazy said the *bordereau* was not the only proof that Dreyfus was guilty; it was shown in other things which Mercier ought to have said and had not.

He went on to say that the document which he himself had got was a danger to the country because, if it were published, together with a facsimile of the handwriting, it might compel France to choose between climbing down or going to war.

Thus Esterhazy, in his turn also, gave a new lease of life to the *bordereau annoté*, the story of which continued to circulate behind the scenes. In view of the persistence of these rumours, Waldeck-Rousseau conceived the idea of asking the German Government whether it would consent to forward him, through the usual diplomatic channels, some of the documents which, after Dreyfus had departed for Devil's Island, had been handed over by Esterhazy to Schwartzkoppen.

He accordingly addressed himself to Count von Bülow, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Berlin, who referred the matter to the Emperor.

Von Bülow eventually replied that he would have been happy to render a service to the French Government, but that unfortunately the reception that had been accorded by the French Press to his official statement "that Germany had never, directly or indirectly, had relations with Dreyfus," made it, in the Emperor's view, impossible for the German Government to intervene in what was purely a French domestic affair. Waldeck-Rousseau returned to the charge, but to no avail.

The case was drawing to an end when, during the sitting of the Court on September 4th, an unexpected incident occurred. An ex-officer in the Austrian army called Cernuski had written to the presiding Judge on the Court-Martial asking that his evidence might be heard. Jouaust, availing himself of his discretionary powers, decided that this new witness should be heard, but informally, merely as a matter of interest, and not upon oath.

Cernuski, who had been living in Paris for the past four years, boasted that he was a descendant of a Serbian dynasty of the tenth century. In November 1895 he had married the daughter of a natural son of the Comte Sérurier, a

Marshal of the Empire. He was an adventurer, and none too scrupulous at that. His mother had died in an asylum, and he himself was rather queer in the head. Indeed, before deserting from the army, he had been in one of the Prague hospitals, undergoing treatment for some sort of mental trouble. For some time he had lived on his wife's dowry, but that being exhausted, he had resumed his old gambling habits. In the more than dubious atmosphere of these flash gaming hells he had, so he gave out, run across an old college friend named Stanislas Przyborowski, a gambler like himself, and a spy. This Przyborowski had formerly had a berth in the Austrian railways, and had kept up a connection with a superintendent inspector named August Mosetig. In 1898 he had taken up with a Bavarian, Mathilde Baumler, who was a professional spy. Lastly, an ex-German lieutenant, Helmuth Wessel by name, who was in the habit of giving information to the French General Staff and had been obliged to clear out of his own country, completed the trio. It was borne in on these three spies that the General Staff, whose case was crumbling away more and more every day, would welcome a bit of new and damning evidence against Dreyfus; so, scenting a little bit of money for themselves, they put Cernuski up to a few things he could say with effect.

Shortly before the Rennes trial Cernuski had found himself in a very tight corner indeed. Over head and ears in debt to his tradesmen, he had been compelled to give up the ground-floor flat he had at Passy, and go and live with his wife in furnished apartments. It was at this crisis in his fortunes that he thought of Quesnay de Beaurepaire, who, voluntarily taking it upon himself to assist the General Staff, was always on the look-out for something that would tell against Dreyfus. Cernuski went to see him, and told him that in September 1894, a short time before Dreyfus was arrested, he had seen on the table of a German officer who was on his way through Paris a number of papers from the French War Office. The officer had told him that the man from whom he had got them was "that swine of a Jew."

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Shortly before Cernuski's visit, Quesnay had had a hoax played on him by a bohemian of the Quartier Latin named Karl, who had brought him a whole bundle of damning things against Dreyfus. Quesnay had made them the subject of two long articles in the *Echo de Paris*. Unfortunately, a week later Karl had revealed his own hoax in an article in the *Figaro*, which sent Paris into fits of laughter. Notwithstanding this uncomfortable experience, Quesnay took Cernuski quite seriously, and implored him to go and give evidence at Rennes.

This was how it came about that, after a little hesitation, Cernuski made up his mind and wrote to Jouaust, on August 20th, a memorandum in which he declared that he knew the names of some five or six people in the pay of different nations which had been divulged to him in August 1894 by a professional diplomat. A month later what had then been told him had been confirmed by a German officer of high rank who was passing through Paris at the time, and who, according to him, vouchsafed the additional information that the most important of these spies was Dreyfus. To prove his assertion, he had shown him some military documents of the gravest moment, mobilization charts, plans of the Eastern Railway System, and so on and so forth. Now, it was in the beginning of November 1894 that the newspapers came out with the tidings of Dreyfus's arrest. Furthermore, somewhere towards the end of 1896 he had sent an account of these matters to the War Office and urged Jouaust to look for it.

When this rigmarole first came into his possession, Jouaust paid no attention to it. As the looked-for reply failed to arrive, Cernuski, under pressure from his wife, and also from de Quesnay, proceeded to Rennes on September 2nd and insisted on being allowed to give evidence.

On being ushered into the Court room, he apologized for his bad French—that was all humbug—and requested the presiding Judge to read his statement, which was none other than the long story we have outlined above. The reading

over, Jouaust asked him if he had anything else to impart. Cernuski said he had indeed, but that he would only say it behind closed doors. What he had to tell was heard *in camera* on September 6th. After taking the oath, Cernuski gave the names of his informers; one, the officer of high rank, was none other than a lieutenant of the name of Schoenebeck; the other was a fellow-countryman of his named Adamovitch, who, he gave out, had had his information from a diplomat, or more precisely from Albert Mosetig, a high official at the Austrian Court. Then he also gave the names of certain spies which, according to his own story, he had put down on paper at the time. They were Hofmann, Guénée, Crémieu-Foa, Maurice Weil, and Loeb or Lebel. Furthermore, he said that in Geneva one day he had mistaken a person who was in company with Schoenebeck for Dreyfus; but now that he saw Dreyfus himself face to face he realized that he had been mistaken.

Jouaust had requested the War Office to let him have the memorandum which Cernuski said he had sent in at the close of 1896. It was found right enough, but it bore only one name, Hofmann. Meanwhile, in the interval between September 2nd and 6th the police had been making inquiries. Jouaust read the report which de Gallifet had sent him, and which presented Cernuski in his true colours, namely as a schemer up to his eyes in debt who hobnobbed with spies and gamblers. That was the end of Cernuski, in whom Quesnay and the General Staff had put their trust.

Seeing that his opponents were not above having recourse to a foreigner for evidence, Labori took it upon himself to ask Schwartzkoppen and Panizzardi to come and give evidence, and their respective sovereigns to give them leave to do so. But his telegrams remained unanswered. Nevertheless, in order to give some indirect satisfaction to Waldeck-Rousseau, the Emperor of Germany caused the following note to appear in the Imperial Monitor of September 8th:

“We are authorized to repeat those statements regarding Captain Dreyfus which the Imperial Govern-

ment, while scrupulously refraining from interfering with the domestic concerns of a foreign Power, has felt itself compelled to make in order to safeguard its own dignity and the interests of common humanity.

"The Ambassador, Prince von Munster, forwarded by command of the Emperor in December 1894, and in January 1895 to M. Hanotaux, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Dupuy, the Prime Minister, and to the President of the Republic, M. Casimir-Perier, reiterated declarations that the German Embassy in France had never entertained relations, direct or indirect, with Captain Dreyfus.

"M. von Bülow, Secretary of State, expressed himself as follows before a committee of the Reichstag on January 24, 1898: 'I declare in the most categorical fashion that between ex-Captain Dreyfus, formerly of the French Army and now a prisoner on Devil's Island, and any German organizations whatever there never has existed any sort or kind of relation or connection.' "

M. Paléologue, on behalf of the Foreign Office, communicated this note to the Judges on September 9th, before the final sitting.

The concluding evidence was heard on the 7th, and the latter part of the sitting was taken up with Carrière's speech for the prosecution, which lasted an hour and a half. Not being used to making speeches, he expressed himself haltingly, left some of his sentences uncompleted, and kept waving his arms about like a forlorn and melancholy flamingo. His whole argument consisted of a repetition of what the witnesses for the General Staff had already said. He had no very definite opinion about the *bordereau*, seeing that the handwriting experts were unable to agree among themselves. . . . It was childish to suppose that Schwartzkoppen would have had recourse to such a muddle-headed individual as Esterhazy. . . . On the other hand, Dreyfus was at the fountain-head of information. . . . Val Carlos

was a perfectly straightforward man, an officer of the Legion of Honour, a friend to France. . . . As for the *petit bleu*, everyone could think as he liked, therefore there was nothing more to be said about it. And he wound up by saying, "In my heart and conscience, I declare to you that Dreyfus is guilty."

Labori, who was to have spoken, did not do so. His bellicose attitude, so some people said, and the imperious and violent tone of some of his rejoinders had alienated the Judges. Moreover, in view of the collapse of the case for the prosecution, the supporters of Dreyfus thought a verdict of acquittal was a foregone conclusion. Fearing that Labori's speech would amount merely to a frontal attack on Mercier and would rouse the hostility of the Judges, they had begged him to renounce his right to speak. Labori deferred to their wishes, though not without regret and a certain degree of bitterness.

The speech was entrusted to Demange. His line of argument was a masterpiece of persuasiveness, of deep feeling and clearness, and it was delivered in a quiet conversational tone. In order to bring the defects of the Army chiefs into stronger relief, he depicted them all as upright officers and honourable men but with minds rather prone to see guilt where guilt was not. Esterhazy was more a swindler than a traitor. Henry was not one of his accomplices. The Judges at the 1894 trial were rather handicapped; they had not seen Esterhazy's writing. "You, gentlemen, *have* seen it, and it should be to you a guiding thread." Then he painted Dreyfus in colours so tragic and so moving that many of the Judges were unable to conceal their tears. It was midday when Demange brought his speech to a close. As the Government representative had signified his intention to reply, the sitting was adjourned until three in the afternoon. In a brief reply, Carrière declared that in criminal affairs proof need not take any particular legal form. In the present case it did not reside in this point or in that—it was everywhere, it was in the thing as a whole. Therefore

the law did not require juries to render an account of the particular way in which they had arrived at their conviction; it merely asked them to say what that conviction was.

Demange, who saw clearly enough the treacherous intent of this short lecture on law, replied, "I know that you need only render account for your verdict to your conscience and to God. . . . But upright men, conscientious men will never elevate to the level of a proof what are but possibilities or presumptions. Gentlemen, I trust in you."

Finally, Dreyfus, gathering all his strength for one supreme effort, declared that he trusted to his comrades' sense of justice, and once more proclaimed that he was innocent.

The Judges then filed out into the council chamber. An hour later they came back into Court, and Jouaust, the presiding Judge, read the verdict. By a majority of five to two the accused was pronounced guilty. Nevertheless, extenuating circumstances were recognized by five votes to two, and the term of imprisonment was fixed at ten years. In conclusion, the Court unanimously demanded that the prisoner should be spared any further ceremony of degradation.

It was afterwards learnt that the two Judges who had declared themselves in favour of an acquittal were Commandant de Bréon and Colonel Jouaust, and that the two officers who had dissented from the proposal to allow extenuating circumstances were Captains Profilet and Beauvais.

The attitude adopted by Commandant de Bréon was the more worthy of praise in that the officer in question was a fervent Catholic and anti-Semite, and had sent his subscription on December 16, 1898, to the list opened by the *Libre Parole* in favour of Henry's widow. When his brother, who was curé of a certain parish in Paris and belonged to the little group of priests who supported Dreyfus, learned that he was to be a member of the Court-Martial, he had enjoined him to judge in accordance with the dictates of his conscience. Every morning, on his way to the Court,



MAÎTRES DEMANGE (*left*) AND LABORI
(DREYFUS'S ADVOCATES)

Commandant de Bréon went into a church and prayed that God would enlighten him.

The Rennes verdict created profound amazement, not only in France but in every foreign country. The anti-Semites, for whom Dreyfus was still a traitor, accepted the "extenuating circumstances" and the reduction of the penalty to ten years with a very ill grace. The supporters of Dreyfus, overwhelmed by such flagrant injustice, proclaimed their indignation to the world. Abroad, everybody was convinced that Dreyfus was innocent, and there was a veritable wave of indignation against France. In Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, in the United States and in Norway there were great popular manifestations, and police protection had to be called in for French Consulates and Embassies.

In the *Aurore* of September 12th, Zola published an article in which he breathed out all his indignation at the monstrous verdict of the Court-Martial.

"We have seen," he said, "the most extraordinary conglomeration of outrages upon truth and justice. A group of witnesses deciding what turn the discussion should take, taking measures each night for the trap that was to be laid for the morrow, terrorizing and insulting those who contradicted them, insolently displaying their gold lace and their gorgeous uniforms. . . .

"A grotesque Public Prosecutor passing all bounds of imbecility, bequeathing to future historians judicial proceedings whose stupid and murderous inanity will remain an eternal source of stupefaction, so cruel and so obstinate as to seem almost mechanical, the product of some human animal as yet unclassified. . . ."

On the morrow of the verdict the members of the Government took stock of the situation. Waldeck-Rousseau and Monis were in favour of bringing the matter before the Supreme Court of Appeal. But de Gallifet persuaded them that to refer the case to yet another Court-Martial would only

bring about another condemnation. This opinion was shared by other members of the Government. Waldeck-Rousseau, before coming to a decision, resolved to consult Maître Mornard, who had followed carefully the proceedings of the Court-Martial. Mornard told him that he had visited Dreyfus every day in his prison, and was convinced that it would be to condemn him to an early death if he were kept any longer in confinement. If he was to live, he must be set free immediately.

Waldeck-Rousseau replied that a free pardon was possible, but before it was granted they would have to make certain that Dreyfus, his family, his counsel, and his friends would accept it. Clemenceau, Jaurès, Yves Guyot, Labori, and Picquart himself opposed the idea of a pardon. Dreyfus once at liberty, back in the bosom of his family, with his wife and children about him—that would be the end of the whole thing. In the eyes of his supporters, whose numbers had increased since the Rennes verdict was made known, Dreyfus would cease to be the noble victim for whom they were struggling.

On the other hand, Joseph Reinach, Bernard Lazare, and Victor Simond appealed to sentiment of humanity, and said that at all costs the victim's life must be saved. All through the trial Dreyfus had spared himself no effort, no toil; but the verdict had broken him, and now, for the first time, with the fear of death upon him, he had begged his brother to bring him his children, whom he had not seen for five years and who had been told that their father had gone away on a long journey.

In the end, those who were in favour of a pardon carried the day. It was agreed that Dreyfus should forgo his right of appeal. On September 19th Emile Loubet signed the decree granting Dreyfus remission of the remainder of the ten years' imprisonment inflicted upon him by the verdict of the Rennes Court-Martial.

That same night the Chief Commissioner of Police came to fetch Dreyfus from the prison, and conveyed him in a

carriage to a station in the neighbourhood of Rennes, where they took train for Nantes. There Mathieu Dreyfus was awaiting his brother, and went with him via Bordeaux and Avignon to Carpentras, where their elder sister, Madame Valabrègue, had an estate at Villemarie, not far from the town.

Just as the two brothers were reaching their destination, after their long journey, the first news that greeted them was the death of Scheurer-Kestner.

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The verdict of the Rennes Court-Martial satisfied no one. For those who, in spite of the evidence, persisted in the belief that Dreyfus was a traitor, the remission of his sentence and his release from prison was a crying injustice. Those—and their numbers were increasing—who were convinced that he had been unjustly condemned and subjected to unmerited torture, regarded the verdict not only as a scandal but, like Zola, as a monumental absurdity. It was in vain that de Gallifet circularized the Army leaders telling them that the incident was closed, the "Affair" dead and buried. It was useless to cry "peace" where there was no peace.

Waldeck-Rousseau, sick to death of a quarrel that had left his country like a house divided against itself, of a feud that had split France into two opposing camps, was all for proclaiming an amnesty. Let both parties lay down their arms, let there be peace with honour on both sides, and above all let there be no more mention of this terrible Affair. Then perhaps Parliament would be able to get on with its normal and legitimate business, the government of the country. "The Amnesty," he said, in a masterly oration, "neither judges nor accuses. It declares no man innocent or guilty, neither does it condemn; it simply ignores, and is conceived solely in the interests of the common weal." Then, aiming a shaft at Mercier, he continued in solemn tones, "No duty transcends the safeguarding of the law, and

particularly the law of all civilized peoples, the law which enjoins that an accused man, even if he be a guilty one, shall not be stabbed in the back, unawares, by an adversary skulking in the dark." He concluded with these words: "The Justice which sits enthroned in the Courts of Law is not the only Justice; there is another Justice, born of the collective conscience of all mankind and handed down through the ages, a Justice which inculcates its lessons on the hearts of all men and has taken its place in the Temple of History."

Noble words and a praiseworthy object. Alas! it was but "to spread the compost on the weeds, to make them ranker." "The Amnesty," said Zola scornfully, in a letter written on the eve of the debate in the Senate and published in *l'Aurore* of May 29, 1900, "the amnesty is directed against the upholders of the Law, so that the real criminals may go unpunished, closing our mouths by an act of insulting and hypocritical clemency, thrusting pell-mell into one and the same sack good men and scoundrels, a crowning equivocation that will put the finishing touch on the disintegration of the national conscience!"

Nevertheless, after prolonged delay, the amnesty was voted and proclaimed, with the result that all pending litigation automatically came to an end. Dreyfus alone was excluded from the operation of the measure, it being the Government's desire to leave the way open for him to apply for a revision of the verdict passed on him at Rennes. Eager to avail himself of this right at the earliest possible moment, Dreyfus, taking advantage of a series of articles which Rochefort had recently been writing on the subject of the *bordereau annoté* (the *bordereau* with notes by the German Emperor), wrote to Waldeck-Rousseau on December 26th as follows:

"My innocence is absolute, and till my last breath I shall leave no stone unturned to establish it in the eyes of the law. I am no more responsible for the *bordereau* annotated by the German Emperor, which is a forgery,

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than I am for the original and authentic *bordereau*, which was Esterhazy's. With the exception of Henry, all the chief instigators of my iniquitous condemnation are still alive. I have not been despoiled of all my rights. I still retain the right which belongs to every man, the right to defend his good name and to make known the truth. Therefore I still have a right, Monsieur le Président, to request that you will grant an inquiry, and I beg hereby to make that request."

Waldeck-Rousseau did not think it incumbent upon him to answer this letter, and it gave rise to no discussion in the Press. The hour and the circumstances were alike unfavourable for an immediate reopening of the case. For the majority of people, the Law had said its last word. Moreover, the great Exhibition, which with its marvellous splendours had captured the imagination of all Paris, had diverted popular attention from political matters. The case which had shaken France to its foundations, shattering friendships and setting kinsman against kinsman, seemed at long last to have passed into the silent realms of history.

CHAPTER VIII

DEATH OF ZOLA.—SYVETON'S ELECTION DECLARED INVALID.—
A SPEECH BY JAURÈS.—THE INVESTIGATIONS OF CAPTAIN TARGE.
—FRESH FORGERIES BROUGHT TO LIGHT.—THE RENNES VERDICT
CALLED IN QUESTION.

ALTHOUGH silence had now descended upon the "Affaire Dreyfus," a melancholy event occurred to recall it to public memory. After spending the summer on their estate at Médan, Zola and his wife returned to their house in Paris on September 28th. The air being damp and chilly, they had a fire lighted in their bedroom. Owing to some obstruction in the chimney, fumes of carbon-monoxide escaped into the room. In the middle of the night Madame Zola, experiencing some difficulty in breathing, arose and went into an adjoining room to get a little fresh air; she then came back and got into bed again. A little while later Zola got up, no doubt to open the window, but his strength failed him, and he collapsed and fell at the foot of the bed. His wife, who by this time had almost lost consciousness, was powerless to help him. Next morning the servant, having knocked at the door in vain, had it forced open by a locksmith. Madame Zola was on the point of death, and her husband lay on the floor beside the bed. A neighbouring doctor, Dr. Rabion, was hastily summoned, and he and Dr. Lenonmand, the police surgeon, arrived together only to find that the famous author was dead.

The funeral took place on October 5th. A company of the 28th Regiment of the Line, under the command of Captain Olivier, formed a guard of honour as the body was brought from the house, after which the hearse, followed by several thousands of people, Dreyfus among them, proceeded to the cemetery at Montmartre. Three speeches were delivered at the graveside, one by Chaumjé, Minister of Public Instruction, the second by Abel Hermant, President of the *Société des gens de lettres*, the third by Anatole France,

who, recalling the part played by Zola in the Dreyfus case, said that it had been "a moment in the consciousness of humanity."

While, so far as the public were concerned, the Dreyfus case was slumbering, Mathieu Dreyfus never wearied in his quest for the "new fact" which would permit his brother to apply for a revision of the finding of the Rennes Court-Martial. Considering the remarkable character of the verdict there pronounced, he thought it very evident that some backstairs trickery had influenced the vote of the five Judges who had pronounced themselves in favour of a verdict of guilty. His first step was to try to find out who the two Judges were that had been in favour of an acquittal. One of them was undoubtedly Commandant de Bréon, whose kindly attitude while the case was in progress, and subsequent ostracism after it was over, left no room for uncertainty on that score. The other, he thought, must be Captain Beauvais who, before the verdict was delivered, had gone over to Demange and, with tears in his eyes, had taken his hands in his. But as a matter of fact, while Mathieu Dreyfus was pursuing his investigations, Captain Beauvais, whom his colleagues suspected of having voted for an acquittal, told them that the two Judges who had done so were de Bréon and Jouaust.

Having got to know this, Mathieu Dreyfus endeavoured, through a friend, to get Jouaust to make a pronouncement; but Jouaust, who had just retired from the Army and desired to enjoy his leisure undisturbed, declined to make any formal statement, merely saying, "I am writing my memoirs. People will know the truth when I am dead."

Having met with no success in the case of Jouaust, and not caring to apply to de Bréon, Mathieu Dreyfus had recourse to Commandant Merle, who also had just retired and had gone to live at Montpellier. He got a friend of his, Dr. Roger Dumas, who went to Montpellier every year for his holidays, to try to get Merle to speak. There were some meetings between the two men during October 1902.

Dr. Dumas having told Merle that he had followed the case carefully from day to day, and that if he had been one of the Judges he would have voted for an acquittal, the Commandant replied:

"It was impossible for anyone but a Judge to come to a conclusion."

"How was that," retorted the doctor, "since the whole case was heard in public?"

"Ah, but you're wrong. We had information that you couldn't have known about, and that is what decided us."

"Well, anyhow, Esterhazy wrote the *bordereau*. There is no getting away from that."

"Oh, leave the *bordereau* and Esterhazy out of it."

"Well, then, was there any truth in that tale of a *bordereau* on thick paper with some of the Emperor's notes on it in which Dreyfus was mentioned by name?"

"What . . . What's that you say? Better not go talking about a thing like that."

Dr. Dumas pressed the point. He told Merle that the Dreyfus family were aiming at getting a fresh inquiry started, that Princess Mathilde had been told things in confidence by General de Boisdeffre about this *bordereau*, and that Emile Ollivier swore he had seen a photograph of it. But Merle, thinking he had already said too much, refused to go any further.

Mathieu Dreyfus reported this conversation to some of his friends, such as Trarieux, Reinach, Clemenceau, Leblois, and Leblois mentioned it to Jaurès. Though political activities were again absorbing his energies, Jaurès continued to take a passionate interest in the Affair. In his view, the Rennes verdict had settled nothing, and, if the forces of nationalism were to be finally broken, it would only be by making the innocence of Dreyfus clear and unmistakable to the French people as a whole.

In the course of the elections of 1902, one of the leaders

of the *Patrie Française*, Gabriel Syveton, who was standing for the Second Arrondissement of Paris, had drawn up a poster in which he referred to the Waldeck-Rousseau Government as the "Foreigners' Party." In spite of the fact that he had been elected on the first ballot by a big majority, the validity of his election was called in question. The inquiry lasted several months, and the report of the commission did not come up for consideration until April 6, 1903.

Jaurès delivered a speech contesting the conclusions of the *rapporteur*, which were favourable to the candidate. His speech lasted the whole of the hearing on the 6th and went on for two more hours the next day. The question of Syveton's election hardly entered into the matter at all. Jaurès merely made it the pretext for what he wanted to say. His object was to show that the real "Foreigners' Party" was not the Republican Party but the adherents of the *Patrie Française* group. As against Syveton's poster, he cited the *bordereau annoté* as an example of how the Nationalists did not hesitate to avail themselves of a forgery to gain their ends.

Accordingly, Jaurès explained to the deputies, who for the most part were in the dark about it, the part which had been played behind the scenes by this mysterious document. In November 1897 the Princess Mathilde, who was then inclined to believe that Dreyfus was innocent, had been told in confidence about its existence by General de Boisdeffre. According to him, Colonel Stoffel, a former attaché at the French Embassy in Berlin before the war of 1870, had told two friends of his, Baron Rey-Roise and Ferlet de Bourbonne, that Count von Munster had said something to him about some notes that had been written by the Emperor on a *bordereau* which Casimir-Perier had restored to the German Embassy. He had told the same story to Robert Mitchel, on the staff of the *Gaulois*.

Ferlet de Bourbonne had passed on this conversation to Séverine, who wrote an article about it in the *Fronde*.

Some time after the Rennes trial Emile Olivier, the ex-Minister, when he was at Vittel had told a story something like it to a number of different people.

This was how a certain small and fashionable clique had become acquainted with the legend of the *bordereau annoté*. Subsequently, it became more or less public property. On February 16, 1898, Millevoye had been one of the first to refer to it at a public meeting at Suresnes. Then the Nationalist Press had got hold of it, and Jaurès quoted numerous references to it in various papers—*l'Intransigeant*, *La Libre Parole*, *La Patrie*, *La Croix*, *Le Petit Journal*, *La Presse*, etc.

He reminded his audience that at the beginning of the Rennes trial *Le Petit Caporal*, in its issue of August 3, 1899, came out with this headline, "The German Emperor and the Dreyfus Case. The Secret Document," and proceeded to announce that it was publishing on the following day "a communication of the gravest importance regarding the secret document in the Dreyfus Case."

But the article, for which the paper was indebted to Ferlet de Bourbonne, never appeared. Mercier had asked the paper not to publish anything that was to figure in the indictment at Rennes.

In the course of Jaurès's speech an incident occurred which brought about a scene between Brisson and Cavaignac. Towards the end of the first sitting Jaurès had come to the episode of Henry's confessions. He reminded his hearers of the profound impression which these confessions and the suicide of the forger had had upon the public at large. Then he read out the letter in which General de Pellieux, realizing that he had been the dupe of dishonourable men who had set him to work on the basis of documents which they knew to be forged, had asked Cavaignac to put him on half-pay. This letter was not, strictly speaking, unpublished, because the *Gaulois*—as we have already recorded—had given the gist of it in its issue of September 2, 1898. But at that time no one took any particular heed of it, and

as de Pellieux did not follow up what he had said about resignation, the story as narrated by the newspaper passed without comment.

No sooner had Jaurès finished his speech than Brisson sprang to his feet. "I," he said, "was Prime Minister at the time, and I say that the Government never had any knowledge of that letter." In the midst of the loud applause with which this speech was greeted by the Left, Cavaignac rose and declared that he had never paid the smallest attention to what General de Pellieux had said about his superiors; that he shouldered full responsibility for everything that had occurred under his administration, and that in the men who had caused de Pellieux to act on the strength of documents that were forgeries he reposed the fullest confidence.

Brisson replied by a statement of fact; Cavaignac, he said, had known about the discovery of Henry's forgery on August 14th, yet it was not until the 30th that he communicated this knowledge to the Prime Minister. Thinking over the matter and wondering what could have been the reason for this silence, he discovered it in the journey which Cavaignac made to le Mans on the 23rd, whither he went in order to take counsel with Mercier.

- Cavaignac retorted that he was under no obligation to make mention of the forgery until he was quite certain in his own mind that a forgery there had been, and this certainty had by no means been his until Henry had made his confession. He went on to say that he had never seen, far less concealed, the so-called annotated *bordereau*, for no one at the War Office had ever mentioned it to him.

It was no easy matter for Cavaignac to give these explanations, for he was the target of a continuous fire of interruptions from the Left. It was all very different from that sitting in July 1898, when the speech in which he believed himself to be establishing the fact of Dreyfus's guilt was greeted with almost unanimous applause.

Next day Jaurès brought his discourse to an end by giving utterance to two hopes: one, that the Government

would institute an inquiry into the conduct of the Intelligence Department, for it was there that the "monstrous forgery" had been carried out; the other, that by its disqualification of Syveton the Chamber would express its condemnation of the abominable electioneering calumnies whereby it had been attempted to cast discredit on the Republican Party.

Speaking on behalf of the Government, General André, who had succeeded de Gallifet as Minister for War, agreed to an inquiry and said that he would expedite the necessary investigations by getting two magistrates to collaborate with him in the task of scrutinizing the documents.

Encouraged by this reply, Jaurès moved that the Chamber should put on record the declarations of the Government. This was agreed to; but some of the Socialists, going one better than Jaurès, moved that a general inquiry should be held into the irregularities committed by the high military authorities and into the conduct of Courts-Martial.

Ribot took advantage of this split in the camp to move the previous question. Faced with these three different motions, the Radicals began to hesitate, and finally one of their number, Chapuis, who remained unsympathetic to the Dreyfus case, proposed a motion recording confidence in the Government and forbidding that the Dreyfus Affair be taken out of the sphere of legal jurisdiction. Feeling that a refusal to accept this motion would imperil the existence of his Ministry, Combes agreed that it should be put, and it was carried by 304 to 196. After which Syveton's election was declared invalid by 281 votes to 228.

Following on these debates, Dreyfus appealed to General André to grant an inquiry into the *bordereau annoté* and the evidence given by Cernuski. The task of carrying out this inquiry was entrusted by André to one of his adjutants, a young officer named Targe, who was as resolute as he was able and conscientious. He had plenty of courage, and boldly demanded to see and examine everything, no matter how secret and confidential it was supposed to be. After some weeks of investigation, he brought his chief, not only

all the documents that had figured in the trial at Rennes, but several others which Henry, Gonse, Cuignet, and Rollin had kept in the background because they told in favour of Dreyfus. Among them were the following:

(1) An account given by Commandant de Fontenillat of the conversation he had had with Panizzardi in November 1897, in the course of which the Italian attaché had told him on his word of honour as a soldier that neither he nor Schwartzkoppen had ever had any relations with Dreyfus.

(2) A letter which Lajoux had sent from Berlin to Henry in April 1895, giving a description of Schwartzkoppen's principal agent in Paris, a description which did not apply to Dreyfus at all, but was admirably suited to Esterhazy.

(3) Three notes from Schwartzkoppen on the traffic in secret plans, for which he was paying twenty francs a sheet. These transactions had started in 1892, before Dreyfus had gone into the department, and it had continued after his condemnation.

With these documents before him, General André, who was not at all conversant with the affair, and consequently had no views of his own concerning it, determined to examine the secret *dossier* for himself. As chance would have it, he lighted first upon a couple of documents which seemed to him to tell against Dreyfus. One was a copy of a portion of a confidential lecture at the École de Guerre, written out by Count d'Arco; the other was the note annexed thereto, dated November 20, 1898, wherein Rollin and Cuignet certified that this copy tallied with a series of pages which were missing from the copy discovered in the possession of Dreyfus in 1894. André questioned Targe about this, and Targe at once produced the note dated March 1899, in which Cuignet and Rollin acknowledged they had made a mistake. Targe also brought him the complete text of the lectures which Dreyfus had attended, which appertained to the period 1890-2. Comparing this with the copy made by Count d'Arco, André saw at once that the latter belonged to the period 1892-4. He then sent for Gribelin, and asked

him to state whether the copy found in Dreyfus's possession was complete or not. Gribelin swore on his honour that it was.

Continuing his investigations, General André discovered that two important documents in the secret *dossier*, as well as the registers of the Intelligence Department, had been tampered with by Henry.

The first of these faked documents was the letter from Panizzardi to Schwartzkoppen, finishing up with the words, "I tell you, I shall soon have the railway plans." On this letter the date April 1894 had been written by Henry. During the Rennes trial Mercier, de Boisdeffre, Gonse, and Cuignet had all made use of this document to prove that Dreyfus had an intimate knowledge of the railway transport arrangements. Mercier even asserted that he had himself put this particular document into the secret *dossier* in 1894.

Meanwhile, Captain Targe had been making a thorough search of the archives, and had succeeded in unearthing the *bordereaux* signed by Sandherr, and by him dated April 1, 1895. To each of these *bordereaux* was attached a copy made by Gribelin of the letter from Panizzardi, the copy bearing a note of the day and hour, viz. March 28th, 3 p.m. On comparing the copy with the original, André and Targe both perceived that Henry had torn off the upper part of the letter with the correct date upon it, viz. 1895—at which time Dreyfus was away on Devil's Island—and had written in 1894 in its stead. Asked by André if he knew the writing, Gribelin at once identified it as Henry's.

Further than this, on the same date, March 28th, at 6 p.m., Panizzardi had sent Schwartzkoppen a second letter worded as follows:

"I beg you, dear friend, to send me as much as you have copied about the telemeter, for as I told you in the letter which my man took round to you at three this afternoon, I am in need of it, as I have to get the whole thing off to Rome."

Sandherr had got Gribelin to make a copy of this letter, and Gribelin agreed that he had done so on March 31, or April 1, 1895, thus confirming the date of the letter about the railways.

After reading these two letters, Schwartzkoppen had torn them up and thrown the pieces into the waste-paper basket, where la Bastian had found them.

The other letter that had been tampered with was yet another letter from Panizzardi, a letter addressed to a colleague of Schwartzkoppen's. In the course of his speech of July 7, 1898, Cavaignac had read out this document, in which the Italian military attaché said that D—— had brought him a number of very interesting things. This time again, the copy of this letter, made on the day of its receipt, was found in a *bordereau* dated March 21, 1894, and signed by Sandherr. This copy had on it the initial "P." Henry had erased the "P" and put "D" in its place.

These two forgeries, which had been pressed into the service at Rennes, constituted sufficient grounds to justify a revision of the case inasmuch as having then been used against Dreyfus they were now found to be really in his favour. But these forgeries were not the only reasons for claiming a new trial. The registers of the Intelligence Department had been pretty seriously tampered with. It will be recalled that, on the occasion of the 1894 trial, Henry, who felt the case tottering, had declared that he had been told by a strictly honourable person that one of the officers belonging to the War Office was playing the traitor. Then he had turned towards Dreyfus, and added, "And that traitor stands there!" One of the Judges, Echemann, had asked him the name of his informant. But he had refused to give it. Now the strictly honourable person was none other than the Marquis de Val Carlos, formerly Spanish military attaché.

When Picquart succeeded Sandherr as head of the Intelligence Department, Henry told him that Val Carlos had spoken purely out of love for France. As a matter of

fact, ever since 1894, Val Carlos had been getting a monthly allowance of four hundred francs. His name figured in the registers under the initials V.C. or under the pseudonym Vesigneul. This monthly allowance only came to an end on November 15, 1897, when Mathieu Dreyfus brought his charge against Esterhazy.

Picquart, who then had full confidence in Henry, used to initial his statements without so much as glancing at them. But Henry thought his former chief *had* noticed the initials V.C. He was therefore afraid that something might happen to make Picquart give out that Val Carlos, far from being a strictly honourable person, was only rather a swell sort of detective, receiving Government pay. If this happened, the evidence given by him in 1894, which was based on a lie, would lose all its importance. To ward off this danger Henry had given orders to Gribelin to get a new day-book and copy out again all the accounts for the years 1896 and 1897, replacing the initials V.C. and the name Vesigneul by "Juana." He himself had substituted the letters H.C. for the Marquis's initials on all the registers of an earlier date.

At General André's request, Gribelin showed him all the old registers, and gave him the explanations we have just recorded. He also told how Henry had increased some of the amounts expended by Picquart so as to convey the impression that Picquart was playing ducks and drakes with the secret fund. He also said that it was Henry who had given Esterhazy the famous *document libérateur*. Finally, when he was asked about the *Speranza* dispatch, which had been sent to Picquart when he was in Tunisia, Gribelin said that was du Paty de Clam's doing.

In the course of his search in the archives of the Intelligence Department, Captain Targe came across some interesting things. First, there was the telegram of January 5, 1895, in which Colonel Guérin apprised General Saussier of the degradation ceremony. It read thus: "Dreyfus protested his innocence and cried *Vive la France!* Nothing else to record." Then there was the file of

Boutonnet the spy, showing that the details concerning the loading of the melinite shell had been delivered by him in 1890. Thirdly, there was the *dossier* of Greiner, the spy condemned in 1892 for having handed over the report of the experimental commission at Bourges in the matter of the Robin shell, and lastly the memorandum by Commandant Bayle on the allocation of heavy artillery among the various Army corps, the supposed disappearance of which document, affirmed by Henry, had been attributed to Dreyfus by Mercier, de Boisdeffre, and Gonse in the course of the evidence they gave at Rennes. Search as he would, Targe could not succeed in finding any trace of photographs of the German Emperor's letters or of the annotated *bordereau*.

These investigations had been going on for four months, from May to October 1903. When they were completed, André handed his report to Combes, who passed it on to Vallé, the Minister of Justice, while Dreyfus formulated an application for a new trial, which he based on the perjury of Cernuski and Savignaud on the annotated *bordereau*, and on a letter which Reinach had received from von Munster regarding the relations between Schwartzkoppen and Esterhazy.

Vallé himself examined the papers and submitted Dreyfus's request to the consulting commission, who unanimously agreed that there was ground for a new trial. The Attorney-General was accordingly instructed to submit a report on the Rennes trial to the Court of Appeal.

CHAPTER IX

THE COURT OF APPEAL INVESTIGATES.—THE EVIDENCE OF CAPTAIN TARGE.—WHAT APPEL, TARBOUX, AND HENRY POINCARÉ SAID ABOUT BERTILLON'S SYSTEM.—THE LEGEND OF THE ANNOTATED *BORDEREAU*.—DREYFUS AND RUSSIA.—THE RENNES VERDICT QUASHED.—THE CEREMONY OF REINSTATEMENT.

THE former president of the Criminal Court, Loew, having reached the age of compulsory retirement, had been replaced by Chambareaud on May 13, 1903. The new Attorney-General was Baudouin, who for a long time had presided over the Civil Tribunal of the Seine. Although he had avoided mixing himself up in the case, he had been inclined to take it that Dreyfus was innocent; but since the verdict at Rennes he had gone over to the other view, for he could not conceive how it was possible for an innocent man to be condemned twice over. When orders reached him from the Minister of Justice to proceed to a new trial, he began to make a study of the papers submitted to him. And gradually, as he progressed, the light began to dawn on him; the charges disappeared, conjectures melted into thin air, and the clumsy, heartless frauds became only too evident. In less than a month he drew up his statement of the case, in the course of which he affirmed his conviction that Dreyfus was innocent. Chambareaud entrusted the report to Boyer, who had taken no part in the first revision.

The Criminal Court met in public session on March 3, 1904. Boyer recited his account of the case. He had gone out of his way to make it as concise and dispassionate as possible. He dismissed the annotated *bordereau* from consideration on the grounds that, even if some such forgery had ever existed, it had not been known to, and therefore had not influenced, the Judges at the Rennes Court-Martial. Nor did he allow that Henry's falsification of the registers, or the perjury committed by Cernuski and Savignaud, constituted, in law, any solid ground for ordering a new

trial. The forged Panizzardi letters, however, he *did* admit; since, if they did not afford conclusive evidence that Dreyfus was innocent, they at least made it desirable to have further light on the case.

Baudouin's statement of the case took up two whole sittings. Into it he had sandwiched a complete story of the case, for the benefit of the seven new councillors who had not been present when the case for the first revision was being argued. Like Boyer, he called for a further inquiry, and this time, he said, it would have to be exhaustive and final. Mornard, who appeared for Dreyfus, then addressed the Court.

The decision was announced the same day. The application for a new trial was allowed, and supplementary investigations were ordered to be proceeded with. The Court next ordered that all the papers in the case should be immediately handed in, and the hearing of the witnesses began on March 8th, lasting right on to the end of July.

The first witness to be called was Captain Targe, whose evidence was taken on March 8, 19, and 21, 1904. At the first hearing he handed the Court the following papers, after having read and commented upon them: (1) A note in which attention was drawn to the falsifications carried out by Gribelin, on Gonse's instructions, in the accounts relating to the payments made to Val Carlos; (2) the papers relating to the 1894 trial; and (3) the records regarding Dreyfus's alleged confessions, etc.

The second time he gave evidence Targe declared that General André and he had wondered what they would do if they found themselves face to face with some incontestable proof of Dreyfus's guilt. He went on to say that nothing would have prevented them from making it known. But such proof they had not found. While Cuignet might be content to hold the view that guilt resulted when there was nothing to prove innocence, he, Targe, considered it fairer to say that innocence resulted when there was no proof of guilt.

Having given expression to these ideas, which were

consonant with both reason and justice, Targe detailed, one after another, the six reports which had been drawn up, from October 1897 to June 1898, on the successive secret *dossiers*. He explained the circumstances in which he had discovered that exhibit No. 26, entitled "Concerning Railways," had been ante-dated *April 1894*, whereas it had reached the Intelligence Department in *April 1895*.

Captain Targe's third deposition was concerned with the *dossiers* relating to Esterhazy, Colonel Picquart, the two Zola trials, and Colonel Henry; and on the note concerning the report made by Commandant Bayle, etc. Captain Targe then declared, in the name of the Minister for War, that every document relating to the Dreyfus case, and to all other cases arising therefrom, had been made known to the Court.

Gribelin, who was called upon to explain his position in regard to the accounts, endeavoured to go back on what he had said, but Baudouin confronted him with a report of it in black and white.

Val Carlos, on being examined as to the information he was alleged to have given to Guénée and Henry, in March 1894, to the effect that there was a traitor in the offices of the General Staff, flatly denied that he had ever said any such thing. Questioned as to the monthly remuneration he used to receive, he at first denied that he had taken money, but on being pressed he at last admitted that he had received 1,500 francs to be handed to a fellow-countryman of his whom Henry had asked for some particulars about Cuba. Later on Mercier and de Boisdeffre admitted that, for years past, Val Carlos had been selling documents to the General Staff. The upshot of Val Carlos's evidence was, therefore, either that he had supplied Henry with false information and dared not confess it, or else that Henry, in order to trump up a charge against Dreyfus before the Court-Martial in 1894, had deliberately invented the supposed statement of Val Carlos about there being "a wolf in the fold," and so on.

In view of the part he had played in the early stages of the affair, du Paty was subjected to a prolonged examination. So far from yielding to the evidence, he entrenched himself more deeply than ever in his old false position, taking Baudouin to task and accusing him of lapping up the slanders put about by Picquart and Cuignet. He represented himself as a victim of Gonse, who had sent him forth to render aid to Esterhazy. He reminded the Court how, in 1894, when he had found it impossible to get a confession out of Dreyfus, he had advised de Boisdeffre to abandon the proceedings, and how, when Sandherr had ordered him to draw up a report on the secret documents, he had not given it as his view that Dreyfus was guilty, but had merely said that the facts above-mentioned *might possibly* apply to him.

In the course of the three occasions on which he was examined, and in reply to questions put to him, he committed himself to the following statements:

(1) *The report on the Secret Documents.* In 1894 he had, at the request of Mercier and Sandherr, drawn up a report designed to set forth the correlation which might possibly be found to exist between the four or five documents that composed the secret *dossier*. But this report was copied out afresh, with a few modifications introduced by his chiefs, and it was this copy that had accompanied the secret *dossier* when it was submitted to the Judges in the Council Chamber.

(2) *His connection with Esterhazy.* He admitted that he had entered into relations with Esterhazy in 1897, some months before the latter's case came on. But this had been at Gonse's request. "My relations with Esterhazy," he added, "were instigated by my superiors. They were recognized, and turned to account, by them."

(3) *On the memorandum in the two handwritings.* He acknowledged the authorship of this memorandum, whereby, in November 1897, he had given instructions

to Henry, when the latter was about to come up before the Court of Inquiry, regarding what he had got to say to General de Pellieux. And when he was asked by the Attorney-General to explain why, after beginning the letter in printed characters, he had gone on with it in a running hand, du Paty's answer was that he didn't see the use of letting a third party recognize his writing.

(4) *On the articles in the "Éclair" and the "Libre Parole," and on the "Blanche" and "Speranza" telegrams.*—He denied that he had written the article in the *Éclair* of September 10, 1896. On the other hand, he admitted that he had read and corrected a draft of the article which the *Libre Parole* published on November 15, 1897, over the signature *Dixi*. He denied that he had in any way inspired the *Blanche* and *Speranza* telegrams.

(5) *On Esterhazy's letters to Félix Faure.* He confessed to having given Esterhazy the gist of the first letter he sent to the President of the Republic, asking for his protection against the attacks which were being made upon him. The other two letters, he said, must have been dictated by Henry.

(6) *On the "document libérateur."* He had never seen this document, nor did he believe that Esterhazy had ever received it. The whole thing looked to him like a trumped-up affair staged by someone in the War Office.

(7) *On the annotated "bordereau."* He was thoroughly convinced that no such *bordereau* had ever existed. If it did exist, it was a forgery. The whole story was incredible.

After giving these explanations in answer to the questions put to him, du Paty volunteered the statement that if, in 1894, he had had any doubts about Dreyfus's guilt, he had none whatever now. He was convinced of it owing to a detail which had escaped him at the time, but which had just been brought to his notice by Bertillon. This was his discovery: On the right-hand side of the *bordereau*, looking

at it face upwards, there was a piece cut out with a pair of scissors. Now, a precisely similar cut appeared on a letter of Mathieu Dreyfus's which had been found in his brother's blotting-book. Bertillon had discovered that if these two cuts were superimposed, one upon the other, they were, in shape, size, and direction, precisely and mathematically identical. From this he had inferred that they were signs of recognition between the two correspondents, and, inasmuch as the letters from Mathieu Dreyfus which were found in his brother's blotting-book could not have come from the German Embassy, Bertillon concluded that the *bordereau* at that Embassy had come from Dreyfus. Such was the "fresh proof" on which du Paty de Clam's conviction reposed.

As a matter of fact, the real explanation of the cut in the paper, as was afterwards shown, was much more simple. When Cochefort, who in 1894 had accompanied du Paty on the occasion of the search carried out at Dreyfus's rooms, had finished his task, he took away with him a number of miscellaneous papers, among which were some letters of Mathieu's. All these papers, which had been put away in a filing case, had been pierced with a pair of scissors so that the string to which the seal was attached might be threaded through them. But this detail, which did not come to light until afterwards, was unknown to his Judges when du Paty told them about his latest proof.

The Court did not attach very much weight to Bertillon's far-fetched demonstrations. But they knew that some obscurantists were the more impressed by them for the very reason that they were totally incomprehensible. Before this, at Rennes, Major Corps and Captain Valério had produced similar systems, and all of them, though mutually destructive, alike claimed to show that the *bordereau* was a product of auto-forgery. Realizing that none but men of the highest scientific eminence could reduce the fantastic vagaries of Bertillon and his rivals to their proper level, the Court requested the *Académie des Sciences* to pick out three experts whom they might suitably ask to examine and report on

these systems. The *Académie* designated Darboux its permanent secretary; Appel, Dean of the Faculty of Science; and Henri Poincaré, Professor of the Calculus of Probabilities at the Sorbonne.

These eminent persons gave the matter their due consideration, and after a few months issued a detailed report exposing the absurdity of Bertillon's system. They added that its only defence against criticism was its obscurity, even as the cuttle-fish cloaks itself in a cloud of ink in order to elude its foes.

All this while the Court had been going on with its inquiries. Cuignet's evidence took up ten hours. Taking a leaf out of du Paty's book, he put up a great show of righteous indignation, accusing the Criminal Court of having played a scurvy trick on him in 1899, when they let Tornielli know what he had said in his evidence about Panizzardi's dispatch. He further accused Delcassé and the Post Office of tampering with the said dispatch, the Ambassadors of lying, André and Targe of falsifying documents, etc. Exasperated at such an exhibition of hollow bombast, Baudouin told him that, if he had been Minister for War, he would have routed him out of the Army ages ago.

The former Ministers for War, generals and other officers, all followed in their turn. To have heard them speak, you would have thought that the culpability of Dreyfus was a postulate that did not call for demonstration. It was for Dreyfus to prove his innocence. As the greater number of their arguments had gone to pieces one after another, they took refuge in generalities, in vague, indefinite phrases intended rather to create an atmosphere than to state precise facts. Even so, they disagreed among themselves, and each one brought along his own pet proof. Roget based his conviction on the "relief" which Dreyfus had manifestly displayed at Rennes when one of the witnesses, a man named Lonquét, who had said he had seen him in Brussels in 1894, appeared, after all, a little bit shaky about the date. Nevertheless, he paid a tribute to Picquart's high character,

and admitted that he had been wrong in accusing him of squandering the secret funds. Zurlinden attached great importance to the system of Major Corps. Mercier set still greater store by Bertillon's system, which he professed to regard as absolutely irrefutable, never dreaming that three of the foremost mathematicians in France were very shortly to make hay of it. Billot, who fancied himself still back in 1897, clung to the "*chose jugée*," and said he had never attached much importance to Henry's forgery. De Boisdeffre and Gonse, who followed, were both rather tame.

Although Targe had found no trace of an annotated *bordereau*, and although none of the High Command made mention of it, the Court took the view that some such document must have played a part at Rennes. It therefore caused Dr. Dumas and Major Merle to be examined by proxy in regard to the conversations they had had together in 1902 about the Rennes trial and the annotated *bordereau*. The doctor stuck to what he had then said; the major denied the statement attributed to him.

The Court further examined all those who had propagated the legend of the *bordereau annoté*, as well as anyone else who, by reason of his social or official position, might be expected to know something about the matter. Among these latter was Casimir-Perier. The Nationalist Press had let it get about that for reasons of State he had returned the *bordereau annoté* to the German Ambassador, with whom (it was alleged) he had exchanged a solemn undertaking never to breathe a word about the matter.

Casimir-Perier said this rumour had caused him much pain and annoyance, since it had led people to suppose that he had been a party, active or passive, to a transaction calculated to bring humiliation on his country. Never had anything of the kind taken place between Count von Munster and himself. He had never been asked to return a document, and he certainly had never done so.

All through his Presidency he had made a point of noting down every day the chief events that had taken place during

that day, and he now read out the entry in his diary which gave a summarized account of the talk he had had with the German Ambassador on January 6, 1895. When he came to see him, Count von Munster, so far from asking for the return of any documents, had protested that no document calculated to implicate Germany in the Dreyfus affair could ever have been discovered at his Embassy.

In saying this, von Munster was speaking in perfectly good faith, for, as will afterwards be seen, Schwartzkoppen, who was in direct correspondence with the War Minister in Berlin, had been careful to keep the Ambassador in complete ignorance of his dealings with Esterhazy. Casimir-Perier, who knew that the *bordereau* had certainly been found at the Embassy, could not, for the life of him, explain the enigma. However, von Munster had assured him that a note exonerating his Embassy, as well as all the other Embassies, would give satisfaction in Berlin, and to the issue of that note he had signified his assent. That being satisfactorily arranged, he had gone on, that same evening, to dine at his mother's. But never, all through that interview, had a word been said about a *bordereau annoté*, much less about giving it back. Indeed, the political situation appeared so satisfactory that Hanotaux, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was enjoying a tour in the south of France at the time. The alleged "historic night" of which Mercier had spoken in his evidence, and which he put now in January '95, and now in December '94, was a pure invention on his part.

The evidence of Hanotaux and Dupuy followed similar lines. Jaurès gave a *résumé* of the speech he had delivered in the Chamber on April 7, 1903; then he read out the articles in *l'Intransigeant*, *la Patrie*, *la Croix*, *la Libre Parole*, etc., in which the legend of the *bordereau annoté* had taken form and substance.

When, however, the Court endeavoured to interrogate the writers of these several articles, they one and all seemed to melt into thin air. Rochefort said he had picked up his information just as one *does* pick up information, without

going bail for its accuracy. Millevoye confessed he had never seen a photograph of the document, but the version he had quoted to the meeting at Suresnes, and had afterwards printed in *la Patrie*, had been furnished to him by a distinguished foreigner whose name professional secrecy forbade him to reveal. Papillaud, editor of the *Libre Parole*, refused to give any evidence at all.

Baron Stoffel, when his turn came, at first refused to answer, though no one was better qualified than he to throw light on these dark places. He, indeed, was the man who had told Baron Rey-Roize, in Ferlet de Bourbonne's presence, that he had seen a letter from William to Dreyfus. It was this letter which was afterwards amplified into the *bordereau annoté*. At length, making up his mind to speak, Stoffel declared that he had never told Rey-Roize, nor yet Ferlet de Bourbonne, nor indeed anyone else at all that he had seen a photograph of the *bordereau annoté*. All he had said was that he was sure such a document did exist. He had this on the authority of someone whose name he could not properly divulge. As to the wording of the annotation, he had quoted it from memory, and could not swear to its accuracy.

- Mercier, who had been examined some days before Stoffel concerning the document in question, told them he had never had official cognizance of it, either during his term of office or while in active military employ. It was only a few days before Rennes that Stoffel had said anything to him, not about the *bordereau annoté*, but about a letter from the German Emperor to von Munster, in which something has been said about *cette canaille de D*—. He had cast a doubt on the genuineness of such a document. There had, moreover, never been any question, whether in 1894 or in 1899, of any *bordereau* other than the *bordereau* on thin paper. All the rest was moonshine.

When Baudouin informed Stoffel of what Mercier had said in his evidence, Stoffel replied that he had never told Mercier he had seen a photograph of the Emperor's letter.

So those who had propagated the legend of the *bordereau* and its Imperial annotations now began, one and all, to eat their words. Yet some such forgery must have existed. In the course of a conversation with Paléologue, Henry had said, "There's a letter from the German Emperor"; and in his correspondence with Esterhazy, Henry had alluded to "the letters from a crowned head of which we must not breathe a word." In the course of the Zola trial Henry had talked about some ultra-secret *dossier* that had been compiled by Sandherr, but neither Mercier nor de Boisdeffre knew anything about it.

Paléologue, who was also called, confirmed the words of Henry. Watinne, who in April 1898 had been instructed by Billot to go through the Dreyfus *dossier* again with Gonse, said that when he questioned Henry about the Imperial letter Henry merely shrugged his shoulders; and then when he asked him what this ultra-secret *dossier* was, Henry told him that it had to do with a letter that Sandherr had had from a friend of his in Alsace. When Watinne asked to see the letter, Henry pretended to hunt about for it, and then, after a while, declared it was nowhere to be found.

De Boisdeffre stated that he had never believed in the *bordereau annoté*, quite forgetting that he had told the Princess Mathilde that he could vouch for its authenticity. Gonse, Billot, Zurlinden, Roget, and Cuignet all gave evidence on the same lines. Lauth, Rollin, Mareschal, François, and Gribelin declared that the first time they had heard any mention of this document was at Rennes. Picquart affirmed that, when he was at the War Office, no reference had ever been made to such a *bordereau*.

From this evidence four conclusions emerged: (1) The document had never existed; but (2) a spurious *bordereau*, supposed to be annotated by the Emperor, must have been manufactured, probably by Lemer cier-Picard, at Henry's instigation; (3) one or more photographs of it must have been shown to some few people under a bond of secrecy, and then destroyed; (4) in this way the legend got about,

and Mercier had made use of it very cleverly at Rennes. What Captain Beauvais told his friends in confidence, and what had passed between Major Merle and Dr. Dumas, put that beyond all question.

After the first revision in 1899, those who insisted on Dreyfus remaining a traitor, whatever happened, became aware that the old stock proofs of the General Staff were falling to pieces, and therefore they invented a new legend. This was that Dreyfus had sold his country's secrets, not to Germany, but to Russia. The particular secrets which he was alleged to have betrayed were concerned with smokeless powder and mobilization. This legend, invented on the eve of the Rennes Court-Martial, was short-lived. The Russian Ambassador publicly denied it, and de Gallifet said it was too silly for words. Besides, everyone knew that the Czar and his Court, as well as all the other European Sovereigns, were convinced that Dreyfus was innocent.

Having finally swept away these two legends—the Imperially annotated *bordereau* and the treasonable commerce with Russia—the Court heard Picquart's evidence, and then, at his request, that of Weil, whom he had designated to the Judges as having been, if not Esterhazy's accomplice, at all events his informant. It was notorious that Weil, who was very well up in Army matters, had blabbed about them rather freely. Moreover, it was also known that, having come more than one unpleasant cropper on the Turf, he had been severely called over the coals by the Marquis de Morès and Drumont, and had never said a word in his own defence. That looked queer. Still, no proof was forthcoming to show that Picquart's suspicions were justified.

Joseph Reinach gave an account of the talks he had had, and the correspondence he had exchanged, with Ressmann and Tornielli, the Italian Ambassadors, as well as with von Munster and Schwartzkoppen. All alike told him they had never had anything to do with Dreyfus. He also recounted a story he had had from Paybaraud, Superintendent of the Police Investigation Department, from which it

appeared that the *bordereau*, intact in its envelope, had been appropriated by la Bastian in the porter's lodge at the German Embassy. Bastian gave it to Brucker, who gave it to Henry. Henry, pretending it was of no importance, began tearing it up. At this Brucker protested, and Henry, seeing it was no good trying to make away with the document, decided to stick it together again and show it to Sandherr.

The next, and last, thing to which the Criminal Court turned its attention was the technical side of the *bordereau*, concerning which they had asked for a report from the most competent military authorities, who gave it as their opinion that the untechnical language in which it was drawn up made it quite clear that the *bordereau* was not the work of an artilleryman; that the three memoranda enumerated in the *bordereau* and connected with artillery referred to three new inventions which had been tried out during the Châlons artillery manœuvres at which Esterhazy was present.

The preliminary proceedings having thus been brought to a close, the case was referred to the three combined Chambers on November 19, 1904. For reasons of health, several counsellors were compelled to decline the task of drawing up the report, which was finally shouldered by Clement Moras, while the *réquisitoire* and the *mémoire* were the work of Baudouin and Mornard respectively. By December 1905 their labours had been completed, but, owing to the intervention of the elections, the case did not come up for trial till some six months later.

On June 18th the three Chambers of the Court of Appeal met together in solemn session. All the members had been supplied with shorthand notes of the evidence given before the Criminal Court as well as with a copy of the speeches of Baudouin and Mornard.

Moras began reading his report on June 18th and did not finish until the 22nd. His arguments were directed towards securing a repeal of the Rennes verdict, and then bringing the case before another Court-Martial. His report constituted a minute and thorough analysis of the case.

Not a trace of emotion was observable in his clear, cold presentment of the facts. In marked contrast to this was the speech of the Attorney-General, which took up eight sittings, beginning on June 25th and ending on July 5th. Baudouin, who had had his doubts about the Dreyfus case as far back as 1894, had been rendered so indignant at the revelations he came across when studying the *dossier* that his speech was vibrant with passionate emotion. Alluding to Mercier, he said he knew where *he* ought to be, if it were not for the amnesty, and that was in a convict prison. Taking a different line from Moras, he appealed for an annulment of the sentence, without any subsequent re-trial.

These speeches, which were published from day to day in the public Press, produced a profound effect on opinion throughout the country. Among the officers most mercilessly pilloried by Baudouin there were a few who protested, such as Cuignet, du Paty, Zurlinden, Rollin, François, Mareschal. Gonse declared he had never said to Picquart, "If you keep your mouth shut, no one will know about it." "Gonse," retorted Picquart, "has so often prevaricated with the truth in this case, both in writing and speaking, that whatever he says now is of no importance." This meant a duel, and it was fought with pistols on July 9th. Gonse fired first, and missed. Picquart forbore to fire at all.

Lastly, Esterhazy himself sent two letters to Drumont. They appeared in the *Libre Parole*. The Major, as hard up as he could possibly be, now that the General Staff had finally washed their hands of him, was living under an assumed name in a boarding-house in a populous London suburb. His first letter was dated June 29th, and it ran like this: "Did I write the *bordereau*? Yes, of course. Everybody knows I did, and those who know it best are the barefaced liars, wherever they hail from—the Polytechnique, the Normale, or Charenton—who say that I didn't. I did what Sandherr told me, that's all." In his second letter he said definitely that he had taken the *bordereau* to the German Embassy himself one Saturday in September, when

Schwartzkoppen happened not to be there. Then he had gone away himself, into the country. Sandherr told him not to put any date on the document, as then they would be able to add whatever date they might think fit.

The only silent one was Mercier. And yet, before the new inquiry began, at a *Patrie Française* dinner on December 3, 1903, he had said, "When the time comes to speak, I will speak, ay, and to the point; that I promise you!" But he said nothing. Drumont, Rochefort, and others, too, reminded him of his promise. Being goaded on like this, he at last decided to write to Ballot-Beaupré. He said in his letter that as the official inquiry was over he couldn't say anything now to refute Baudouin, whose report was built up on "inexactitudes." He said that (1) to go into the question of Esterhazy's alleged misdeeds they would have had to do what he told them to do, that is, see if the same number of lines to the centimetre appeared on the *bordereau* as on the letters on tracing paper discovered in his possession; and that (2) to gauge the value of Bayle's report, it would be interesting to know how, and why, that document had suddenly turned up again, after it had disappeared and been given up for lost for several years; that (3) December 12, 1894, and not January 6, 1895, was the date he had assigned to the famous "historic night," when Peace and War had trembled in the balance. And that was all. About the *bordereau annoté*, not a word!

Mornard dealt faithfully with these three allegations. As for the first, Esterhazy had admitted the genuineness of the letters on transparent paper, just as he had avowed himself the author of the *bordereau*. They had had two expert examinations, one in 1898 and the other in 1899, and in both cases it was agreed that the papers were identical. Secondly, Bayle's report had been unearthed after a brief search by Captain Hellouin, among the archives of the 1st Bureau, and there were two witnesses to confirm the fact. Lastly, the date of the "historic night," as given by Mercier, had been belied by Casimir-Perier and Dupuy.

In view of this complete collapse, Drumont published an open letter to Mercier in the *Libre Parole*. "You haven't spoken," he said; "you've only made a show of speaking." Mornard's speech took up July 5th, 6th, and 7th. He pleaded for the quashing of the sentence and no new trial. He held that the results of the inquiry so clearly implicated Esterhazy and Henry that a criminal trial would have to arraign them both. Now one of them was dead; and the other had been finally acquitted. Both, therefore, in terms of article 445 of the Code, were beyond the reach of the law, immune from further molestation.

At length, the three Chambers united to consider their verdict. As the innocence of Dreyfus was now established beyond all doubt, the discussion centred round the question as to whether there should, or should not, be a further trial. The respective presidents of the three Chambers declared against it. The chief president, Ballot-Beaupré, concurred. A majority of the Court took the same view, which was endorsed by thirty-one votes to eighteen. As to Dreyfus's innocence, this was upheld by the unanimous verdict of the Court.

The public proceedings began at noon on July 12th. Amid a tense silence, and in the presence of an audience that seemed to realize that the hour through which they were now passing was unprecedented in the annals of human justice, Ballot-Beaupré read out the verdict which he had drawn up. He read quite simply and quietly, as though the verdict he was pronouncing was just the ordinary termination to some quite insignificant and everyday affair. And yet those few pages, setting forth all the various charges which had been piled up one upon another against Dreyfus, and thereafter the minute and relentless logic that had torn those charges to shreds—all this was a shining exemplar of masterly legal dialectic.

The reading lasted an hour. When he came to the final page, Ballot-Beaupré paused and stood for a few seconds in silence, as though to dissociate his final conclusion from the written words before him. Then, in tones still clear and

calm and grave, forcing himself by a supreme effort to repress the emotion which struggled for mastery, he brought his reading to a close :

"And whereas, in the last analysis, of all the charge brought against Dreyfus nothing now remains to be overthrown, and whereas the annulment of the previous verdict leaves nothing in the shape of crime or delinquency that can be urged against him,

And whereas, in virtue of the last paragraph of article 445 no fresh trial can be ordered,

"Therefore,
this Court declares null and void the verdict of the Court-Martial of Rennes, which, on September 9, 1899, sentenced Dreyfus to ten years' imprisonment and degradation, and declares that such sentence was erroneously and wrongfully pronounced."

Dreyfus having stated that he did not wish to avail himself of the pecuniary compensation which, by virtue of article 446, he was entitled to claim, the Court duly put this, his renunciation, on record. It then gave orders that its verdict should be posted up in Paris and in Rennes, and published in the *Journal officiel*, as well as in five other newspapers. It further authorized Dreyfus to publish it, at the Government's expense, in such fifty newspapers in Paris and in the provinces as he might select.

On the same day as that on which the verdict was delivered, Monis, a Senator, proposed the following resolution on behalf of the groups of the Left: "The Senate, desiring to record its admiration of the civic courage displayed by two of its most deeply lamented former members, Scheurer-Kestner and Trarieux, resolves that busts of those two great citizens shall be placed in the ante-chamber of the Hall of Session." The motion was carried by 181 to 29.

The same evening the Cabinet met at the Elysée to consider what compensation should be given to Dreyfus and Picquart. On a motion proposed by Etienne, now Minister for War, it was decided to pass a special Bill to invest Dreyfus

with the rank of Chef d'Escadron and with the Cross of the Legion of Honour. Picquart was to be promoted Brigadier-General.

Next day, the 13th, in virtue of a report drawn up by Messing, the proposals affecting Dreyfus were carried by 442 to 32, and the motion to reintegrate Picquart with the rank of Brigadier-General by 447 to 26.

The Chamber passed a resolution rendering homage to those who had striven to right the wrong, and branding with infamy the names of those whose misdeeds had been denounced in the verdict of the Court of Appeal. By 316 votes to 165 it was resolved that the ashes of Zola should be transferred to the Panthéon.

When the Bill for the rehabilitation of Dreyfus was brought forward in the Senate, Mercier asked leave to explain why he was voting as he did. Declaring that he had nothing to reproach himself with, he attacked the Court of Appeal, accusing it of irregularity in its procedure. Shouts of indignation broke forth at this, and many of the senators present reminded him of the evil he had wrought in 1894.

Unmoved by the clamour around him, Mercier went on, "The arguments adduced at the trial of 1899, and his conscience——" He got no farther. At that word "conscience," Delpech arose. Pointing to Mercier with arm outstretched, he cried:

"If we had it in mind to push our work of retribution farther still, there is a man who ought to go to prison in place of the honourable victim whose innocence, after such long and terrible sufferings, was yesterday proclaimed to the world. You, sir, are that man." The Left broke out in loud applause. Then Barthou had his say. He told Mercier that he was amazed that a man who had committed the monstrous crime for which he was responsible should endeavour to cast a slur on the Court of Appeal.

Mercier essayed to reply, but this time the uproar was so great that he could not make himself heard. The Bill for the reinstatement of Dreyfus was then passed by 182 votes to 30, and for that of Picquart by 184 to 26.

These resolutions having been duly carried, the Cabinet decided that the conferring of the Cross of the Legion of Honour upon Dreyfus should take place in one of the quadrangles of the École Militaire, and that Targe, who had been promoted major a year since, should stand at his side and receive the rosette of an officer of the Order. The ceremony took place on July 22nd at half-past one in the afternoon.

Detachments of Artillery and Cuirassiers, under the command of Colonel Gaillard-Bournazel, of the Cuirassiers, were drawn up round the four sides of the quadrangle. A few spectators had been privileged to occupy the windows of the rooms overlooking the scene. Among them was Madame Lucie Dreyfus, whose emotion was so great that she could not restrain her tears. The brothers of Dreyfus, and his children, were also there, together with General Picquart, Baudouin, Anatole France, and a number of journalists and photographers. General Gillain of the cavalry passed along in front of the troops, then took his place in the centre of the square and drew his sword. Colonel Gaillard-Bournazel called upon the names of the officers who were to receive the insignia of the Order. Dreyfus and Targe advanced and took their stand before the general.

The bands crashed out. Then came a moving silence. In clear, ringing tones General Gillain called out the names of the two officers. He decorated Targe, and then, advancing towards Dreyfus, he said :

"In the name of the President of the Republic, and in virtue of the powers conferred upon me, Major Dreyfus, I create you a Chevalier of the Legion of Honour." Thrice he touched Dreyfus on the shoulder with his sword, then he pinned the cross on his cloak and, embracing him, said, "You served, in days gone by, in my division; I rejoice to have been entrusted with the task that I have now fulfilled." Again the trumpets rang out and the drums rolled. "Vive Dreyfus! . . . Vive Picquart! . . . Vive la République! . . ." shouted the spectators.

